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The protection of aliens offers an international minimum standard of
treatment. The main interference risked by foreign investors is the expropriation of
their property. This may occur in two forms: as an outright taking or as measures
having an equivalent effect. Changes in international economics and politics have
placed the latter in the centre of legal debate. Indirect takings refer to those measures
that are not openly expropriatory, but result in the deprivation of the property of an
alien. Identifying the boundaries between them and non-compensable regulatory
measures is the chief problem in this area of international law. While the issue is left
unsolved by the conceptual analysis of indirect takings, two doctrines provide useful
guidelines on it. The first one has been identified as the sole-effect doctrine.
According to this position, the central factor in establishing whether an indirect
taking has occurred is the result of the host-state measures on the affected property.
The second position is the so-called police powers doctrine. Besides the effect on the
alien's property, this takes into account the purpose and the context of the respective
measures. The present thesis investigates which of these doctrines conform to
international law. For that purpose, it studies the protection of the property of aliens
in the law of nations, as developed in the different international fora where the issue
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That aliens should be protected is an old principle of the law of nations. Known
to the Romans since Cicero's time, it was only developed in the 19lh century as a
consequence of the evolution of world economy.1 This protective principle offers a
minimum standard of treatment to foreigners. It provides essentially for two things:
security of the person from injury or restraint, and the preservation of property from
political risk in the host-state.2 That is to say, the protection of property from
potential interferences based on ideological hostility towards foreign investment,
nationalism, and changes in industry patterns and domestic state policy
considerations. These interferences have generally adopted the form of the taking of
foreign property, whether as an outright deprivation or a major infringement with it.3
The articulation of a branch of international law aimed at reducing political risk is a
relatively recent development. Known as international investment law, it comprises
today an older branch of the law of nations -the international law of expropriation.
The latter is founded on three distinct, but closely related concepts: property, taking
and compensation.4
1 See F Dunn, 'International Law and Private Property Rights', (1928) 28 Colum. LR 166, at 171-3;
and J Herz, 'Expropriation of Foreign Property', (1941) 35 AJIL 243, at 244.
2
Dunn, supra note 1, at 176.
3
See P Comeaux and N Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Direct Investment under International Law.
Legal Aspects of Political Risk (1996), xvii; and M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign
Investment (2004), 75-87.
4 See R Dolzer, 'Indirect Expropriation ofAlien Property', (1986) 1/1 ICSID Rev. 41, at 41.
1
Higgins observes that the right to hold property reflects a social instinct. As a
consequence, it has a very long history.5 It is not uncommon to find a reference to
property in the sources of international law. A definition, however, is hardly ever
seen.6 According to Katzarov, a certain consensus among lawyers and scholars has
evolved over its content, comprising a positive and negative aspect.7 On its positive
side, property is an absolute right of disposal. In practice, it is only generally
unlimited. On its negative side, it is an exclusive right, conferring upon its holder the
power to forbid any other to perform an act of disposal. This notion of property is not
restricted to tangibles. Rights have been accepted as an integral part of the concept of
property in international law by tribunals and scholars.8 Not only the right to hold
property, but also its social function have been commonly recognised by
conservative and liberal authors, including Marxist ones. This notion, which can be
traced back to medieval times, is found today in virtually all nations.9 There is an
inherent tension in the co-existence of private property and its social function, as the
requirements of society sometimes come into conflict with individual property rights.
5 R Higgins, 'The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law',
(1982) 176/III RdC 259, at 273.
6See ibid., 269.
7
See K Katzarov, The Theory of Nationalisation (1964), as referred to in Higgins, supra note 5, at
270.
8 On the broad notion of property in the international law of expropriation, see, e.g., Herz, supra note
1, at 244-5; Higgins, supra note 5, at 271; M Pellonpaa and M Fitzmaurice, 'Taking of Property in the
Practice of the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal', (1988) 19 Neth. YIL 53, at 58; Comeaux and
Kinsella, supra note 3, at 1-2; G Sacerdoti, 'Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on
Investment Protection', (1997) 269 RdC 251, at 381; H Sedigh, 'What Level of Host State
Interference Amounts to a Taking under Contemporary International Law', (2001) 2/II JWIT 631, at
647; T Waelde and A Kolo, 'Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 'Regulatory
Taking' in International Law', (2001) 50/IV ICLQ 811, at 835; Y Dinstein, 'Deprivation of Property
of Foreigners under International Law', in N Ando et al (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda
(2002), 856; G Sampliner, 'Arbitration of Expropriation Cases under U.S. Investment Treaties - A
Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn't Bark?', (2003) 18/1 ICSID Rev. 1, at 14; Y Fortier and S
Drymer, 'Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or
Caveat Investor", (2004) 19/11 ICSID Rev. 293, note 9 at 296; and J Paulsson and Z Douglas, 'Indirect
Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitrations', in N Horn (ed), Arbitrating Foreign Investment
Disputes. Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004), 152-3.
9
See Higgins, supra note 5, at 274-5.
See, also, F Mann, 'Outlines of a History of Expropriation', (1959) 75 LQR 188, at 189.
2
And this tension between personal and community interests is at the core of the
notion of takings.
Expropriation was, and still is, the main interference risked by an alien
investing abroad. There is no unanimously agreed-upon definition of it, however.
The term is generally equated to the taking of property by the state.10 In other words,
its actual or effective deprivation, either by ousting the owner and claiming the title,
or by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility." Exceptionally, taking
and expropriation have been distinguished in international case-law. In the ELSI
case, for instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to interpret the terms
taking and espropriati, used in the English and Italian versions -respectively- of a
friendship, commerce and navigation treaty (FCN) concluded between the US and
Italy. In that opportunity, the ICJ considered the former to be "wider and looser" than
the latter.12 Some authors have also perceived taking and expropriation to be
different. For example, Paulsson and Douglas distinguish them on their effects.
While a taking is non-compensable, they argue, an expropriation requires
compensation.13
Expropriations have received other names too. In the 1970s, Weston called
them -rather unsuccessfully- wealth deprivations, in an attempt to introduce a
10
See, e.g., Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 55; A Mouri, The International Law of
Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (1994), 66; A Avanessian,
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in Action (1993), 29; Comeaux and Kinselia, supra note 3, at 3; R
Jennings and A Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (1996), note 9 at 916; F. Beveridge, The
Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under International Law (2000), at 13; C Brower and J
Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1998), note 1718 at 369; J Dugard, International
Law. A South African Perspective (2000), 225; and D Wallace, 'Case Study under NAFTA: Lessons
for the Wise?', in N Horn (ed), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes. Procedural and Substantive
Legal Aspects (2004), 255.
" See B Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (1999), 453 & 1467.
12 Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A. (ELSI) (US v. Italy), International Court of Justice, Judgment, 20 July
1989, (1989)28 ILM1138, para. 113.
13 See Paulsson and Douglas, supra note 8, at 148-50.
3
"normatively neutral statement" that would replace wealth for "the more popular
'property'".14 The other notions of expropriation normally used in doctrine, and
sometimes in treaties and judicial decisions, refer to specific forms of takings.
Nationalisations are the expropriation of one or more major industries or resources
within a general programme of social and economic reform.15 Dolzer and Stevens
call the transfer of property, to nationals of the host state, indigenisation.16
Requisition refers to the power of an occupant state to use the resources of the
occupied territory and the services of the persons subject to the occupation regime
for the maintenance of its military forces, in return for compensation.17 Takings or
expropriation, however, should not be confused with sequestration, defined in
comparative law as the action ordered by national authorities under its domestic law,
by which the state assumes temporary control over an object of private property
belonging to someone subject to its jurisdiction, without transfer of title and without
the payment of compensation.18 An example of this form ofmeasure is the seizure of
property as a result of a sanction imposed by the state in the exercise of its police-
powers. In all, there is an extensive literature on the terminology and classification of
expropriations, a topic that remains not fully clear, consistent or established because
it originates in domestic law and practice, and is not easily translated to the
international level.19
International law traditionally recognises the state's right to expropriate foreign
property, under certain conditions. The state measure resulting in a deprivation will
14
See B Weston, "Constructive Takings' under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem
of'Creeping Expropriation", (1975) 16/1 Virginia LR 103, at 112-3.
15 See I Brownlie, Principles ofPublic International Law (2003), 512-5.
16 R Dolzer and M Stevens Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995), 98.
17 R Dolzer, 'Requisitions', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV, at 205.
18 R Dolzer, 'Sequestration', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV, at 383.
19
UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (2004), Vol. I, at 236.
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be considered lawful under international norms if it is for a public purpose, of a non¬
discriminatory nature and followed by the payment of compensation. More recently,
treaty and international case-law have added a fourth requirement: due process of
law in the execution of the respective measure.20 If the national authorities fail to
comply with any of these requirements, the taking would constitute a confiscation.21
The state would incur in international responsibility and would be liable for
breaching the minimum standard governing the treatment of aliens. These norms
only come into play where the property of foreigners is involved. In other words,
international law does not generally provide a remedy to domestic claimants for the
expropriation of their property by their own authorities.22 These apparently simple
rules have lacked, however, clarity not only at the moment of establishing the time,
form and amount of compensation that should be paid in case of a lawful or even an
unlawful expropriation, but also at the moment of determining whether compensation
is due at all.
According to the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law
Commission (ILC), a wrongful act entails two obligations for the responsible state
under general international law: cessation and reparation.23 The latter was expressly
recognised in 1928 by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in an
often quoted passage of the Chorzow Factory case:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act -a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals- is that reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all
the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
20 See Chapter 5 infra.
21
Brownlie, supra note 15, at 509.
22 Comeaux and Kinsella, supra note 3, at 5.
See Chapters 3 and 5 infra.
23 See Arts. 30 and 31 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001. Available at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
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probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or,
if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; the award if need be, of damages for loss sustained
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it -such are
the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for
an act contrary to international law.24
In conformity with Article 34 of the ILC Articles, full reparation for the injury
caused by an internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution,
compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.25 Restitution is the re-
establishment of the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed,
when it is materially possible and the burden derived from it is proportional to the
benefit to be obtained.26 It might involve the restitution of physical assets or sums of
money. It might also involve the payment of a replacement value for a damaged
asset, or the payment of the costs for its repair, as long as the asset is replaceable and
marketable in a used condition.27 Restitution should normally prevail over
compensation in international law.28 This means that the obligation to compensate
will come into play only when the injury is not made good by restitution, covering
9Q • •
any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits. In many cases it is
simply not possible to restore the situation that existed before the commission of the
wrongful act. For this reason, states and other subjects of international law
24 See Factory at Chorzow (Germany v Poland), PCIJ, Judgment, 13 September 1928, (1928) PC1J
Rep. Series A No 17, at 47.
See, also, J Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility.
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2005), 211.
25 See Art. 34 of the ILC Articles.
26 See Art. 35 of the ILC Articles.
27 I Marboe, 'Compensation and Damages in International Law. The Limits of the 'Fair Market
Value", (2006) IN JWIT121, at 744-5.
28 The primacy of restitution can be traced back to the Chorzow Factory case. Arts. 35 and 36 of the
ILC Articles refer to it too.
See Crawford, supra note 24, at 213-4, and Marboe, supra note 27, at 744.
29 See Art. 36 of the ILC Articles.
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commonly seek compensation, which will normally consist of a monetary payment.30
Its determination is, therefore, an essential aspect of international law.
Compensation is also one of the requirements of a lawful taking. In doctrine,
this term is distinguished from damages, which refers to the consequence of a breach
of an international obligation. No such obligation is violated when a state lawfully
expropriates foreign property.31 The ILC made no distinction between the two
notions in its Articles, largely because it relied on the case-law of the PCIJ and the
ICJ, and neither of these tribunals distinguishes them carefully in their judicial
decisions.32 The issue is further confounded by the fact that international case-law
recognises the same financial effect for both lawful and unlawful expropriations, in
general. This situation has been exceptionally -and properly- criticised by tribunals,
judges and authors.33 The practical difference between the two types of takings is
usually found elsewhere; in the obligation of restitution, which would only originate
from the commission of a wrongful act -i.e. of an unlawful expropriation. However,
as Marboe points out:
Claimants in their written and oral submissions sometimes rely on the standard of
compensation for a lawful expropriation, even if they are of the opinion that the
expropriation was unlawful. This can be explained by the fact that restitution is often
not regarded as the best or the most desirable remedy. Claimants and tribunals thus
frequently turn immediately to the secondary remedy, the 'compensation'.
Furthermore, the choice of this standard perhaps is considered to be helpful for the
acceptability of their claim by the court or tribunal and by the respondent State
because it does not 'punish' the State for having acted illegally.34
30 See Crawford, supra note 24, at 218-9.
31
Marboe, supra note 27, at 725-6.
32
Ibid., note 3 at 724 & note 14 at 726.
33 See ibid., 726-8.
See, also, D Bowett, 'State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for
Termination or Breach', (1988) 59 BYIL 49, at 61; and G Sacerdoti, 'The Admission and Treatment of
Foreign Investment under Recent Bilateral and Regional Treaties', (2000) I/I JWIT 105, at 123.
34
Marboe, supra note 27, at 728.
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The problem of compensation was highly debated by capital-importing and
capital-exporting states after the emergence of the notion of nationalisation in the
first half of the 20th century. Particularly, the question of the amount of compensation
required for an expropriation to be considered lawful35. This issue has been largely
settled by treaty practice in the last decades.36 Ironically, the same changes in
international economy and politics that brought the clarification of the problem of
compensation have highlighted a long-present and, until not so long, dormant issue
in the international law of expropriation: that of indirect takings.
Expropriations may occur as an outright taking or as measures having an
equivalent effect. Normally referred to as direct expropriation, the former may come
as a nationalisation or an expropriation, depending on whether the actual taking is of
a general kind or is property or enterprise specific.37 Historically, outright takings
• 38
were the first and most common form of expropriation, but are nowadays rare.
Only occasionally, modern investment treaty cases relate to direct takings.39 It is
generally easy to establish when a direct expropriation has occurred, for they are
normally adopted through legislative or administrative measures. If it did occur,
compensation is due, no matter what the cause of the taking was.40 Indirect
expropriation refers to those measures that falling short of a direct taking, amount in
their effects to one, thus requiring compensation. This type of taking, the prevalent
35 U Kriebaum, 'Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State', (2007) 8/V
JWITl\l,dXl\l.
36 See Chapter 2 infra.
37
UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 235.
Both involve the physical taking of property.
Ibid., at 236.
38 See UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 236 & 240.
39
See, e.g., Companla del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic ofCosta Rica, ICSID case No.
ARB/96/1, Award, 17 February 2000, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
40
Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 717.
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form today, has received many different names and definitions in international law.
The terms de facto, disguised, creeping, consequential, or constructive expropriation,
as well as regulatory takings, stress certain aspects of indirect expropriations in their
definitions. The development of these notions has been progressive, which explains
why some of them relate to behaviour that would not have provided a sound legal
basis for an expropriation claim under a FCN, but would do so under a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT).41
Contrary to a de jure or formal taking, a de facto or informal one involves no
express legislative or administrative measure announcing the expropriation.
However, the benefit of the property for the owner is effectively neutralised by the
correspondent governmental act.42 The name disguised expropriation indicates that it
is not visibly recognisable as a taking.43 The notion of creeping expropriation
emphasises the slow and incremental encroachment of the property rights of the alien
by a group of measures that only retrospectively will become evident as a taking.44
Creeping expropriations are comprised of a number of elements, none of which can
separately constitute the international wrong.45 Modem investment treaty case-law
has defined them as:
41 M Reisman and R Sloane, 'Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation', (2003)
74 BYIL 115, at 119.
See Chapter 5 infra.
42
See, e.g., Mouri, supra note 10, at 70.
43
Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 350.
See Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1CJ, Judgment, 5 February 1970, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Fitzmaurice, (1971) 3 ICJ Rep.
44
Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 124; and Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 350.
45 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, Award, 2 June
2000, Dissenting Opinion of Keith Highet, at para. 17, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WasteMgmt-Jurisdiction-dissent.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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a form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality in the sense that
it encapsulates the situation whereby a series of acts attributable to the State over a
period of time culminate in the expropriatory taking of such property.46
Consequential expropriations refer, according to Reisman and Sloane, to the
failure of the host state to create, maintain, and properly manage the legal,
administrative, and regulatory normative framework established in an investment
treaty.47 A constructive expropriation points out to the fact that effects similar to a
taking are produced, though externally the situation remains unchanged.48 Lately,
regulatory takings have been added to the lexicon of international law to designate
those measures that relate to the exercise of the host-state's powers to govern the
social and economical activity within its boundaries. This concept derives from the
doctrine on the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, and although it has not yet
been formally used in treaties, it can be recognised in modern forms of expropriation
described as tantamount or equivalent to the latter.49 All these forms of indirect
expropriation are subsumed in its elusive definition: state measures that are not
openly expropriatory, but result in the deprivation of the property of an alien.50
The conceptual analysis of indirect takings only illustrates how they may
appear in practice, but leaves its main question unanswered: at what point does a
regulatory measure become compensable? Or, more precisely, which is the element
or elements that determine the existence of an expropriation under international law?
The only possible approach to this problem is case-by-case. Such an approach has
46
Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, at
para. 20.22, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ea/documents/GenerationUkraine_000.pdf> (last visited
31 March, 2008).
47 Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 128-9.
48
Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 350.
49
Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8, note 46 at 821; and Z AlQurashi, 'Indirect Expropriation in the
Field of Petroleum', (2004) 5/V1 JWIT&91, at 901.
50 See A Newcombe, 'The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law', (2005) 20/1
ICSID Rev. 1, at 10.
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been widely adopted in doctrine and expressly recognised in recent treaties.51 It is
obviously not a methodology that is specific to the issue of indirect expropriation,
but one that will be used in most instances in which an adjudicator applies legal
standards to a particular set of facts.52 As Paulsson and Douglas point out:
[t]he only real guidance with respect to the threshold of interference for state
measures affecting investments is the product of inductive generalizations from the
findings of international tribunals and domestic courts as to the factual
53
circumstances that give rise to a [...] taking.
Decision-makers in international law normally refer to the statements of other
tribunals. According to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, judicial decisions are
subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law. Though not a proper
source of international law, they will be generally treated as authoritative statements
by other decision-makers. Judicial decisions will aid them settling a dispute in two
situations: when there is no applicable treaty or clear interpretation of an existing
one, and when it is not easy to ascertain the existence or meaning of an international
custom or general principle of law.54
51 G Christie, 'What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?', (1962) BYIL 307, at
308; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third. The Foreign Relations Law ofthe United
States (1987), § 712, Reporter's Note 6, at 211; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 100; AlQurashi,
supra note 49, at 905; Paulsson and Douglas, supra note 8, at 146; B Kunoy, 'Developments in
Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration', (2005) 6/III JWIT 467, at 467
& 473; Newcombe, supra note 50, at 6; and M Gutbrod and S Hindelang, 'Externalization of
Effective Legal Protection against Indirect Expropriation. Can the Legal Order of Developing
Countries Live up to the Standards Required by International Investment Agreements? A
Disenchanting Comparative Analysis', (2006) 7/1 JWIT59, at 63.
See, also, e.g., Art. Annex B of the 2004 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment between Uruguay and USA, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008); or
Annex B.13 (1) of the 2006 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between
Canada and Peru, available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canadajDeru.pdf>
(last visited 31 March, 2008).
52 Fortier and Drymer, supra note 8, at 314.
53 Paulsson and Douglas, supra note 8, at 146.
54 See A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2006), 293-300.
See, also, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 56; Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at
642-3; and Sornarajah, supra note 3, note 6 at 317 & 351.
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The PCIJ and the ICJ have seldom referred to indirect expropriation in their
judgments.55 The case-law on this issue derives mainly from the ever-growing
number of arbitral awards in investor-to-state disputes based on BITs or investment
chapters of economic integration agreements (EIAs).56 Outside international
investment law, the protection of property from deprivation has been normally
addressed by regional human-rights bodies too, particularly in Europe.57 Important
judicial decisions for the international law of expropriation also emerge from ad hoc
dispute-settlement institutions, most notably the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
(Iran-US CT).58 The case-law of domestic courts in the US is highly instructive as
well, and should not be overlooked in any study on the law of indirect
expropriation.59
Two doctrines provide guidelines on the threshold problem, i.e. that of defining
the boundaries between non-compensable regulatory measures and indirect takings.60
The first one has been identified as the sole-effect doctrine. According to this
position, the central factor for establishing whether an indirect taking has occurred is
the result of the governmental measures on the affected property. The purpose of
these measures is not essential to this determination, nor is the fact that the actual
title of the asset remains with the owner. This view goes back to the 1922 Norwegian
55 See Chapter 7 infra.
56 See Chapters 5 and 6 infra.
57 See Chapter 3 infra.
58 See Chapter 4 infra.
59 See Chapter 6 infra.
60
See, e.g., M Brunetti, 'Indirect Expropriation in International Law', (2003) 5/III FORUM 150, at
151; R Dolzer, 'Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?', (2003) 11 NYU EU64, at 79-80;
R Dolzer and F Bloch, 'Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?', (2003) 5/III FORUM 155,
at 158; Fortier and Drymer, supra note 8, at 300; V Heiskanen, 'The Contribution of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation', (2003) 5/III
FORUM 176, at 176-8; A Weiner, 'Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of
"Legitimate" Regulatory Purposes', (2003) 5/III FORUM 166, at 166; Kunoy, supra note 51, at 471;
Newcombe, supra note 50, at 5-6, 9-10, 22, & 25-9; Gutbrod and Plindelang, supra note 51, at 63-6; V
Heiskanen, 'The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation in Light of the Practice of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal', (2007) 8/IIJWIT215, at 217; and U Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 724-9.
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Shipowners claim and the 1928 Chorzow Factory case.61 The sole-effect approach
has received the implied support of many scholars.62 Its constitutive elements are
already found in the concept of indirect taking given by Christie in the 1960s:
[an] interference with an alien's property [that] amount[s] to expropriation even
when no explicit attempt is made to affect the legal title to the property, and even
though the respondent State may specifically disclaim any such intention.63
The second position is the so-called police powers doctrine. Besides the effect
on the alien's property, it takes into account the purpose and context of the respective
measures when establishing whether the regulatory action of the state amounts to an
indirect expropriation. This doctrine maintains that non-discriminatory measures
adopted for a legitimate public purpose are necessarily lawful under international
norms, and do not give rise to compensation.64 The police-powers solution can be
traced back to the 1934 Oscar Chinn case.65 It has been recently endorsed by last-
generation US BITs and free trade agreements (FTAs).
Both positions offer useful guidance to any decision-maker addressing the
threshold problem. However, choosing one doctrine or the other is not indifferent for
the chief actors of international investment law. Dolzer and Stevens explain that:
to the investor, the line of demarcation between measures for which no
compensation is due and actions qualifying as indirect expropriations may well make
61 See Christie, supra note 51, at 311; Higgins, supra note 5, at 323; Sedigh, supra note 8, at 647; and
Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 119-20.
For an early exposition of the sole-effect position, see Herz, supra note 1, at 248 & 253.
62
See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 5, at 331; Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8, at 824-5, 827, & 846;
Dinstein, supra note 8, at 869; F Orrego Vicuna, 'Carlos Calvo, Honorary NAFTA Citizen', (2002) 11
NYU ELJ 19, at 27; B Appleton, 'Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective', (2003)11
NYU EU 35, at 37; I Madalena, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Protection of the Environment:
the Border between National Environmental Regulation and Expropriation', (2003) 12/111 Eur. ELR
70, at 70; Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 130 & 141; A Redfern and M Hunter, Law and
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2004), 586-7, & 588-9; Paulsson and Douglas,
supra note 8, at 158; Kunoy, supra note 51, at 468 & 474; and Gutbrod and Hindelang, supra note 51,
at 66.
63
Christie, supra note 51, at 309.
64 Heiskanen (2003), supra note 60, at 177.
65 See Dolzer and Bloch, supra note 60, at 159.
An embryonic version of this view can be found in Dunn, supra note 1, at 180.
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the difference between the burden to operate (or abandon) a non-profitable enterprise
and the right to receive full compensation (either from the host State or under an
insurance contract). For the host State, the definition determines the scope of the
State's power to enact legislation that regulates the rights and obligations of owners
in instances where compensation may fall due.66
The sole-effect position clearly stresses the interests of the foreign investors; its
counterpart, those of the host-state.67 The present work investigates which of these
two doctrines conform to international law -particularly, to its rules on the protection
of aliens, and the international minimum standard of treatment on which they are
based. For this purpose, six chapters -excluding the introduction and conclusion-
study the international law of expropriation: from the early protection of aliens in the
law of nations, to the debate on compensation for takings, and beyond. They focus on
the sophisticated solutions on indirect takings adopted in the different fora of
contemporary international law in which property and its deprivation have been
addressed.
Chapter two outlines the evolution of the law of expropriation in the 19th, 20th
and 21st centuries. A forum-based analysis of indirect takings follows this
introductory part. Interferences with property under international human rights law
are studied in chapter three. It traces the difficulties in the incorporation of property
as a human right in multilateral instruments and its progressive recognition in the
regional systems of Europe, the Americas and Africa. This chapter is centred,
however, focuses on the development of the protection of property by the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights. The case-law on expropriation of the Iran-
US CT is analysed in chapter four, which deals with its definition of property and
66 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 99-100.
67
See Waelde and (Colo, supra note 8, at 822-3.
14
expropriation; other measures affecting property rights; the contours of indirect
takings; and its conditions of legality and their consequence.
Foreign investment and its taking, as regulated in bilateral treaties and
construed in international arbitration, are examined in chapter five. The conventional
notions of investment and expropriation are seen through the eyes of their drafters
and interpreters. International investment law, however, does not only derive from
bilateral agreements. Chapter six studies the multilateral treaties that deal with
property and its expropriation, as well as the failed attempts to regulate them and
relevant soft-law instruments on the topic. Chapter seven offers a legal analysis of
the sole-effect/police-powers controversy. It explains the rationale behind the rules
on expropriation in international law, and looks at the latest shift in the debate over
the protection of aliens. This last part of the work gives an interpretation on the
concept of fair and equitable treatment, and traces its main elements in international
investment arbitrations. The interaction between this protection and that against
indirect takings is also addressed in this chapter.
The present thesis deals with indirect takings, but is ultimately about the
property of aliens in the law of nations. It attempts to answer the threshold question
from the standpoint of the minimum standard on which its protection is based; a
standard that lies at the heart of the international law on expropriation, and
international investment law in general.
15
2
FROM COMPENSATION TO INDIRECT TAKINGS
Historical and ideological differences between capital-exporting and capital-
importing states explain the long debate on the payment of compensation for
expropriation in the law of nations. According to developed states, an international
minimum standard stressing the need for a prompt, adequate and effective
compensation is required in case of taking of foreign property. Under this standard,
the owner should receive the full value of his lost investment. Against it, developing
and communist states, as well as those countries that gained their independence from
colonial rule in the aftermath of the Second World War, proposed a national
standard. Articulated during the process of nationalisation of foreign property, it was
later developed by the UN General Assembly resolutions that asserted the principle
of permanent sovereignty of the state over its natural resources and the concept of
new international economic order (NIEO). This new alternative standard required an
adequate or appropriate compensation that would consider all the relevant
circumstances surrounding each particular taking. The determination of this
compensation should be left to the expropriating state, in conformity with its
municipal law, and would range from the full value of the taken property to none,
depending on each particular case.
While these two views on the compensation for the taking of aliens' property
collided at the UN, significant changes in international economy and politics
gradually moulded state policies, legislation, and international practice on foreign
16
investment. The collapse of communism and the progressive liberalisation of
national and international economy led erstwhile statist-orientated countries to desire
it. They enacted, for this purpose, investment codes, and concluded international
agreements that protect foreign investors in the traditional terms advanced by capital-
exporting states. Both the national and international treatment standards were
included in these treaties. This meant the defeat of the exclusive standard of national
treatment put forward by second and third world countries. They also discarded their
position on compensation in these treaties, part of which had achieved international
consensus at the UN in 1962. This situation and the increased governmental
regulation in areas formerly ran by the state, like the industrial exploitation of natural
resources, or of current public concern, like the protection of the environment, have
modified the nature of the international legal debate. The always relevant problem of
compensation has given way to that of indirect takings, as the most controversial
issue in the law of expropriation today.
The present chapter deals with the classical international norms on takings
and their challenges. These include the 19th century Calvo doctrine and clause; the
1917 Russian revolution; the Mexican constitution of the same year; the
• th •
nationalisations of the second half of the 20 century and their lump-sum
agreements. They also include the diplomatic controversy on the permanent
sovereignty over natural resources and the NIEO that took place at the UN in the
1960s and 1970s. An introduction to the current doctrinal debate in the international
law of expropriation completes this brief historical survey on the protection against
takings.
17
2.1. Calvo doctrine and nationalisations
Prior to the Second World War, imperial-powers provided the necessary
degree of legal and administrative certainty to those investing in their colonial
territories through their domestic laws and institutions.68 For those investing in non-
colonial territories, mainly independent Latin American countries, the US and the
imperial-powers developed an absolute international standard of treatment.69
According to it, aliens should be granted a minimum degree of protection, regardless
of how the nationals of the host-state country were treated by their own authorities.
Against this principle, Latin American states advanced the relative standard of
national treatment. In conformity with it, aliens should not be treated differently from
the nationals of the country that hosted them.70 The classical norms on the
responsibility of states derive from this dispute, which explains why there was
normally no distinction in the past between the rules of state responsibility and the
substantive rules of treatment of aliens in the writings of scholars and the practice of
states. Today, it is generally acknowledged that these two types of norms refer to
different, but related, areas of international law.71
By the end of the 20th century, the so-called international minimum standard
had prevailed.72 Non-compliance with it by the host government makes it now liable
68 On this period, see, in general, Sornarajah, 'Power and Justice in International Law', (1997) 1
SJICL 28, at 54-5; and Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 18-20.
69 Vattel had already advocated this principle in the 18th century.
Sornarajah, supra note 3, note 34 at 19.
70 This principle can be traced back to the works of Vitoria in the 16th century.
Ibid., 18-9.
71 See A Cassese, International Law (2005), 243-4.
72
See R Higgins, Problems & Process. International Law and How We Use It (1994), 159; P
Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (1997), 256; and Cassese, supra
note 71, at 121.
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under the international law of state responsibility. The authorities infringing an
international obligation are responsible for that breach and have to repair it. The
government of the injured foreigner is entitled to ask for reparation through
diplomatic means.73 It can resort to self-help, in the form of non-forcible action, so as
to constrain the other state to correct the wrong, or even punish it for the violation of
the international norm. Such action might take the form of economic sanctions, or the
suspension or termination of a treaty, among other possibilities. Forcible measures
involving armed reprisals and war were also an option in classical international
law.74 Not anymore.
Also known as international standard of justice, the principle advanced by the
US and Western European states was first described by the US-Mexican General
Claims Commission in the 1926 Neer case:
[...] the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency,
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.75
In its early formulations, this international standard included certain
protections: that against denial of justice; indecent treatment if imprisoned; disorders,
violence and deportation in abusive ways; and expropriation.76 The latter did not
mean that the host-state had no right to take the property of aliens. It meant that the
host-state could only take his property if the respective measure was lawful, i.e. if it
73 See Malanczuk, supra note 72, at 256-7.
Classical international law refers to the body of rules that existed before the Second World War.
Those created in the ensuing years constitute contemporary international law.
See J Pastor Ridruejo, Curso de Derecho Internationaly Organizaciones Internationales (2000), 59-
63.
74
See, e.g., the 1902 dispute between Venezuela, on one side, and Great Britain, Germany and Italy,
on the other, at note 85 infra.
75 US-Mexican General Claims Commission, (1926) 4 RIAA 60, or (1927) AJIL 555.
76
D Vagts, 'Minimum Standard', in R Berhardt (ed.), EPIL (1997), Vol. Ill, at 408.
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was adopted following three requirements: for public purposes, without
discrimination, and accompanied by compensation.77
2.1.1. Against the international standard
The institution of diplomatic protection has its origins in the relations between
Latin America and the US. In other parts of the world, like Africa and Asia, the
system of extraterritorial jurisdiction had been employed to protect the rights of
aliens. For instance, nationals of some European countries in the Ottoman empire
benefited from so-called capitulations, by which the Sultan allowed them to be
subject to the law of their nationality, and not to Ottoman law.78 But it was not only
diplomatic protection that developed from the relations of Latin American states and
the US -later joined by Western European countries. So did its negation.79 The initial
assault on the 19th century international protection of aliens came from Argentina,
and took the name of Calvo doctrine. It proposed the standard of national treatment,
• • • 80derived from the principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality of states.
This doctrine was an application of the principle of non-discrimination, both as a
77 See R Dolzer, 'New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property', (1981) 75/111 AJIL
553, at 557-8; P Norton, 'A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the
International Law of Expropriation', (1991) 85 AJIL 474, at 475-6; and A Cassese, International Lcrw
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minimum and maximum standard of treatment.81 Calvo did not consider the content
of the international standard to be unacceptable. He only claimed that both nationals
and non-nationals of the host-country should be protected by the domestic law of the
latter. As a consequence, disputes arising from its application should be settled by
the courts of this state, under its municipal norms.82
The Calvo doctrine originated in the negative perception held in Latin America
towards US foreign investment. Sornarajah explains that in this region:
foreign investment and the claims relating to the international law that protected it
were perceived as instruments through which the United States was able to maintain
its economic dominance in the region. [...] The idea that there were supranational
norms which permitted the protection of the foreign investor was anathema to the
Latin American jurists who argued that only protection that existed for foreign
83
investment was to be found in the domestic legal systems of the host state.
Not surprisingly, the US itself had embraced this position when it was a
recipient of investment from Europe. Its authorities only changed their mind when
84 •
the US became an exporter of capital into Latin America. European countries
investing in the region also adopted the international minimum standard. In its name,
capital-exporting states abusively exercised their right of diplomatic protection in
Latin America during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The most famous example
of abuse was the naval blockade of the Venezuelan coast by Germany, Italy and the
United Kingdom in 1902, who demanded reparation for Venezuela's sovereign-debt
81 See F Francioni, 'Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderline between
Law and Equity', (1975) 24/11ICLQ 255, at 269.
82 See N Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Balancing Rights and Duties (1997), 178.
See, also, R Bishop, J Crawford and M Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes. Cases, Materials and
Commentary (2005), 3; and J Paulsson, Denial ofJustice in International Law (2005), 20-1.
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default and damages for their nationals.85 Calvo's theory was a direct reaction to this
type of situations.86
As a corollary to his doctrine, Latin American countries inserted a clause in
those concession contracts concluded with foreigners, by which the alien waived the
right of diplomatic protection.87 Known as the Calvo clause, it meant that a foreign
investor would be in the same position as a local one, both subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the host state's courts at the moment of determining their rights and
obligations.88 Article 9 paragraph 2 of the 1934 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States illustrates the doctrine, when it stated that "[njationals
and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities
and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the
nationals".89 Examples of the Calvo clause also include Article 21 of the 1892 Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Colombia and Italy, and Article 7
of the 1948 American Treaty of Pacific Settlements (Pact of Bogota). The Colombia-
Italy FCN provided that:
Both Contracting Parties wish to avoid disputes which could affect their friendly
relationship and agree that in connection with disputes involving private parties
arising out of criminal, civil or administrative matters, their diplomatic agents will
abstain from intervention, save in case of denial of justice or extraordinary
unlawful delay in the administration ofjustice. 90
The Pact of Bogota says:
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The High Contracting Parties bind themselves not to make diplomatic
representations in order to protect their nationals, or to refer a controversy to a
court of international jurisdiction for that purpose, when the said nationals have had
available the means to place their case before competent domestic courts of the
91
respective State.
Although the debate over the Calvo clause developed almost exclusively in the
• • .... 99
Americas, it became one of the most controversial issues in international law.
Overall, this doctrine has not been generally well received in the international foran
The PCIJ recognised diplomatic protection as a right of the state, derived from
international law, in the Mavrommatis case.94 Critics of the Calvo clause have
referred to this judgment to conclude that diplomatic protection cannot be renounced
by nationals. Several claims commissions and courts have dealt with the validity of
the clause. The most famous of these cases is North American Dredging Company of
Texas, settled by the US-Mexican General Claims Commission in 1926.95 In this
landmark case, the tribunal adopted the rule known as limited validity of the Calvo
clause, and thus avoided having to choose between upholding it altogether or
denying its efficacy completely. According to this rule, there is no generally accepted
norm of international law forbidding an individual to relinquish, to any extent and
under any circumstances or conditions, the protection of his government. Although
the individual would be legally bound by the clause to which he contractually agreed,
the state of his nationality would not be bound by an agreement to which it was not a
91 Available in Spanish at <http://www.oas.org/iuridico/spanish/tratados/a-42.html> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
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party. In other words, his government would not be deprived from exercising its right
of diplomatic protection. The Calvo clause would therefore only insist on the
requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies before such an exercise. In practice,
this solution downgraded the clause to an altogether superfluous provision, repeating
a condition already included in the general rules of admissibility of diplomatic
protection.96 Other judicial decisions followed this view.
In 2006, the ILC expressly decided "to leave open the question whether the
State exercising diplomatic protection does so in its own right or that of its national -
or both".97 The ILC's Articles on Diplomatic Protection acknowledged that the
Calvo clause was viewed as a regional custom in Latin America and "formed part of
the national identity of many States".98 Nevertheless, it failed to recognise that
several Latin American countries have enacted national legislation to promote the
flow of investment into their economies, and that, as Schrijver points out:
[t]he changing attitude of a number of Latin American countries towards foreign
investment is also reflected in their increasing participation in multilateral
investment instruments such as ICSID and MIGA as well as in the increasing
99
number of bilateral investment treaties they have concluded in recent years.
The ILC did, however, recognise that capital-exporting states have vigorously
disputed the validity of this clause. Quoting North American Dredging Company of
Texas, the ILC finally endorsed the limited validity of the Calvo clause, as put
forward in that case, expressly stating that this clause:
is difficult to reconcile with international law if it is to be interpreted as a complete
waiver of recourse to international protection in respect of an action by the host State
constituting an internationally wrongful act (such as denial of justice) or where the
96 See Cassese, supra note 77, at 50.
See, also, Graham, supra note 93, at 296; and Schrijver, supra note 82, at 179-80.
97
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injury to the alien was of direct concern to the State of nationality of the alien. The
objection to the validity of the 'Calvo clause' in respect of general international law
are certainly less convincing if one accepts that the right protected within the
framework of diplomatic protection are those of the individual protected and not
those of the protecting State.100
2.1.2. The road to lump-sum agreements
Two events would further undermine the international protection of foreign
investment. Until 1917, the right of private property was recognised by the municipal
legislation of almost every state. It was also protected by the international minimum
standard, complemented by a non-exclusive national standard of treatment. Those
Latin American countries that supported the Calvo-doctrine version of the latter, i.e.
national treatment as an exclusive standard, were the sole exception to the general
rule. This consensus among nations was broken by the Russian Revolution and its
repudiation of the right of private property. The newly-created Soviet Union
introduced to the international lexicon the term nationalisation to designate
expropriations of a general character.101 Subsequent takings of the property of
Russian nationals and foreigners, without compensation, followed. The communist
authorities justified the lack of payment to aliens invoking the principle of national
treatment. Western states only came slowly to terms with the Soviet nationalisations,
but never formally accepted these measures as legal.102
Another revolution, this time in Mexico, led to the establishment of the social
function of property at a constitutional level. In the early 20th century, Mexican law
100
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was built on individualism and private property as an absolute, untouchable right.103
One of the main purposes of the revolution that started in 1910 was the redefinition
of this approach.104 The 1917 constitution, still in force in Mexico, achieved such an
objective in its article 27, which provides:
Ownership of the lands and waters included within the boundaries of the national
territory belongs originally to the Nation, which has had and continues to have the
right to transmit ownership thereof to private parties, thereby constituting private
property.
Expropriations may only be made for reasons of public utility and by means of
compensation.
The Nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private property the
modalities required by public interest, as well as to regulate, for social benefit, the
exploitation of natural resources capable of appropriation, in order to make an
equitable distribution of public wealth, conserve them, achieve the balanced
development of the country and improve the life conditions of the rural and urban
population.105
This remodelled notion of property, subordinated to the common welfare of the
society, was in no case a new concept in the history of law. The social function of
property had already been advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas in the medieval ages,
and included in the influential Napoleonic civil code of the XIX century France.106
Although the Mexican version did not mean expropriation without compensation, it
meant, as Lowenfeld points out:
distinctions between state-taking of a private home where a school or highway was
to be built, and state ownership (or acquisition of ownership) of a major industry,
such as electric power generation, petroleum exploration, or railroads. For the
former, compensation, generally prior and more or less in full value, was
contemplated, if not always implemented. For the latter, as well as for redistribution
of land pursuant to agrarian reform programs, compensation was not excluded, but it
need not be prior or prompt, and the state's ability to pay was an important factor in
determining what level of compensation was appropriate.107
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The famous 1938 diplomatic exchange between the governments of the USA
and Mexico, derived from the 1917 agrarian expropriations and 1938 nationalisation
of the oil industry in the latter, summarised the opposed positions of capital-
exporting and capital-importing countries regarding the issue of compensation.
Reaffirming the principles of national and international treatment, the US Secretary
of State, Cordell Hull, declared that "no government is entitled to expropriate private
property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and
effective payment therefore".108 Hull referred to this formula as the principle of just
compensation, then extensively accepted in comparative constitutional law.109
Prompt, adequate and effective meant that compensation should not only correspond
to the value of the property taken, but should also be paid speedily to the owner in a
transferable currency."0 Mexico distinguished expropriations from nationalisations,
admitted that only adequate compensation was due, and insisted on the Calvo
doctrine, declaring -in the words of Cassese- that "international law only required
[...] foreigners to be treated no less favourably than [...] nationals, and [that] the
time and manner of payment must be determined under the laws of the expropriating
State".111
Eventually, Mexico and the USA agreed on the compensation to be paid, each
insisting on their respective legal positions until the end.112 In the following years,
nationalisations occurred in Eastern Europe, former Western colonies, and Latin
America. All the countries under communist control nationalised private property,
108 Ibid., 400.
109 Ibid.
1,0 See Chapter 5 infra.
111
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whether owned by their own citizens or by foreigners. For instance, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Flungary and Poland, from 1945 to 1948; China, from 1949 to 1957;
and Cuba, from 1959.113 In the decolonised states of Africa and Asia, as in Latin
American countries, nationalisations befell on major natural resources. The Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company's properties in Iran, for example, were nationalised in 1951; the
Suez Canal Company in Egypt in 1956; and Dutch properties in Indonesia in 1958-9.
In the early 1970s, nearly all the Arab states abrogated the concessions of the major
Western oil companies or directly nationalised them. As to Latin America, mines and
other major enterprises were subject to general expropriations in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Peru, among other states.114
Expropriations were followed by state-to-state or state and former-owner
negotiations, sometimes with the participation of intermediaries, like the World Bank
which offered its good offices in the negotiations between Egypt and the Suez Canal
Company.115 Negotiations normally led to lump-sum agreements. Through these
treaties, the expropriating state allocated a single sum of money, determined on the
basis of various criteria, which generally met halfway the conflicting interests of the
two countries concerned.116 Lump-sum agreements settled, in a definitive form,
difficult disputes arising from nationalisations, and were concluded in large numbers:
around 200, since the end of the Second World War.117 They involved a compromise
where the seized property was never returned, and the amounts given were lower
than those originally claimed by the disposed foreigner. The negotiations which took
'13 See Comeaux & Kinsella, supra note 3, at 63-4.
See, also, Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra note 82, at 4.
114 See Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 405.
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place to conclude these treaties with the UK and USA, for instance, were described
by Lowenfeld as follows:
In the case of the nationalizations in Eastern Europe, [...] the United States
negotiated so-called 'lump-sum agreements' with each state, between 1948
(Yugoslavia) and 1982 (Czechoslovakia), under which the taking state kept the
property but agreed to payment of stated sums over an extended period, and the
United States agreed to adjudicate the claims of eligible former owners and make
pro rata payments to them out of the funds recovered. In most cases the United
States held some 'bargaining chips', such as frozen assets or promise of economic
assistance. The United Kingdom also negotiated lump-sum agreements with the
Eastern European states as well as Egypt but, with fewer bargaining chips (and less
willingness to jeopardize its position as a financial center by blocking bank
accounts), settled sooner than the United States and generally for lesser amounts
118
relative to the value of the properties in question.
Lump-sum agreements were concluded almost exclusively under political and
economic considerations. For the host-state, law played a role only at the moment of
deciding whether to take the measure, negotiate settlements and pay
compensation.119 Sole-arbitrator Dupuy, in the Topco/Calasiatic case, considered
lump-sum agreements to have no evidentiary value in international law because they
were "inspired basically by considerations of expediency and not of legality".120 The
• 121 •
Iran-US CT reached a similar conclusion in a number of its decisions. This
circumstance introduced even more uncertainty to an already inefficient protection
against expropriation, for none of the available solutions on the treatment of foreign
• *122investors offered a reliable picture of practice, and none was completely irrelevant.
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2.2. The law of expropriation at the UN
The spread of communism after 1945 and the newly obtained sovereignty of
several African and Asian states after the decolonisation process123, led to a
globalisation of the long-standing conflict between the US and Western Europe, and
the Latin American states.124 Capital-importing countries blamed the weakness of
their national economies on the foreign control over key industries and major natural
resources, which were seen as vital for the welfare of the population and the security
of the state. They concluded that their political independence was nothing but formal,
and that the only way to achieve an authentic sovereignty was by gaining economical
independence from developed states.125 This meant, in practice, the extension of the
public sector through the nationalisation of both industries and natural resources, and
the establishment of state monopolies.126
The classical international law of expropriation was aimed at protecting
physical persons from situations involving individual takings. It soon proved to be
inadequate to solve the new problems posed by these expropriatory measures of a
general character. Former European-colonies claimed that the traditional rules of
international law, in which formation they took no part, did not reflect their own
cultural and legal traditions.127 They rejected the international minimum standard and
supported the Calvo doctrine developed in Latin America.128 In an effort to assert
123
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multilaterally the concept of economical independence at an international level, the
capital-importing states challenged customary law at the UN. Technically, the
resolutions of its General Assembly do not constitute a source of international law.
Nevertheless, they can evidence customary norms, since they reflect the views of the
states voting for it.129 As the ICJ declared in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons:
General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have
normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinion iuris. To establish
whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at
its content and the conditions of its adoption: it is also necessary to see whether an
opinion iuris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show
the gradual evolution of the opinion iuris required for the establishment of a new
, 130rule.
The attempt of capital-importing states to modify customary international law
was, then, well-aimed. The result of their effort was, however, inconclusive.
2.2.1. Sovereignty and natural resources
Gaining control over natural resources was one of the main motives that drove
European states like Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, France, and later
Germany and Italy, to colonise overseas territories throughout the world.131 The
exploitation of these resources was considered unlimited, and was left, almost
exclusively, to the colonising state.132 During this period, the flow of assets within
imperial limits was sufficiently protected by the laws of the correspondent power.
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There was no need for an international law on foreign investment in these regions,
and the making of these rules was restricted to the relations of the Latin American
states and the US, and later European countries.133 After the decolonisation process
of the second half of the 20th century took place, it was only a matter of time until the
newly independent states of Africa and Asia would espouse their claim to permanent
sovereignty over natural resources to that of communist and Latin American
countries. As Waelde recalls, the world was divided in this period in separate blocks:
"[t]he rich and exploitative 'North'", on one side, and "the underveloped and striving
'South', and the sympathetic socialist countries", on the other.134 The theoretical link
between the communist and developing countries' position was based on the right of
self-determination, central to the decolonisation process and the notion of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, first referred by the Marxist-Leninist Declaration
of Rights of the Operative and Exploited People of 10 July, 1918.135 The reliance of
capital-exporting states on property rights and the sanctity of contracts was
challenged by capital-importing countries, who considered the right of economic
self-determination of a state to outweigh any other. Claiming that full compensation
in case of expropriation would turn any major restructuring of a national economy
impossible, capital-importing states questioned classical international law and tried
to establish customary rules of expropriation through UN General Assembly
resolutions.136
133
Sornarajah, supra note 68, at 54.
134
T Waelde, 'Requiem for New International Economic Order', in G Hafner et al (eds.), Liber
Amicorum I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998), 774.
Such rhetoric can still be heard in certain academic and political circles, particularly in Latin America.
135 See Hartwig, supra note 132, at 663.
136 See Comeaux and Kinsella, supra note 2, at 65.
See, in general, Brower, supra note 131.
32
The first of these attempts was Resolution 523 (VI) of 1952. Although there
was no express mention of the issue of expropriation, it emphasised that "under¬
developed countries have the right to determine freely the use of their natural
137 •resources". That year, the General Assembly expressly declared in Resolution 626
(VII) that "the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and
resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter of the United Nations".138 Two years later, based on the
right of self-determination, the permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and
resources was established by Resolution 837 (IX).139
In 1958, the General Assembly established by Resolution 1314(XIII)140 the
Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Following its report,
Resolution 1803 (XVII) was adopted in 1962.141 Known as the Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the General Assembly declared in it
the inalienable right of all states to freely dispose their natural wealth and resources
in accordance with their national interests. This right was linked to the principles of
sovereign equality of states, self-determination and economic independence.
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962 further recognised some of the requirements of a
lawful taking advanced by capital-exporting states, but in a weaker form:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons
of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding
purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force
1:17 See UNGA Res. 523 (VI), adopted on 12 January, 1952.
UN General Assembly resolutions are available at <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
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in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance
with international law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to
a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be
exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or
international adjudication.142
Besides the international minimum standard, this resolution reaffirmed the
principle of pacta sunt servanda by stating that "[fjoreign investment agreements
freely entered into by or between sovereign states shall be observed in good faith
j- y, 143
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962 was adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12
abstentions. France and South Africa voted no, and the communist-bloc, plus Ghana
and Burma, abstained. The USA voted in favour, but stated -for the record- that
according to Resolution 1803 (XVII) "the owner shall be paid" meant that the
payment of compensation was not discretionary but an obligation of the state, and
that "appropriate compensation" would be interpreted as meaning, under
international law, prompt, adequate and effective compensation.144 This resolution
recognises the power of the state to take private property, a principle already
mentioned by Grotius, known today as the state's right to expropriate or
nationalise.145 It also recognises the rule of pacta sunt servanda, dating back to
Cicero and Ulpian, as applied to investment agreements.146 The right to expropriate
and nationalise is an attribute of sovereignty, as much as its limitation by means of
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.147 Since both principles conform to the very
nature of international norms founded on the notion of sovereignty, their recognition
142 UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 1962, para 4.
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by the resolution was easily considered to evidence customary international law.148
This was, for instance, the position adopted by Dupuy, the sole arbitrator in the
Topco/Calasiatic case.149
Due to the consensus achieved by the contending group of states in 1962, even
the payment of an "appropriate" compensation was acknowledged for many years a
customary status.150 Lowenfeld explains that Resolution 1803 (XVII) was fairly
regarded to:
[...] constitute a consensus of sorts between developed and less developed countries,
around four basic principles:
that compensation must be paid in the event of taking of alien property;
that such compensation must be paid in accordance with international law;
that investment agreements between states and private parties have a binding
effect; and
that arbitration agreements between states and private parties have a binding
effect.151
The General Assembly addressed the issue of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources again in 1966, when Resolution 2158 (XXI) recognised, in order to
improve its exercise:
[...] the right of all countries, and in particular of the developing countries, to secure
and increase their share in the administration of enterprises which are fully or partly
operated by foreign capital and to have a greater share in the advantages and profits
derived therefrom on an equitable basis, with due regard to development needs and
objectives of the peoples concerned and to mutually acceptable contractual
practices.152
104 countries voted in favour of this resolution, while 6 states abstained,
including the USA, who criticised its lack of clarity on the problem of
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expropriation.153 That same year, the right of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources was included in Article 1 paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.154 After reaffirming this right in Resolutions
2386 (XXIII) of 1968155, 2692 (XXV) of 1970156, and 3016 (XXVII) of 1972157, the
General Assembly went a step further in 1973, when its Resolution 3171 (XXVIII)
plainly stated an exclusive national treatment standard in the following terms:
[...] the application of the principle of nationalization carried out by States, as an
expression of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural resources, implies
that each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the
mode of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with the national legislation of each State carrying out such measures.158
This declaration was founded on the principles of self-determination and
sovereign equality of states, as recognised in Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970, which
contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.159 The replacement of an "appropriate" compensation, for only a
"possible" one, and the fact that its determination was left solely to the domestic
legislation of the expropriating state, led to the adoption of Resolution 3171
(XXVIII) of 1973 by 108 votes in favour to 1, with 16 abstentions, including this
time 10 Western European countries and the USA.160 These abstentions certainly
153
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reduced the legal weight of this resolution. The developed countries' opposition,
almost a year later, to the adoption of the so-called Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States would confirm the lack of opinio iuris of this new approach on the
issue of compensation.
2.1.2. International economic orders
Seeking greater sympathy for their particular interests in the international
economic system, and expecting to neutralise the 1947 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), developing countries decidedly encouraged the creation
in 1964 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as
their "institutionalized mouthpiece" in the field of international economic
relations.161 By the beginning of the 1970s, however, capital-importing states had
given up on their intention of reforming the international economic order. The idea
of its replacement by a new one strongly emerged in these years.162 The success of
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in substantially
increasing the prices of this natural resource in 1973, served as a catalyst that
brought together developing countries in support of a call for a NIEO. Communist
states declared themselves immune from most of the demands that this order
involved. Nevertheless, they supported the third-world, as part of their strategy of
political and economic competition with Western states.163 Designed to better
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represent the interests of Latin American and newly decolonised countries, the NIEO
was defined by Tomuschat:
as a body of general legal, political and economic principles, outlined in various
resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, which, as a whole, [were]
intended to provide a blueprint for an alternative international economic system, the
overriding objective of which [was] an international redistribution of wealth to the
advantage of developing States and to be achieved by systematic preferential
treatment of this group of States on all levels of international economic relations.164
In 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order.
Reaffirming once more the sovereign equality of states and self-determination, the
resolution confirmed the:
[f]ull permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all
economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to
exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its
own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the
, 165State.
This declaration was supplemented by the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, included in UN General
Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of the same year.166 Both resolutions were
adopted by consensus, notwithstanding the reservations registered by developed
States.167 Inspired in them, the most important document encompassing the
principles of NIEO was the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 1974.168 Twelve
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years after Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962, and less in conformance with the
position of developed countries, the General Assembly declared this time that each
state has the right:
[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures,
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the
State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State
and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned
that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States
169
and in accordance with the principle of free choice ofmeans.
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the UK,
and the USA voted against this resolution. Austria, Canada, France, Israel, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain abstained.170 With 120 votes in favour to
6, and 10 abstentions, to a very large extent, this resolution confirmed the Mexican
doctrine set forth in the diplomatic correspondence ensued with the US in 1938. In
fact, it was no other than the president of Mexico who first suggested the idea of a
legally binding Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. And it was this
country that officially introduced in the Second Committee of the General Assembly
a draft Charter that would be voted and adopted as Resolution 3281 (XXIX) in
1974.171 Again, the standard of compensation was typified as "appropriate" and its
determination was left exclusively to the domestic laws of the nationalising or
expropriating state. As with Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) of 1973, all the major capital-
exporting states either opposed or abstained from the 1974 Charter and its national
treatment standard.172 This circumstance minimised the legal impact of the Charter:
169 UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 1974, art. 2.2 (c). See, in general, the whole resolution adopted that
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its challenge to international law was limited to a political one.173 According to
Petersmann, the drafting history and the voting of the resolution deprived its content
of the character of opinio iuris, "at least on the part of [its] dissenters and abstainers,
which included the main addressees of many of the Charter demands".174 In the
Topco/Calasiatic case, Dupuy considered the Charter to have nothing more than a
lege ferenda value and only for those states that adopted it. For those countries
voting against it, Dupuy even concluded that this resolution was contra legem.]75
Lowenfeld recalls that, in its historical context:
[a]t minimum, the Charter on the Rights and Duties of States was a concerted effort
by the developing countries to repudiate a system of law in whose creation they
played little or no part. [...] Viewed more than a quarter century later, the Charter
[...] seems less significant than it appeared at the time. If there was indeed an effort
to divorce international investment form international law, that effort did not
succeed, [njearly all the capital-exporting states either voted against [it] or abstained,
so that the consensus attributed to Resolution 1803 of 1962 [...] could not be
attributed to the Charter.176
Against this background, the UN General Assembly abandoned the practice of
advocating a NIEO in its resolutions on international economic cooperation. In some
cases, it has even expressly endorsed the old or traditional economic order.177 Several
reasons explain the collapse of the NIEO. According to Waelde, the concept was
politically and commercially unworkable, for -in his words- "[i]t was not possible to
direct or regulate international business by resolutions at diplomatic conferences".178
Third-world governments eventually realised that international trade and foreign
173 See Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 413-4.
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investment were not responsible for underdevelopment. As a result, open market-
economies were established in these countries, and the inward-orientation of national
policies was replaced by an outward-orientation of them.179 Furthermore, the statist
model of development was seriously discredited, due to corruption practices in third-
world states, and the fall of communism or its transformation -as in China and
Vietnam- left those countries supporting the NIEO without an alternative model to
capitalism. In all, the very notion of a third world, with its own characteristics and
interests, disappeared after the other two blocks -the first and second worlds- faded
away with the end of the Cold War.180
2.3. Changes in economy, politics and treaty-law
The political and economical background that explained the 20th century
nationalisation process, and the ensuing debate on compensation at the General
Assembly, has been essentially transformed in the last decades.181 Politically,
permanent sovereignty over natural resources is no longer a priority for those states
that gained control over these elements. Moreover, the favourable scenario that had
given capital-importing countries a unity of purpose and, consequently, a
considerable diplomatic weight, has been substantially modified by the recovery of
the developed states from the 1970s oil crisis and the collapse of communism at the
end of the 1980s. Economically, foreign investment is no longer focused exclusively
on the area of natural resources. Other sectors like manufacturing, services and high
179 Ibid., 779-80.
180 See ibid., 780-2.
181 See UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 11-2.
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technology are increasingly attracting foreign investors today. These changes in
international politics and economics had led to a withdrawal of the state from the
direction of business worldwide. Deregulation and privatisation became key topics in
the governmental agendas of most states, whether developed or developing. By the
end of the last century, foreign investors had returned to former second and third
world countries, encouraged by the liberalisation of investment conditions and
economic growth.182
The mixture of fear and desire that foreign investment represented to
developing states is largely part of the past. It is no longer perceived as negative in a
• • 183
globalised world, based on deep and extended links between national societies.
Property rights and market-oriented policies have been increasingly recognised.
State-run enterprises have become privatised companies that need foreign investment
to operate and thrive in profitable, but highly-regulated sectors of the economy. In
this context, the old hesitation between restricting or facilitating foreign investment
is gone, even in those states that supported the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States in 1974.184 It was not only the decline and fall of the Soviet Union
and its satellites that made them change their mind. It was also the economic
stagnation of most of Africa and Latin America, which sharply contrasted with the
fast economic development of the East Asian states that had welcomed foreign
investment and free-market policies, like Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand. In the end, even those countries that did not reject foreign
investors, but did not encourage them either, realised that an attractive investment
182 See Waelde, supra note 134, at 783-4.
183 See Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra note 82, at 7-8.
184 See Comeaux and Kinsella, supra note 3, at xxi-iii; and Waelde, supra note 134, at 783-5.
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climate was needed if they were to profit from foreign capital in their development
185
process.
2.3.1. Investment protection at the turn of a century
Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, foreign direct investment (FDI) -i.e.
when the manager holds control of the company186- is now perceived as more
attractive by host-states than foreign indirect or portfolio investment -this is, when
the management and control of the company are dissociated.187 The main reasons for
this new approach towards FDI are that it is easily available, it does not burden the
capital-importing country with debt, and it brings additional contributions to the
host-state, for example, in terms of know-how, technology, and skills.188 Numerous
other benefits of FDI for the host country can be mentioned. Just to name a few,
those highlighted by Rubins are worth recalling: "wage increases, reduced
unemployment, increased demand for local goods, inflow of foreign capital, opening
of markets, improved balance of payments, [...] increased tax revenues, and
improved infrastructure".189
Developing countries, eager to regulate and attract foreign investment, have
committed themselves to its encouragement and protection through national laws
185 See A Lowenfeld, 'Investment Agreements and International Law', (2003) 42 Colum. .JTN 123, at
126-7.
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enacted to deal specifically and solely with the investment of aliens in one piece of
legislation. They are known as investment codes.190 Despite being the result of
different social, economical and legal traditions, these codes bear extensive
similarities and even uniformity on particular topics. Examples of investment codes
are the Korean Foreign Capital Inducement Act of 1966; the Chilean Statute of
Foreign Investment of 1974; the Namibian Foreign Investment Act of 1990; and the
Polish Foreign Investment Law of 1991.191 The primary purpose of investment codes
is the promotion of FDI, and to that effect they regulate its admission and standards
of treatment192. These standards include national and most-favoured-nation (MFN)
treatment; sometimes fair and equitable treatment (FET); the free transfer of capital
and profits; the protection against expropriation; and a dispute settlement
mechanism.193
Treaties dealing with the promotion and protection of foreign investment
have come to confirm and supplement domestic policies and provisions favourable to
it. BITs started to be signed and ratified on the second half of the 20th century by
developed and developing countries, not only to encourage foreign investment, but
also to protect it.194 This second aspect of BITs explains their spread. Host-states
compete to offer potential investors a credible protection of foreign property mostly
by concluding BITs. These treaties allow governments to make clear commitments
which explicitly involve states, not just private parties and governmental officials. A
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mandatory dispute-settlement mechanism enhances the enforcement of those
commitments.195 The first BIT was entered into by Germany and Pakistan in 1959.196
The number of agreements concluded worldwide since then has increased
substantially. By 2006, almost 2,500 BITs had been signed, most of them after 1990.
The total number of BITs in force was more than 1,800 by the end of 200 5.197 BITs
have even been concluded between developing states198, and developed ones.199 At
the end of 2004, one-fourth of the total number of BITs concluded worldwide
corresponded to those signed between developing states.200 The only countries that
901
have not yet concluded at least one BIT are city states or island microstates.
Bilateral, trilateral and multilateral EIAs currently complement the international law
of foreign investment.202 One example is the 1992 North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the US.203 Notwithstanding its
195
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sectorial character, the multilateral 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) also includes
• • 204
important investment provisions.
There are other examples too. The Common Market of the South, commonly
referred to as Mercosur, is a customs union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. The investment of aliens and related issues are addressed
in its 1994 Colonia and Buenos Aires Investment Protocols.205 The Colonia Protocol
covers foreign investments from nationals of member-states in the territory of any
other member-state, and includes in its Article 4 a protection against expropriation
which resembles that of NAFTA. Article 1 defines investment in traditional broad
terms, comprising tangibles and intangibles, and Article 9 gives the investor the
option of having an investment dispute with the host-state settled by arbitration under
the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
or the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Buenos Aires
Protocol covers foreign investments from nationals of non-member states in the
territory of any member-state, and provides the same protections as the Colonia
Protocol, including the settlement of investor-to-state disputes through international
arbitration. Neither of the two Mercosur protocols is, however, in force today.206 The
natural reluctance of Brazil towards the international protection of foreign
investment, the numerous BIT arbitrations initiated against Argentina, and the
204See Part III and V of ECT.
205 The Colonia Protocol for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments in Mercosur was
approved by Common Market Council Decision No. 11/93 of 17 January 1994. Available in Spanish
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entrance of Venezuela as a member to the customs union in 2005, considerably
reduce the chances of obtaining the necessary number of ratifications for these
instruments. But this situation does not change the overall picture of international
investment law, for the total number of EIAs that contain a commitment to liberalise,
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promote and protect foreign investment was more than 230 by 2006.
This impressive network of BITs and EIAs is mainly aimed at facilitating
trade and investment flows. The promotion and protection of foreign investment is
achieved through provisions on its admission, general standards of treatment and
mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes.208 Among these standards are,
for instance, FET, full protection and security, non-discrimination, observance of
specific undertakings, national and MFN treatment, and free transfer of funds.
Although BITs and the corresponding chapters of EIAs do not follow a uniform
design, they tend to establish the international adjudication of investor-to-state
disputes and corroborate the customary requirements of a lawful expropriation with
an extraordinary homogeneity.209 This circumstance, and the inclusion of a national
treatment, combined with applications of the international standard, like the
protection against expropriation, FET, and full protection and security, among others,
has meant the demise of the Calvo doctrine in treaty-law -i.e. of an exclusive national
treatment for all types of investors in the host-state.
The wide conclusion of BITs and EIAs in Latin America only came to
confirm the abandonment of the NIEO, even in the region of its birth. The settlement
207
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of investor-to-state disputes through international arbitration, as well as the Hull
formula, has been included in the treaties concluded by the country of Carlos Calvo -
Argentina-; by the state that advanced the concept of adequate or appropriate
compensation -Mexico-; and by the first country to call for a NIEO in 1952, during
the debate of the draft of the International Covenant on Human Rights -Chile.210
Many Latin American states have also become a member to the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).211 More importantly, most of them have
become a party to the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
• • 212between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington Convention).
Following the then predominant NIEO approach in the region, these states had stayed
out of this treaty during the 1960s and the 1970s. While some Latin American
countries only became parties to the Washington Convention in the 1980s, most of
them did in the 1990s.213 Nevertheless, things change quickly in this volatile region.
Argentina is currently the country with the highest number of investment claims
lodged against it before ICSID: 42, by November 2005.214 The amounts awarded by
arbitral panels to claimants in investment-treaty arbitrations are normally large and
sometimes extremely large, particularly for a developing country like Argentina. Its
government might face a hard choice: paying and mortgaging its future development,
210
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or not paying and being shunned from the powerful group of open-market, trade-
oriented, pro-investment states. If forced into this choice, the Argentinian authorities
have already showed their reluctance to follow the second path. The recent
withdrawal of Venezuela from the World Bank, and of Bolivia from the Washington
Convention, leaves open the question of whether this growing opposition to the
international minimum standard will affect what, until recently, appeared to be a
clear trend towards foreign investment and free-market rules not only in Latin
America, but also in the other regions of the globe.
2.3.2. A shift in the international debate
The new economic, political and legal framework of the last decades has not
modified the fact that takings are the main risk a foreign investor can face in the host
country. Nonetheless, the debate on the international law of expropriation has moved
from the problem of compensation to that of indirect takings. In recent years,
international treaties have endorsed the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and nationalisation advanced by capital-importing countries in the 20th
century; returned to the Hull formula or similar ones supported by capital-exporting
countries since the 19th century; consistently included the notion of indirect taking
without defining it; and confirmed the general failure of the NIEO with regards to
international investment law.215
The customary nature of the rights of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and nationalisation can be traced back to the UN General Assembly
2,5 See Chapters 5 & 6 infra.
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Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962. It has now been confirmed by the expropriation
provisions of BITs and some EIAs, which include nationalisations as another form of
taking, thus implicitly recognising the permanent sovereignty over natural resources
• • *91 ft
advocated by communist, Latin American and newly decolonised countries.
Article 13 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of
Treaties, in force since 1996, also refers expressly to the "permanent sovereignty
over natural wealth and resources".217 In the area of energy law, the ECT also
includes an express recognition of this right in its Article 18, titled "Sovereignty over
Energy Resources". In recent years, the permanent sovereignty over natural
resources has been interpreted and applied as a source of duties, as well as rights,
with respect to the treatment of foreign investors.218 According to Schrijver, this
means that:
Assertions of economic sovereignty of host States now include recognitions of
obligations, for example to respect international law, to observe in good faith
contractual and treaty obligations and to provide fair treatment to foreign investors,
including appeal possibilities and recourse to international dispute-settlement
219
mechanisms [...].
On the specific problem of compensation, international treaties typically refer
to a "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation220 or to other formulas, such as
"just" compensation, followed by requirements -for example, a specific method of
216 See, e.g., Art. 5 of the 1993 Algeria-France BIT, available in French at
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valuation- that make them similar in practice to the former.221 The conventional
adoption of the capital-exporting countries' view on this issue indicates a deflection
from the appropriate compensation standard and a return to the Hull or comparable
formulas, so stubbornly rejected by capital-importing states in the diplomatic
forum.222 This is noteworthy, considering that the payment of an appropriate
compensation in conformance with international law was regarded as an international
legal custom, applicable in case of expropriation or nationalisation, after the adoption
by the General Assembly in 1962 of Resolution 1803 (XVII).
Until the recent nationalisation wave in certain Latin American countries,
including Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the last major expropriation of a general
kind took place in Libya, in 1973. This concept still haunts from time to time the
political debate not only in developing countries, but even in developed ones, like
the UK. Although nationalisation is, under certain conditions, a legal option of the
state, it is no longer the central issue in international law of expropriation. Takings
are currently more likely to be aimed at individual properties or enterprises, and to
assume a more subtle character: an indirect form. Guzman mentions, among the
reasons for the fall of the use of outright seizures as a policy tool:
the success of [least developed countries (LDCs)] in removing control of property
from the hands of former colonial powers and their citizens, a fall in the popularity
of state ownership, a desire to attract new investment, a belief among LDCs that they
can benefit from investment as long as it is regulated, improvement in the
managerial and administrative expertise of LDC governments, changed international
economic conditions, and changed behavior [sic] on the part of investors who have
adopted investment strategies that are less vulnerable (e.g., joint ventures, structures
that leave certain important operations outside of the host country, strategically
221 See Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 108-9 & 114-7; Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 394-5; and
UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 235 & 243-5.
See, e.g., Art. 5 of the 1980 Philippines-UK BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_philippines.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
222
Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 483-4.
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placed management from the home country without whom the value of assets fall
223
substantially, and so on).
Two categories of costs face a country that chooses to directly expropriate a
foreign investor. Not only the government may be far less competent to run the
enterprise than the original owner, but the country's international reputation will be
damaged before other states and potential investors.224 Gutbrod and Hindelang agree
with Guzman, and add that:
States which wish to import capital do not like to be associated with posing a
permanent, non-calculable threat to foreign-owned property but prefer to present
themselves as places with very stable, reliable and orderly regulatory
environments.225
In this new context, the establishment of the boundaries between non-
compensable regulatory measures and indirect takings is the main question that the
international law of expropriation has to answer these days.226 Heiskanen, quoting
Dolzer, describes the new scenario as follows:
the focus of debate in international investment law has shifted from the standard of
compensation to the definition of expropriation. As a result of this shift, which has
taken place in the context of the ongoing economic globalization and the global
adoption of neo-liberal policies, the key issue in the field is no longer whether full
or only 'appropriate' compensation should be paid, but rather whether any
expropriation has occurred in the first place. As the State increasingly withdraws
from its role as an economic actor -owner or manager of enterprises- to the role of
a regulator, the tools it employs also change. In this new context, where
nationalizations of enterprises or entire industries become less common, if not
extinct, and are replaced by regulatory interventions, 'the single most important
227
development in state practice has become the issue of indirect expropriations'.
The need to answer the threshold question is compounded by the fact that
unlike nationalisation programmes, which are adopted and implemented under
223 A Guzman, 'Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties', (1998) 38 Virginia JIL 639, note 23 at 647.
224 See ibid., 663-4.
225 Gutbrod and Hindelang, supra note 51, at 59.
See, also, Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 118.
226
See, e.g., Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8; Dolzer, supra note 60, at 64-5; Dolzer and Bloch, supra
note 60, at 155; Heiskanen (2003), supra note 60, at 176; Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 344-5; and
UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 237.
227 Heiskanen (2007), supra note 60, at 215.
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exceptional circumstances, the regulation of vital areas of public interest is now part
of the state's routine.228 BITs and the investment chapters of EIAs address the issue
of takings by speaking not only speak of "expropriation" or "nationalisation", but
also of "direct" or "indirect"229 nationalisation or expropriation, and measures
"equivalent"230 or "tantamount"231 to these. The problem is that BITs and EIAs
merely mention such concepts without defining any of them. Even though direct
takings are normally easy to recognise; indirect expropriations are not. A definition
is surely lacking. Or at least, reliable guidelines to help decision and policy-makers
distinguish non-compensable measures from indirect expropriations.
2.4. Conclusion
Before 1917, expropriations were identified with individual takings. Two
positions could be clearly distinguished in this period when approaching this area of
international law. Acknowledging the interest of each state in the proper treatment of
its nationals and their property abroad, capital-exporting countries upheld the
international minimum standard and the principle of diplomatic protection.
Conversely, affirming the complete and exclusive jurisdiction over persons and
events in its territory, capital-importing countries endorsed the national treatment
standard and the principle of territorial sovereignty represented by the Calvo
doctrine. The former position eventually prevailed, due to the economic and military
power of the states supporting it. At least, until the emergence in 1917 of the notion
of nationalisation during the Russia revolution, and the remodelled concept of private
228 Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 718.
229
E.g., Art. 6 of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
230
E.g., Art. 13 of the ECT, cited at note 220, supra.
231
E.g., Art 1110 ofNAFTA, cited at note 216, supra.
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property in the Mexican constitution of that year. The 1938 diplomatic exchange
between the US and Mexico summed up the views of the opposed groups of states.
The extensive nationalisation process, the subsequent conclusion of lump-sum
agreements, and the General-Assembly based controversy involving well established
legal concepts such as sovereignty, self-determination, equality of states, pacta sunt
servanda, non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of disputes, brought further
uncertainty to a handful of already erratic rules of customary international law.
Changes in the international politics and economy of the last half of the 20th
century have strongly undermined this enduring dispute between capital-exporting
and capital-importing countries. Today, developing states no longer protect
themselves from FDI, but compete for it, mainly by offering legal protection to those
aliens investing abroad. To this effect, BITs and EIAs have been widely concluded in
the last decades, in terms that only confirm the failure of an exclusive national
treatment standard and the proposed NIEO. Legal customs, whether established or
still debated, like the concept of nationalisation as an implied acknowledgement of
the host state's right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources; the
international adjudication of investor-to-state disputes; and the reception of the
customary requirements for a lawful expropriation in the terms stubbornly put
forward by developed countries, have been widely introduced in the provisions of
these treaties.
In the domestic sphere, the liberalisation and development of national and
international politics and economy, conveying the recognition of property rights and
the enactment of investment codes, has also led to the expansion of the scope of state
regulation. Health; planning and land use; antitrust; securities; consumer and
54
environmental protection; amongst other, have joined traditional areas of public
policy like taxation and labour. This situation and the conventional incorporation of
the Hull and equivalent formulas, along with the undefined concepts of expropriation
and nationalisation in their direct and indirect forms, has finally replaced in the




INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND PROPERTY
Property is a human right protected by international law since its inclusion in
the 1948 Universal Declaration. Although not considered within the guaranteed
rights of the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, its deprivation is regulated by treaty law in
Europe, the Americas and Africa. Within the three regional systems of human rights,
however, it is mainly in Europe that expropriation has been analysed and studied
since the early 1950s. Far from the ideological debate at the UN between capital-
importing and capital-exporting states, based on the opposition of the principles of
national and international treatment of aliens, the European Commission and Court
of Human Rights have developed an influential case-law on interferences with
property. This case-law derives from their interpretation of Article 1 of the First
Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights.
According to Article 1, as construed by these institutions, the state is not
prevented from interfering with the use of property. A measure that produces this
result is justified when the correspondent authorities observe a fair balance between
individual and community interests. For this purpose, the state is given a wide
margin of appreciation. The European Commission and Court have recognised three
related rules in this provision: lesser interferences to the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions, the control on its use, and the deprivation of property. Each rule is
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found, respectively, in the first sentence of Article 1, in the second sentence of the
same paragraph, and in its second paragraph. Distinguishing among these rules is not
easy in practice. The European Court has given a broad interpretation to the notion of
control on the use of property. Conversely, the concept of expropriation has been
construed more restrictively. In this context, this tribunal will consider lesser
interferences only when it is not able to establish a deprivation or control on the use.
From the three forms of interference that comprise Article 1, only deprivations create
a right to compensation. And only in relation with those non-nationals that were
victims to an expropriatory measure. The state will enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation at the moment of establishing the amount of compensation due,
especially in cases of nationalisation. On this respect, the European Court requires an
amount reasonably related with the property taken, but not necessarily full
compensation.
This chapter deals with property and its deprivation in international human
rights law. It centres on the protection of this right in the Americas, Africa, and
Europe. The relevance of the decisions of the European Commission and Court
explains the focus given to the practice of these institutions regarding not only the
deprivation of property, but also lesser interferences and the control on its use. This
case-law is addressed in detail, explaining the nuances surrounding each of the rules
included in Article 1 of the First Protocol. The chapter ends with the study of the
meaning given by these institutions to certain concepts included in the third rule:
public interest, conditions provided by municipal law, and those stipulated by general
principles of international law.
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3.2. A debated right and its deprivation
The right to property is part of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Article 17 of this declaration states that "(1) Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others", and "(2) No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property".232 Adopted as a UN General Assembly
resolution233, the Universal Declaration was the result of a collective effort of the
post-Second World War international society that included, for the first time in the
history of international law, states with important differences in their political, social,
economic and cultural backgrounds. According to Cassese, its aim was to find the
lowest common denominator in the conception of basic human rights, and the
relationship between state and individual.234 This legally non-binding instrument
focused on civil and political rights, rather than on economic, social, and cultural
rights.235 Although it reflected a developed states' view of human rights, the
Universal Declaration has been considered to evidence customary international
law.236 It forbade arbitrary deprivations of property and, therefore, acknowledged the
right to expropriate by implication.237 The two legally binding 1966 multilateral
treaties known as the UN Covenants, one on civil and political rights, and the other
2,2 Available at <http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
233 UNGA Res. 217 (III), adopted on 10 December, 1948.
234
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236 See F Tschofen, 'Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign Investment', (1992) 7/II
ICSID Rev. 384, at 388.
See, also, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, US Circuit Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, 30 June, 1980, Opinion by
Circuit Judge Kaufman. Available at
<http://www.icrc.Org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/27721 c 1 b47e7ca90c 1256d 18002a2565?OpenDocument> (last
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on economic, social and cultural rights, were based on the Universal Declaration.
The Covenants, however, did not include the right of property, revealing a second
and third world approach to human rights.239 This omission was in conformity with
the trend to undermine international customary norms, which in the past had
protected the property of aliens from expropriation through the Hull formula.240 The
right to own property was only reasserted by the UN in 1986, in a General Assembly
resolution.241 Meanwhile, two regional human-rights treaties followed in the
footsteps of the Universal Declaration and acknowledged the state's right of
expropriation by implication in Europe and the Americas during the 1950s and
1960s. A couple of decades later, another regional human-rights treaty recognised
this right in Africa.
3.1.1. Inter-American and African approaches
Article XXIII of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man expressly established that "[e]very person has a right to own such private
property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the
™
Ibid., 388.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its first Optional Protocol, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were opened for signature,
ratification and accession by UN General Assembly Res. 2200 A (XXI), adopted on 16 December,
1966.
Both treaties entered into force in 1976
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dignity of the individual and of the home".242 Originally, the American Declaration
was a legally non-binding instrument adopted within the context of the Organization
of American States (OAS). It came to be considered by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as
incorporated into the OAS Charter, only after the amendment of the latter in 1967
and 1970.243 The Inter-American Commission even considered the American
Declaration in the 1990s to establish "universal and regional rules which have
become rules of customary international law and, as such [...] obligatory in [...]
international law".244 By then, the Inter-American human rights system had
established a more detailed regulation of the right of property in another legally
binding instrument. Article 21 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights -
also known as the Pact of San Jose de Costa Rica245- contains a protection against
expropriation. Consequently, it recognises the correspondent right of the state to
expropriate by implication, following certain requirements which constitute a
minimum standard of treatment applicable not only to foreigners, but also to
nationals of the state adopting the respective measure. Article 21 provides:
242 The American Declaration was approved by the Ninth International Conference of American States
held in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948. Available at
<http://www.hrcr.org/docs/OAS_Declaration/oasrights.html> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
242 S Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System (1997), 23-30.
See Res. No. 23/81, Case 2141 (United States), 6 March, 1981, Annual Report of the 1/A Commission
HR 1980-1981, available at <http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.81eng/USA2141.htm> (last visited 31
March, 2008);
and Res. No. 3/87, Case 9647 (United States), 22 September, 1987, Annual Report of the I/A
Commission HR 1986-1987, available at <http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/86.87eng/EUU9647.htm>
(last visited 31 March, 2008).
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'Report on Nicaragua', Annual Report of the I/A Commission HR 1993, available at
<http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/93eng/TOC.htm> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, S Davidson, 'The Civil and Political Rights Protected in the Inter-American Human Rights
System', in D Harris and S Livingstone (eds.), The Inter-American System ofHuman Rights (1998),
276.
Finally, see Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of the I/A Court HR, 14 July, 1989, on the Interpretation of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties ofMan within the Framework of Article 64 of the
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1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and
according to the forms established by law.
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by
,246
law.
Property was one of the most debated rights during the preparatory stage of the
American Convention. Some delegations even tried to remove any reference to it
from the treaty, but in the end the right to property and its social function were
included in the approved text of the Convention.247 Since then, the Inter-American
• • • 248Commission has considered Article 21 as a rule of customary international law.
The Inter-American Court has dealt exceptionally with this right. According to
it, Article 21 refers to property in the traditional wide sense attached to the word,
comprising tangible and intangible assets.249 Under this broad interpretation, the
private and communal property of indigenous peoples has also been considered
protected by Article 21.250 The only case presented before the Court that relates
246 Available at <http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm>
(last visited 31 March, 2008).
247 See Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, I/A Court HR, Series C No. 79,
Judgment, 31 August 2001, para. 145 & note 57. Available in Spanish at
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_79_esp.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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directly, so far, to an indirect taking is Ivcher. The applicant was a naturalised
Peruvian citizen who owned a television network where he had been denouncing
serious violations of human rights and acts of corruption. In conformity to a domestic
statute, owners of telecommunications media companies in Peru must be of this
nationality. Based on this norm, the Peruvian state annulled Mr. Ivcher's nationality
in order to remove him from the editorial control of his television network. As a
consequence, a judicial resolution suspended the exercise of the applicant's rights in
the company and revoked his appointment as a director and chairman. Mr. Ivcher
was prevented from transferring his shares and receiving dividends, and from taking
part in board meetings, where the minority shareholders took important decisions,
like increasing the company's capital. This judicial measure even prevented Mr
Ivcher's wife, co-owner of the shares, from enforcing her rights.251 The case was
submitted to the Inter-American Court by the Commission, following the two-tier
procedure established in the Convention. Implicitly endorsing the concept of indirect
expropriation, and quoting the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the
Court said:
To determine whether Mr. Ivcher was deprived of his property, the Court should not
restrict itself to evaluating whether a formal dispossession or expropriation took
place, but should look beyond mere ajrpearances and establish the real situation
behind the situation that was denounced.
The tribunal found no evidence of public utility or social interest in the
domestic judicial decision that prevented Mr. Ivcher from exercising his property
rights. Moreover, the tribunal found no indication that the applicant received
On the relation between private property and the communal property of indigenous peoples, see
Comunidad Indigena Yakye Axa case, supra note 249, paras. 143-51; and Comunidad Indigena
Sawhoyamaxa case, supra note 249, paras. 126-41.
251 See Baruch Ivcher Bronstein case, supra note 249, paras, 125-7.
252
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The Inter-American Court made reference to Belvedere Albergheria S.R.L. v. Italy, Eur. Court HR,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-VI, Judgment, 30 May 2000, para. 53.
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compensation for the deprivation of the enjoyment and use of his property, or that the
measure that affected him was adopted satisfying the minimum requirements of due
process of law.253 Mr. Ivcher's deprivation of property was thus considered
inappropriate, arbitrary and in breach of Article 21 of the American Convention.254
In the words ofOrrego:
It was [...] held that although the claimant was not deprived of his property of
company shares, he was in fact deprived by judicial decision of the fundamental
rights associated with such property, namely the right to vote in the company and to
receive dividends.255
Article 14 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also
establishes the right of expropriation by implication.256 The terms of this provision
are broad. In conformity with it, not only "[t]he right to property shall be
guaranteed", but also "[i]t may only be encroached upon in the interest of public
need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the
provisions of appropriate laws".257 Like Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the
European Convention, and contrary to Article 21 of the American Convention,
Article 14 does not refer explicitly to the payment of compensation in any form. The
few pronouncements of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
regarding this provision relate with the state's sealing up of premises of
publications.258 In Media Rights Agenda, the African Commission found a violation
to the right protected by Article 14 in these terms:
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The right of property necessarily includes a right to have access to property of one's
own and the right that one's property not be removed. The decrees which enabled
these premises to be sealed up and for publications to be seized cannot be said to be
'appropriate' or in the interest of the public or the community in general. [...] In
addition, the seizure of the magazines for reasons that have not been shown to be in
259
the public need or interest also violates the right to property.
This view was reaffirmed in Constitutional Rights Project, where the African
Commission declared:
The government did not offer any explanation for the sealing up of the premises of
many publications, but maintained the seizure in violation of direct court orders. [...]
The right to property necessarily includes a right to have access to one's property
and the right not to have one's property invaded or encroached upon. The Decrees
which permitted the newspapers' premises to be sealed up and publications to be
seized cannot be said to be 'appropriate' or in the interest of the public or the
community in general. The Commission finds a violation of Article 14.260
3.1.2. The European Convention and property
The Council of Europe advanced in 1950 the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.261 Its aim was, to encourage a cohesive
democratic bloc of states that would serve as a buttress against communism and the
resurgence of national-socialism.262 Better known as the European Convention on
Human Rights, this international agreement had to reflect the views of the members
of the Council, which ranged from capitalist to socialist states. For this purpose, its
drafters tried to include those core values that create and maintain a democratic
259 Communications 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional
Rights Project v. Nigeria, African Commission HPR, 12th Activity Report 1998-99, Annex V, para.
77, in R Murray and M Evans (ed), Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights (2001), at 727.
260 Communications 140/94, 141/94 and 145/95, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties
Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, African Commission HPR, 13 Activity Report
1999-2000, Annex V, para. 54, as quoted in Evans and Murray, supra note 259, at 175.
261 This treaty entered into force in 1953.
262 H Mountfield, 'Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of the European Court of
Human Rights', (2003) 11 NYU EU 136, at 138.
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society, while at the same time respecting the political, social and economic
differences of the parties, present at the moment of its signature.263 Based on Article
17 of the Universal Declaration, the earliest list of basic civil and political rights
considered by the first drafting committee of the European Convention did include
the right of property, but it was later deleted on the suggestion that this right was not
a fundamental requirement of a democratic society.264 According to Robertson and
Merrills, it was then clear that the inclusion of the right of property would only be
acceptable to Western socialist governments if the relevant provision would not
prevent states from nationalising private property.265 The Council decided not to
defer the signature of the European Convention until an agreement on an acceptable
wording for this right and those of education and to free elections would be
reached.266 The right of property was, therefore, not included in the adopted text of
this treaty. Two years later, an agreement on the wording of the protection of
property was reached. Incorporated in Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the
European Convention, it said:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.267
263 See ibid., 138-9.
264 See D Harris, M O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights
(1995), 516; and J Merrills and A Robertson, Human Rights in Europe. A Study of the European
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The right of property has been dubbed the problem child of the European
family of rights and freedoms.268 The difficulties that surrounded its introduction
among those protected by the European Convention explain the fact that Article 1
neither mentions expropriation as such, nor includes the right to be compensated in
an express form. This right is only implied in the reference to general principles of
international law regarding deprivations of property, a formula adopted as a
compromise between those states in favour of mentioning compensation and those
against it.269
Article 1 was soon criticised in doctrine as an inadequate and excessively weak
provision, establishing an economic and social entitlement rather than a proper
right.270 The European Court of Human Rights has not shared this vision. According
to it, by recognising the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, Article 1 is in
substance guaranteeing the right of property of both tangible and intangible assets.
The wording of the other official version of the European Convention confirms the
conclusion of the Court. In the French text, the first paragraph of Article 1 talks
about "biens" and "propiete", instead of "possessions".271 The European Court,
however, has not considered the right to acquire property as protected by the
• 272 • • • iConvention. In this context, the European Commission and Court have interpreted
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possessions to comprise, for instance, contractual rights273, company shares274,
*)HC TT7 ")"7Q
goodwill in a business , fishing rights , patents , and planning permissions.
According to Condorelli, neither the Commission nor the Court have identified with
precision the contours of the right of property, thus allowing the progressive
enlargement of this legal concept according to the needs of an evolving society.279
But such approach is not without limits. The European Court, for example, has
considered the enjoyment of aesthetic or environmental qualities of possessions as
not guaranteed under Article l.280
The meaning given by the European Court to the term possessions is an
autonomous one.281 As a consequence, the determination of its existence in a specific
situation is not affected by the non-recognition of an interest as a right or its legal
qualification, when recognised, under the relevant municipal law.282 Nevertheless,
273 See A, B and Company AS v. Federal Republic ofGermany, Eur. Commission HR, No. 7742/76,
(1978) 14 Decisions and Reports 146.
274 See Bramelid & Malmstrom v. Sweden, Eur. Commission HR, Nos. 8588/79 and 8589/79, (1982)
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the correspondent applicant must demonstrate that his interest has an economic
value. That is to say, in the words of Clayton and Tomlinson, a legal right to some
benefit, even if is contingent upon satisfaction of certain conditions.283 Expectations
are generally not regarded as possessions because they lack the necessary degree of
certainty or concreteness.284 Exceptionally, the European Court has considered them
within this concept. Licences to serve alcoholic beverages285 or to extract gravel286,
among others, are included in this term only if the licence-holder has a reasonable
and legitimate expectation as to their lasting nature.287 From this perspective, claims
can also be considered possessions.288 This is how the European Court construed in
Pressos Compania Naviera, for instance, the legitimate expectation that an
unresolved claim will be decided in accordance with the general law.289 In sum, as
the European Court observed in Kopecky:
'Possessions' can be either 'existing possessions' or assets, including claims, in
respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a 'legitimate
expectation' of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast,
the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise
effectively cannot be considered a 'possession' within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-
fulfilment of the condition290.
283
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284
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It took some time before the first case on Article 1 was decided by the
European Court.291 The increasingly complex regulations, derived from the market-
oriented policies favoured in the continent during the last decades, and the
establishment of the individual right of petition before the Court by Protocol 11 of
the European Convention292, prompted a large and authoritative case-law on Article
1. State measures can interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in three
different degrees under this provision. Lesser interferences, deprivations, and
controls on the use of property have been identified by the European Court ofHuman
Rights as distinct, but somehow connected rules.294 The second and third rules -this
is, deprivations and controls on its use- are particular instances of the first rule -i.e.
of lesser interferences with possessions.295 The fact that these rules are related
explains the general approach of the European Court when considering cases under
Article 1. The tribunal will first establish whether a deprivation or a control on the
use of property has taken place: in both cases there has to be a reasonable and
291 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court HR, Series A No. 24, Judgment, 7 December 1976.
292 In force since 1998.
293 See Gretton, supra note 271, at 291.
294This test was first applied by the European Court in 1982. See Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden,
Eur. Court HR, Series A No. 52, Judgment, 23 September 1982, para. 61.
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foreseeable national legal basis for the measure.296 Only if neither has occurred, will
it study whether the state has interfered with this right in any other way.297
3.2. The peaceful enjoyment of possessions
Under Article 1, the state can justify interferences with the right of property "in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by the law and by the
general principles of international law", in relation with the second rule, and "in the
general interest", in relation with the third rule. It is unlikely that any particular
distinction was intended between public and general interest. The European Court
has not attempted to distinguish them either.298 Moreover, the tribunal has applied a
single test for the three rules at the moment of establishing whether an interference is
justified or not. Each will require the achievement of a fair balance between the
interests of the individual and the community. In the application of the balance test,
the correspondent state has consistently been given a wide margin of appreciation not
only to identify the public or general interest involved, but also to assess if it prevails
over that of individuals or legal entities.299 This margin is wider in cases falling
under the third rule.300 The payment of compensation will generally play an
296 Mountfield, supra note 262, at 141.
297 See T Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005), 110-2; and Ovey and White, supra
note 278, at 347.
298
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299
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important role in the determination of the proportionality of an interference with
301 •
property. The European Court expressly declared so in James:
Clearly, compensation terms are material to the assessment whether the contested
legislation respects a fair balance between the various interests at stake and, notably,
302
whether it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants.
Given the common analytical approach adopted by this tribunal to all
interventions with property, the practical relevance of the distinction among lesser
interferences, deprivations and controls on use, lies in the payment of
compensation.303 According to the case-law of the European Commission and Court,
lesser interferences and controls on the use of property do not create a right to
compensation. In cases of deprivation, these institutions have considered that the
protection of Article 1 would be illusory and ineffective in the absence of a
compensatory principle equivalent to that of European comparative law.304 Full
compensation is, nevertheless, not guaranteed in all circumstances.305
3.2.1. Lesser interferences
The European Court of Human Rights first distinguished state interferences
with property, different from deprivations or controls on its use, in the most widely
,01
Anderson, supra note 268, at 548.
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cited judgment under Article 1 of the Protocol.306 In Sporrong, the Swedish
government had granted long-term expropriation permits to the city of Stockholm.307
Although not depriving the applicants' rights by themselves, these permits gave the
authorities the power to do so in the future. The city of Stockholm then adopted
prohibitions on construction on the applicants' properties. After being in force for
twenty three and eight years, respectively, Mr. Sporrong and Mr. Lonnroth
complained that these permits made it impossible to sell or build anything in these
properties, and difficult to invest or obtain mortgages for them. The applicants
argued that this situation amounted to an interference with their right to a peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions. The European Commission of Human Rights found
no violation of Article 1, and concluded that the measures where enforced in the
general interest and where thus justifiable.308 But the approach of the European Court
in this case was both different and novel. Before Sporrong, it was generally assumed
that claims related with Article 1 should take the form of either a deprivation or a
control on the use of property. In Sporrong, the European Court found that the state
can interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions by measures that do not
amount to deprivations or controls on its use. Applying the fair balance test between
the individual and community interests, this tribunal concluded that a violation of the
rule established in the first sentence of Article 1 had taken place.309
Loizidou is another example of a finding on lesser interferences. This case
originated in an application against Turkey lodged with the European Commission
306 C Yannaca-Small, "Indirect Expropriation' and the 'Right to Regulate' in International Investment
Law', in OECD, Working Papers on International Investment (2004), Nr. 4, at 13.
307 Under the 1972 Expropriation Act.
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309
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by a Cypriot national.310 Mrs. Loizidou owned land in northern Cyprus before the
Turkish occupation. After it, she was prevented from returning and enjoying her
property. The Court considered the continuous denial of access to Mrs. Loizidou's
land by Turkish military personnel as an interference with her rights under Article 1.
But it did not regard the violation as a deprivation or a control on the use of property.
The tribunal regarded the breach to "clearly fall [...] within the meaning of the first
sentence of that provision [...] as an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions" and observed "that hindrance can amount to a violation of the
Convention just like a legal impediment".311
Although the condition of public or general interest is not expressly mentioned
in this sentence of Article 1, the European Court has considered it applicable to any
interference by the host-state within this provision. In Beyeler, the tribunal declared
that:
The principle of a 'fair balance' inherent in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 itself
presupposes the existence of a general interest of the community. [...] it should be
reiterated that the various rules incorporated in Article 1 are not distinct in the sense
of being unconnected and that the second and third rules are concerned only with
particular instances [...]. One of the effects of this is that the existence of a 'public
interest' required under the second sentence, or the 'general interest' referred to in
the second paragraph, are in fact corollaries of the principle set forth in the first
sentence, so that an interference with the exercise of the right to the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 must
312also pursue an aim in the public interest.
The distinction between deprivations and controls on the use of possessions is
not always easy. According to van Dijk and van Hoof, when property is clearly
affected by a state measure and it is not possible to identify a deprivation or a control
on its use, the European Court will decide the respective case in conformity with the
310
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rule laid down in the first sentence of Article l.313 Lesser interferences are, therefore,
a residual category in this provision.314 Ovey and White observe that the Court has
adopted a broad approach to the notion of the control on the use of property, leaving
comparatively few cases to be considered under this rule.315 The European
Commission and Court had found violations to the protection of peaceful enjoyment
of possessions in, for instance, the refusal of a housing licence to an applicant to live
in his own house316; the provisional transfer of the applicants' land to other
landowners as part of a consolidation plan317; the annulment by law of an arbitration
award in favour of the applicants318; an urban development scheme which impeded
the development of the applicant's property for many years319; and public interest
declarations -issued as a preliminary expropriation-, and prohibitions to build or
change the use of certain parcels of land.320 Anderson observes that lesser
interferences:
[have] been applied to both restrictions which are consistent with Article 1 and
might just as well have been characterised as controls of use, and to particularly
321
blatant interferences which could easily have been described as deprivations.
More recently, the European Court considered the problem of interferences
with the right of peaceful enjoyment of possessions in one of the numerous cases
involving claims of restitution of property from central and eastern European states.
313 Van Dijk and Van Hoof, supra note 280, at 626; and A Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the
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Broniowski relates to the re-drawing of the eastern border of Poland after the Second
World War along the Bug River322. Polish nationals living in those territories beyond
it were then repatriated and had to abandon their property. Poland took upon itself
the obligation to compensate these people. As other repatriates, Mr. Broniowski was
entitled to buy land from the state and have the value of his abandoned property
considered in the purchase price. Because of the number of persons involved in this
scheme323, Poland decided to reduce the pool of land available to them by excluding
state agricultural and military property. The Polish state was therefore unable to fulfil
its obligation of compensation. When this exclusion was later declared
unconstitutional, Poland considered its duty to be discharged towards all those
repatriates that had been somehow compensated. In the case of Mr. Broniowski, this
meant approximately two per cent of the value of the house and land abandoned by
his grandmother. Applying the fair balance test, the European Court concluded that
the applicant "as an individual [...] had to bear a disproportionate and excessive
burden which cannot be justified in terms of the legitimate general community
interest pursued by the authorities".324 A violation of Article 1 was thus found.
The concept of lesser interferences developed by the European Court has
exerted some influence in other international fora. It reappeared in the case-law of
the Iran-US CT, particularly in its decisions construing the phrase "other measures
affecting property rights".325 The notion of lesser interferences also looms, for
322
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instance, in Cinco Pensionistas, a case brought before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. As its name indicates, Cinco Pensionistas referred to five individuals
affected by an arbitrary -and considerable- de facto reduction of their pensions by
Peru.326 As in Ivcher, the Inter-American Court ruled against the Peruvian state. In
this case, however, the tribunal avoided any express mention of a deprivation of
property, opting for rather vaguer terms as conculcar -to infringe- or violar -to
breach.327
3.2.3. Control on the use ofproperty
The second paragraph of Article 1 refers to state measures that fall short of
deprivation, but interfere with the right of property to a higher degree than those
established in the first sentence of this provision. The state has a wide power to
enforce those laws that are necessary to control the use, enjoyment or disposition of
property in conformity with the general interest328, or to secure the payment of taxes.
So is its margin of appreciation to judge the necessity of the measure adopted, from
the standpoint of the principle of fair balance.329 This means that the review of the
state action by the European Court will be limited to the establishment of a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised.330 Compensation will not always be payable for controls on use
See, in general, Chapter 4 infra.
326 See Cinco Pensionistas case, supra note 249.
327 Ibid., para. 121.
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329
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of property. Its availability, however, will be one of the factors taken into account in
the assessment of the balance test, and its payment should normally support a finding
of non-violation of Article l.331 This criterion of fair balance is flexible. A measure
will be disproportionate when the public interest could have been satisfied without
imposing an excessive burden on someone. In practice, the European Court will not
easily conclude that a fair balance between the individual and community interest
was lacking/'32 Chassagnou and Hutten-Czapska are rare examples of cases in which
the Court found state authorities to fail the proportionality test when controlling the
use of property.
Chassagnou was referred by the European Commission to the Court, and was
based on the application lodged by ten French nationals claiming that the compulsory
transfer of the hunting rights over their land to a municipal hunters association
constituted a violation to Article l.333 The claimants were forced to tolerate the
presence of armed men and gun dogs on their land every year, even though they did
not want to hunt on their land, and objected -on ethical grounds- to the fact that
others might come to it and do so. Although the Court noted that the claimants had
not been deprived of their right of property, it also noted that the compulsory transfer
of their hunting rights over it prevented them from using these rights which are
directly linked to that of property.334 The tribunal did recognise a general interest in a
See, also, Mellacher and others v. Austria, Eur. Court HR, Series A No. 169, Judgment, 19 December
1989, para. 48; AGOSI case, supra note 295, para. 52; and Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy, Eur. Court
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331 Nevertheless, in several cases the European Commission and Court have concluded that the
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law aimed at avoiding unregulated hunting and encouraging the rational management
of game stocks.335 Nonetheless, it concluded that the result of the concrete measure
established by such a law -this is, compelling small landowners to transfer hunting
rights over their land, so that others can make use of it in a way which is totally
incompatible with their beliefs- placed the claimants in a situation which upsets the
fair balance between the protection of the right of property and the requirements of
the general interest. As a consequence, the European Court found the control on use
to constitute a violation ofArticle l.336
Hutten-Czapska also originated in an application lodged with the European
Commission, later transferred to the Court when Protocol 11 to the European
Convention came into force.337 The claimant complained about the situation created
by the implementation of laws which imposed tenancy agreements and set an
inadequate level of chargeable rent on her property in Poland. These measures were
implemented as part of special lease-schemes applied during the communist regime
and temporarily after its demise. As in Chassagnou, the European Court noted that
the claimant never lost her right to sell her property and that the authorities did not
apply any measures resulting in the transfer of her ownership. Nevertheless, it
acknowledged the fact that:
she could not exercise her right of use in terms of physical possession as the house
was occupied by the tenants and that her rights in respect of letting the flats,
including her right to receive rent and to terminate leases, were subject to a number
338of statutory limitations.
In Hutten-Czapska, the Court again recognised a general interest in the laws










protection of tenants and ensuring the gradual transition from state-controlled rent to
a fully negotiated contractual rent, during the period of reform after the collapse of a
communist regime.339 The Court, however, found that the laws enacted and
implemented by the state entailed a disproportionate and excessive burden on the
claimant, one which cannot be justified by any legitimate interest of the community
pursued by it.340
Even though Article 1 does not expressly require controls on the use of
property to be in conformity with law, the European Court has considered itself
competent to review the lawfulness of these measures.341 The tribunal will respect
the legislature's judgment on the general interest involved in cases of control on the
use, unless that appraisal is manifestly not in accordance with law342 or without
reasonable foundation.343 In this context, purposes considered to be in the general
interest are, for instance, social and economic policies related with town planning344;
alcohol consumption345; housing346; the protection of nature347 and the
environment348; and the combat of international drugs trafficking.349 Regarding taxes,
contributions, and penalties, the European Commission has declared that taxation
measures will adversely affect the guarantee established in the second paragraph of
Article 1 only if they place an excessive burden on the person concerned or
339 Ibid, para. 160.
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fundamentally interfere with his financial position.350 In relation with measures taken
by the state to enforce tax obligations, the European Court has held that it will
respect the authorities' assessment unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation.351 As
a result, the second paragraph of Article 1 allows national authorities an almost
unlimited power to impose restrictions on the use of property in accordance with the
general interest.352
In contrast with the narrow reading given by the European Court to the notion
of deprivation, the concept of control on the use of property has received a wider
one. Clayton and Tomlinson, point out that the elimination of one of the bundle of
rights comprising ownership, for instance, will usually not be enough to deprive
someone of his or her ownership, but this infringement may amount to a control on
the use of property.353 However, not all interference short of deprivation will
necessarily be considered such an act by the European Court.354 A state may control
the use of property by requiring certain actions or imposing certain restrictions in the
activities of individuals and legal entities.355 The European Court has a longstanding
tendency to classify measures that by most ordinary standards would be considered
deprivations as controls on use.356 The seizure of obscene publications357; refusal to
register as certified accountants358; withdrawal of licences359; rent controls36 ;
350 See Svenska Mcmagementgruppen v. Sweden, No 11036/84, (1985) 45 Decisions and Reports 211,
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planning restrictions361; temporary seizure of property in criminal proceedings362;
temporary seizure of an aircraft for drugs enforcement363; and retrospective tax
legislation364, are all examples of control on the use of property. Under the second
paragraph of Article 1, states are even entitled to adopt measures which affect the
execution of contracts in force.365
3.3. Expropriation in the European Convention
According to the second sentence of Article 1, deprivations of property are
permitted if the respective state measure is adopted in the public interest, subject to
the conditions provided by national law, and by the general principles of
international law. Expropriations, as such, are not mentioned in this provision.
Nevertheless, the European Court has considered the notion of deprivation to cover
not only direct takings of property, but also measures that amount to them.366 The
tribunal explained in Sporrong that:
In the absence of a formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of ownership, the
Court [...] must look behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the
situation complained of [...]. Since the Convention is intended to guarantee rights
that are "practical and effective" [...], it has to be ascertained whether that situation
367amounted to a de facto expropriation [...].
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Neither a sole-effect nor a police-powers approach is followed by the European
Court on the problem of indirect takings. Ovey and White observe that the extinction
of the rights of the owner will be the main criterion at the moment of determining
whether a deprivation has taken place.368 However, not all acts producing this result
will necessarily constitute an expropriation. They might well be treated as a control
on the use of property.369 Within this context, the destruction of property will be
tantamount to a deprivation.370 A restriction of rights will not constitute an
expropriation, though it might be a lesser interference.371 Temporary seizures of
property will not constitute deprivations, but they might amount to a control on the
use of property.372 According to Clayton and Tomlinson, when there is no formal
extinction of legal rights, in general:
the Court has been cautious in finding that [an] interference might nevertheless
amount to 'deprivation' in fact. Such a 'de facto deprivation' can only be established
where there has been a substantial interference with the enjoyment of possessions,
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3.3.1. Indirect takings and public interest
One of the cases were the European Court of Human Rights did find a
deprivation of property in the form of an indirect expropriation is
Papamichalopoulos. This dispute related to the transference of the applicants' land to
a Navy fund in Greece. Although such property was not available for state disposal
under Greek law at that moment, the Navy constructed a base and a holiday resort in
the area. The applicants obtained domestic judicial recognition of their titles to the
land, but could not enforce these judgments. Different attempts were made to obtain
from the authorities land of equal value in exchange, but all failed. The applicants
further claimed damages for the land transfers without success in the Greek courts.
The European Court found an interference with the applicants' right of property.
Although the applicants were never formally expropriated, since the property was in
fact transferred to the Navy, they were "unable either to make use of their property or
to sell, bequeath, mortgage or make a gift of it".374 The European Court concluded
that this interference was not for the purpose of controlling the use of property and:
that the loss of all ability to dispose of the land in issue, taken together with the
failure of the attempts made so far to remedy the situation complained of, entailed
sufficiently serious consequences for the applicants de facto to have been
expropriated in a manner incompatible with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of
their possessions.375
An indirect taking was also found by the European Court in relation with a
different kind of state measure. In Hentrich, the applicants bought land in France,
over which -some months later- the tax authorities of Alsace exercised a right of pre¬
emption based on a French law, then in force, that allowed the state to offer the
374





owners to pay the price specified in the contract of sale, and a ten per cent premium
provided for by law, when the sale price was considered to be too low. The purpose
of this right was to prevent tax evasion. The applicants unsuccessfully challenged the
measure adopted by the French authorities in domestic courts, before turning to the
European Court in search of redress. The application of the fair balance test to this
case led the European Court to find a violation of Article 1, mainly because:
as a selected victim of the exercise of the right of pre-emption, Mrs Hentrich 'bore
an individual and excessive burden' which could have been rendered legitimate only
if she had had the possibility -which was refused her- of effectively challenging the
measure taken against her.376
Another example of an indirect expropriation is Pressos Compania Naviera. In
this case, the applicants' ships were involved in collisions in territorial waters of
Belgium and the Netherlands, as a result of the negligence of Belgian pilots on board
of these. Some of the applicants initiated legal proceedings against the Belgian state
and others against a private company offering pilot services. None were successful
on account of a Belgian law that exempted retroactively the state and other
organisers of pilot services from their liability for negligent acts.377 According to the
European Court, this law:
simply extinguished, with retrospective effect going back thirty years and without
compensation, claims for very high damages that the victims of the pilot accidents
could have pursued against the Belgian State or against the private companies
3/8
concerned, and in some cases even in proceedings that were already pending.
The tribunal found that a fair balance between the individual and collective
interests was not kept. Therefore, an interference with the applicants' right of
property had taken place. According to the European Court, a violation of Article 1
was committed, since:
376 Hentrich v. France, Eur. Court HR, Series A No. 296-A, Judgment, 22 September 1994, para. 49.
377




[t]he financial considerations cited by the Government and their concern to bring
Belgian law into line with the law of neighbouring countries could warrant
prospective legislation in this area to derogate from the general law of tort.
Such considerations could not justify legislating with retrospective effect with the
379
aim and consequence of depriving the applicants of their claims for compensation.
Directly related with the fair balance test is the notion of public interest. In
conformity with the second sentence of Article 1, the measure resulting in a
deprivation must be aimed at this objective. Although there is no conventional
definition of such a term, the European Court has considered it to be similar to that of
general interest, known in international law as public purpose.380 This condition will
require a balancing of the individual and collective concerns.381 The object of such a
test is to differentiate, as Higgins worded it, takings for purely private gain on the
part of the ruler from those for reasons related to the economic and social preferences
of the country concerned.382
The European Court has given the state great autonomy when adopting
measures that interfere with the right of property. According to Ovey and White, for
the tribunal there is almost a presumption that a national measure is in the public
interest.383 This explains its reluctance to review the identification of the collective
interest involved made by the state adopting the respective measure.384 In early cases
related with takings of property, the European Commission and Court held that states
••• f f TOC t
had an unlimited right to determine the necessity of such deprivation. This almost
absolute right has been replaced by the wide margin of appreciation illustrated in
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James. In this case, the applicants were trustees -acting under a will- of an area in
central London where a large estate was developed. A leasehold law conferred rights
of acquisition to the occupants of this estate. A number of them exercised this right
and deprived the trustees of their ownership in a number of properties. The
applicants claimed that this compulsory transfer gave rise to a violation of Article 1.
In essence, the applicants were complaining against the terms and conditions of the
contested legislation, not against the manner of execution of the law by a state
authority.386 From this perspective, the European Court started its analysis of the
situation by declaring that:
a deprivation of property effected for no reason other than to confer a private benefit
on a private party cannot be 'in the public interest'. Nonetheless, the compulsory
transfer of property from one individual to another may, depending upon the
387
circumstances, constitute a legitimate means for promoting the public interest.
Not only did this tribunal consider that the taking of property in pursuance of a
policy calculated to enhance social justice within the community can be properly
described as being in the public interest, but also that an expropriation adopted in
pursuance of a legitimate policy may be in such an interest, even if the community at
large has no direct use or enjoyment of the property taken.388 The European Court's
general view on the margin of appreciation provides a clear guideline on how to
approach other cases involving deprivations of property for public purpose:
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate
what is 'in the public interest'. Under the system of protection established by the
Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment both
of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation
of property and of the remedial action to be taken [...].
Furthermore, the notion of'public interest' is necessarily extensive. In particular, as
the Commission noted, the decision to enact laws expropriating property will
commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social issues on which
386 James and others case, supra note 295, para. 36.
387
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opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court,
finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the
legislature's judgment as to what is 'in the public interest' unless that judgment be
389
manifestly without reasonable foundation.
The justification for this wide margin of appreciation is, then, that national
authorities know better the needs of their societies.390 This extensive conception of
public purpose makes it unlikely for any tribunal to deny the general interest claimed
by the state adopting a measure that deprives someone of his or her property.391 On
this basis, for instance, the European Court concluded that the leasehold law
involved in James was compatible with Article 1. This margin, although
considerable, is not without limits and -as the European Court declared in
Broniowski- "the exercise of the State's discretion, even in the context of the most
complex reform of the State, cannot entail consequences at variance with Convention
standards".392 According to Ruiz Fabri:
[t]he Court's review is limited in practice to verifying whether, in the abstract, the
deprivation of property has pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest. This
393
means that any probing judicial review will focus on other criteria.
3.3.2.. Conditions providedfor by law
In conformity with the second sentence of Article 1, an expropriatory measure
must be subject not only to the conditions established in municipal law, but also to
those established in the general principles of international law. This means that any
taking in breach of domestic norms amounts to a violation of Article 1,394 The act of
389
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deprivation adopted by the state must have a basis in municipal rules.395 The
European Court has considered this condition not merely to refer back to domestic
norms, but also to the quality of these rules, "requiring it to be compatible with the
rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention".396
National law should, therefore, be adequately accessible and sufficiently precise.397
In addition, it must have foreseeable consequences, and the taking itself should be
surrounded by basic procedural safeguards.398 Whether the deprivation is subject to
the conditions provided by municipal law requires a case-to-case analysis, where the
European Court will only look for manifest violations of domestic norms.399 It will
not examine the correct application of national law. In this respect, the European
Court will refer to the judgment of the relevant domestic court in order not to
function as a "fourth instance".400
The second sentence of Article 1 also means that any taking in breach of the
general principles of international law will amount to a violation of it. These
principles entitle non-nationals to protection against arbitrary expropriations by the
host state in the form of compensation for the loss of their property.401 According to
Ruiz Fabri, a special reference to them was a result of a compromise between states
which refused any mention of compensation and states which desired such a
mention.402 European case-law actually describes, in general, a form of protection
395
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that is very close to the requirements of these principles of international law.403 The
standard of compensation is, however, only incorporated for cases of deprivation, not
for those related with controls on the use or lesser interferences with property.404
Article 1 would strongly imply that there is no duty to compensate for normal
regulation.405
The European Court has concluded that a reference to the general principles of
international law does not entitle nationals of the expropriating state to this
guarantee.406 While such an approach conforms to the international minimum
standard enjoyed by foreigners under international law, it contradicts the equal
application of human rights law in the host-state. It also runs counter the European
Convention itself, for Article 14 expressly prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment
of its substantive rights on grounds of national origin. The reason for this position
was explained in James in the following terms:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform,
there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals and
non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are
more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have
played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted
on its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in
the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals and non-nationals
and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater
burden in the public interest than non-nationals.407
The tribunal confirmed their exclusion from the protection of Article 1 by
referring to the travaux preparatoires of the Protocol.408 There would be,
consequently, no compensation for the deprivations of the property of nationals of
404
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the host state. At least, in theory. Due to the application of the fair balance test,
however, their position is rarely -if ever- less favourable than that of non-
nationals.409 As the European Court declared in Holy Monasteries:
the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value
will normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of
compensation can be considered justifiable under Article 1 only under exceptional
circumstances.410
Regarding the standard of compensation in case of deprivation, the Court has
not followed international law. While according to the latter, the alien is entitled to a
prompt, adequate and effective compensation of the value of his of her property
taken, Article 1 requires neither this standard nor the same level of compensation for
every category of deprivation.411 The European Court will give the state a wide
margin of appreciation when it comes to compensation. That is to say, it will respect
the judgment of the domestic authorities on the terms and conditions of the
compensation, unless that it is manifestly without reasonable foundation.412 For this
purpose, the European Court will distinguish between nationalisations and other
forms of takings, as the state's margin of appreciation appears to be wider in the
former. The tribunal explained in Lithgow that:
Article 1 (P1 -1) does not [...] guarantee a right to full compensation in all
circumstances, since legitimate objectives of 'public interest', such as pursued in
measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice,
may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.413
According to the European Court, the amount of compensation due in case of
deprivation is that reasonably related to the value of the expropriated property. In any
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case, compensation must be adequate. This is, it should take into account the damage
arising from the length of the deprivation, and be paid within a reasonable time 414
Excessive delays in receiving final compensation by those deprived of their property
will amount to a breach of the fair balance requirement.415
3.4. Conclusion
The right of property of tangible and intangible assets is protected, primarily,
by regional instruments of human rights. Among these, one provision stands out as
the main source for the study of expropriation in this area of international law:
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention. The case-law related with
this provision recognises three different, but connected rules. A single test is applied
to determine if the measure interfering with this right is justifiable: the observance of
a fair balance between the interests of the individual and the community. National
authorities have a wide margin of appreciation at the moment of establishing whether
this test is observed or not. The European Court has adopted a broad notion of
control on use, thus leaving few cases to be considered as deprivations or lesser
interferences. A measure that interferes with the right of property to a higher degree
than a lesser interference, but falls short of a deprivation, is a control on the use. The
state may exercise this control by requiring certain actions or imposing certain
restrictions in the activities of persons. To this respect, the power of the state is
almost unlimited. The European Court will respect the judgment of the national
414 Guillemin v. France, Eur. Court HR, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-1, Judgment, 21
February 1997, para. 54.
415 Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcao and Others v. Portugal, Eur. Cout HR, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 2000-1, Judgment, 11 January 2000, para. 54.
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authorities regarding the general interest involved, unless this assessment is
manifestly not in accordance with law or without reasonable foundation. As with
lesser interferences, the control on the use of property does not create a right to
compensation for those affected by the respective measure.
The term expropriation is not expressly mentioned in Article 1. The European
Commission and Court have nevertheless interpreted the notion of deprivation of
possessions to cover both direct and indirect takings. The extinction of the owner's
legal rights is the benchmark at the moment of establishing whether an expropriation
has occurred. If there is no formal extinction of legal rights, an indirect taking will
require a substantial interference with the right of property. In conformity with
Article 1, measures that deprive a natural or legal person of the use of his possessions
must be adopted in the public interest. This term is not defined in the First Protocol,
but the European Court has identified it as general interest. In other words, public
purpose, as it is commonly known in international law. This requires a fair balance
between the welfare of the individual and the community. The European Court will
respect the sovereign exercise by the state of its sovereign right to expropriate. A
wide margin of appreciation will, therefore, be given to the national authorities at the
moment of judging the public interest of the respective measure. The expropriatory
act must also be subject to the conditions established by municipal and international
law. This does not only mean that the measure needs to be based in domestic norms
that are compatible with the rule of law. It also means that non-nationals are entitled
to compensation in case of expropriation. An international minimum standard is
therefore recognised to this respect, within the limits of the wording of Article 1. Full
compensation, nevertheless, is not guaranteed. According to the European Court, the
92
amount required by this provision is that reasonably related with the value of the
taken property. Again, the state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation when
establishing the standard of compensation. This range will be wider in cases of
nationalisations. In practice, both nationals of the host state and foreigners are
compensated for deprivations. The sole-effect doctrine is not found in Article 1 or in
its interpretation by the European Court. Facts that would normally be classified as
deprivations might be given the category of controls on use by this tribunal, even of
lesser interferences. This situation and the lack of an absolute standard of
compensation for the deprivation of property allows the European Court to take into
account not only the interests of the aliens, but also those of the host state, without
having to resort to the sole-effect's counterpart in cases of interference with the
rights of property: the police-powers theory.
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EXPROPRIATION IN THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
The Iran-US CT was set up in 1981 as part of the political compromise reached
by the Iranian and US governments. In conformity with its constitutive treaty, the
tribunal was established to settle disputes between the nationals of both states arising
out of interferences with a conventional international minimum standard of
treatment, which protected them against expropriations and other measures affecting
property rights. No definition was given in this instrument to property. The Iran-US
CT chose the traditional wide notion of foreign investment, comprising tangibles and
intangibles. Expropriation was interpreted by the tribunal as covering both de jure
and de facto takings, the latter derived not only from acts but also from omissions.
Before the establishment of the Iran-US CT, only a handful of decisions given by
claims commissions, the PCIJ, arbitral tribunals and the ICJ, had referred to the
expropriation of aliens.416 The judgments of the Iran-US CT formed the first clear
and detailed international case-law on this issue. The link between expropriation,
taking and deprivation was thus established in a generally coherent jurisprudence,
which illustrates when an act constitutes one and when it does not.
The tribunal recognised and developed the protection against expropriation
included in the customary international minimum standard, without losing sight of
the jurisdiction given in its constitutive treaty. The Iran-US CT did not hesitate to
solve the thorny issue of the state's intent at the moment of taking the property of an
4,6 See Chapter 7 infra.
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alien. Adopting a sole-effect approach in most of the cases brought before it, the
Iran-US CT awarded compensation when there was a non-ephemeral and
unreasonable interference of the state with the enjoyment of the constituent elements
of the right of property. That is to say, with the use or control of the property and of
the economic benefits derived from it. The tribunal also construed and applied the
notion of other measures affecting property rights, included in its jurisdiction.
Through the application of this concept the Iran-US CT was able to award
compensation in those situations were the deprivation did not amount to a taking. To
this effect, the tribunal relied on the interpretation given by the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights to the notion of lesser interferences.
The jurisprudence of the tribunal is, in general, expressly reasoned and publicly
available.417 For this reason, the work of the Iran-US CT constitutes an indispensable
guide for decision-makers confronted with the difficult problem of establishing the
boundaries of compensable and non-compensable state measures. International
arbitral tribunals in investor-to-state disputes have referred profusely in their awards
to the case-law of the Iran-US CT. The present chapter studies this jurisprudence. It
deals with the tribunal's definition of property and expropriation, as well as with its
views on those acts that constitute a taking and those that do not. The notion of other
measures affecting property rights, as developed in the case-law of this tribunal, is
duly analysed too. Finally, the traditional requirements of public purpose, non¬
discrimination and compensation are seen from the Iran-US CT's standpoint.
417 Art. 32 of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure of 3 May 1983.
Available at <http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008), or reprinted in
(1984) 2 Iran-US CTR 433.
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4.1. Takings in an ad hoc forum
The 1979 Iranian revolution that replaced the constitutional monarchy under
the Shah4n for an Islamic Republic under the Rahbar4'9, gave rise to most -if not all-
the expropriation claims presented to the Iran-US CT.420 In the context of a strong
anti-Western rhetoric that led to political and civil unrest, US business dependents
and representatives were gradually repatriated or forced to depart the country. The
new government wanted the complete control of certain vital sectors of the economy,
so banks, insurance companies, some heavy industries, and the oil industry were
nationalised in 1979 and 1980. Besides direct expropriations, the Iranian government
also implemented other measures that affected foreign investors. For example, it
encouraged the formation of workers' councils to manage their businesses, and
replaced those managers and directors designated by the respective company for
those appointed by the authorities of Iran. When at the end of 1979, the US Embassy
in Teheran was seized and nationals of this state were taken hostages, all existing
business contacts between the two countries were brought to an end.
Iran failed to comply with the orders to release the hostages issued by the
International Court of Justice in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran Case.42] An unsuccessful rescue operation launched by the US ensued, as
418 Persian for "monarch", the title of former Iranian rulers.
419 Persian for "supreme leader", currently the highest political and religious authority in Iran.
420 G Aldrich, The Jurisprudence ofthe Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1996), 171.
See, also, C Brower, 'Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation: A
Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal', (1987) 21 II 639, at 641-3;
or Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 369-72.
421 See S Riesenfeld and D Caron, 'United States-Iran Agreement of January 19, 1981 (Hostages and
Financial Agreements)', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV, at 1218-7.
See, in general, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (US v. Iran),
International Court of Justice, Provisional Measures, 15 December 1979, (1979) ICJ Rep:, and United
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well as the adoption of internal measures by the latter to exert economic pressure on
the new government in Iran, the most important of which was the freezing of Iranian
assets in the US. Negotiations finally took place between the two states during 1980
under the good offices of the Algerian government.422 The crisis was settled in 1981
through a group of treaties known as the "Algiers Accords", one of which was the
Claims Settlement Declaration that established the Iran-US CT.423
4.1.1. Defining property and expropriation
According to Article II paragraph 1 of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the
Iran-US CT was set up to resolve disputes between nationals of both countries
arising, among other things, out of "expropriations and other measures affecting
property rights". These disputes had to be resolved in conformity with Art. V of the
same treaty. This is:
on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of
commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking
into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
424
circumstances.
Although Article II paragraph 1 did not define "property rights", the tribunal
followed the general approach in international legal practice and opted for a broad
notion of property, including both tangibles and intangibles. This solution followed
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (US v. Iran), International Court of Justice,
Partial Judgment, 14 May 1980, (1980) ICJ Rep.
422 See Riesenfeld and Caron, supra note 421, at 1218-9.
423 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, (1983) 1 Iran-US CTR 9, or (1981) 20 ILM 231. Also available at
<http://www.iusct.org/claims-settlement.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
Besides the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Algiers Accords consisted of three political agreements
and two technical ones.
See Brower, supra note 420, at 640; and Riesenfeld and Caron, supra note 421, at 1219.
424 See J Wetsberg, 'Applicable Law, Expropriatory Takings and Compensations in Cases of
Expropriation: ICSID and Iran - United States Claims Tribunal Case Law Compared', (1993) 8/1
ICSID Rev. 1, at 5-6 & 8-10.
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that adopted by the 1922 Norwegian Shipowner's claim, the 1926 Chorzow Factory
case, and the 1934 Oscar Chinn case.425 In the interlocutory award of Starrett, the
Iran-US CT declared that property must be deemed to comprise physical assets as
well as contract rights.426 This wide concept was confirmed in the final award of the
same case, where the tribunal stated that "[i]t is a well-settled rule of customary
international law that a taking of one property right may also involve a taking of a
closely connected ancillary right".427 In conformity with this broad notion of
property, management rights428, the right to receive dividend payments429, and other
shareholders' rights and interests430, inter alia, would be included within the Claims
Settlement Declaration. The partial award of Amoco International Finance gave a
concept of takings that illustrates the wide scope of its object:
[expropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer of property rights,
may extend to any rights which can be the object of a commercial transaction, i.e.
freely sold and bought, and thus has a monetary value.431
425 See Norwegian Shipowners (Norway v. US), Anderson, Vogt, and Valloton, arbitrators, Award, 13
October, 1922, (1922) 1 RIAA 307, at 325; Factory at Chorzow case (Germany v Poland), PCIJ,
Judgment, 25 May 1926, (1926) PCIJ Rep. Series A No 7, at 44; and Oscar Chinn (UK v. Belgium),
PCIJ, Judgment, 12 December, 1934, (1934) PCIJ Rep. Series A/B No 63, at 88.
See, also, A Reinisch, 'Expropriation', 5-7. Unpublished paper of the International Law Association's
Committee on International Law on Foreign Investment, available at <http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdf/Foreign%20Investment/ILA%20paper%20Reinisch.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
426 Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc., v The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Iran-US CT, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-24-1,
19 December 1983, (1985) 4 Iran-US CTR 122, at 156-7.
427 Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc., v The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Iran-US CT, Final Award No. ITL 314-24-1, 14
August, 1987, (1988) 16 Iran-US CTR 122, at 230.
See, also, Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v The Islamic Republic of Iran and The National Iranian
Oil Company, Iran-US CT, Award No. 425-39-2, 29 June, 1989, (1990) 21 Iran-US CTR 79, at 115.
428 See SEDCO, Inc., and Sediran Drilling Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, and The
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, First Interlocutory Award No ITL 55-129-3, 28 October 1985,
(1987) 9 Iran-US CTR 248, at 277.
429 See Foremost Tehran, Inc. et al case, supra note 325, at 244-50.
430 See Thomas Earl Payne v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No.
245-335-2, 8 August 1986, (1988) 12 Iran-US CTR 3, at 7-11.
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This scope was, nonetheless, not unlimited. The tribunal excluded, for instance,
claims that sought compensation for personal injuries.432
The Iran-US CT considered expropriation and taking to be synonyms.
According to Mouri a distinction appears to have been made between these concepts
and deprivation. As he explains, in the tribunal's case-law "expropriation always
results in a deprivation of the owner of that property or right", but "the converse is
not always true: deprivation is not in all circumstances an act of expropriation".433 In
most cases where a deprivation was found, however, the tribunal did conclude that it
amounted to a taking.434 Judge Brower declared in Eastman Kodak that an
expropriation usually implies "that the State involved has itself acquired the benefit of
the affected alien's property or at least has been the instrument of its
redistribution".433 Acknowledging that this might not always be the case, in Tippets,
Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) the tribunal preferred to use "deprivation" over
"taking", because "the latter may be understood to imply that the Government has
acquired something of value, which is not required".436 Nevertheless, the Iran-US CT
concluded in the same case that both:
A deprivation or taking of property may occur under international law through
interference by a state in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits,
even where legal title to the property is not affected.437
432 See Manuchehr Haddadi v. The United States ofAmerica, Iran-US CT, Award No 162-763-3, 31
January 1985, (1987) 8 Iran-US CTR 20, at 22.
See, also, Jack Rankin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No 326-10913-2, 3
November 1987, (1988) 17 Iran-US CTR 135, at 148.
433
Mouri, supra note 10, at 88.
See, also, ibid., 66-9.
434 G Aldrich, 'What Constitutes a Compensable Taking: The Decisions of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal', (1994) 88 AJIL 585, at 589; or Aldrich, supra note 420, at 178; and Wetsberg, supra
note 424, at 15.
435 Eastman Kodak Company, Eastman Kodak International Sales Co., and Kodak Inc. case, supra
note 325, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Brower, at 173 & 181.
436
Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Iran-US CT, Award No. 141-7-2, 29 June 1984,
(1986) 6 Iran-US CTR 219, at 225.
437 Ibid.
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As illustrated in this last paragraph, the Iran-US CT construed the term
"expropriation" used in the Claims Settlement Declaration to cover not only de jure,
but also de facto takings.438 The tribunal dealt with few claims of direct expropriation,
and it had no problems in finding that a taking took place when there was an Iranian
law expressly nationalising an industry or a particular entity.439 The majority of the
cases brought before the tribunal were related with claims of indirect expropriation,
where either there was a de facto seizure of property without any formal declaration
announcing the taking, or there was such formal declaration, but a de facto taking had
allegedly occurred at an earlier date.440 Both acts and omissions were included in the
tribunal's case-law on indirect expropriation. The Iran-US CT generally required an
affirmative action from the government that adopted the challenged measure before
finding that a taking attributable to the latter had occurred.441
The tribunal further distinguished the term "taking" or "expropriation" from
"appropriation", the latter being not an act of the state, but of a private person -like
the party to a contract- that results in the owner's deprivation.442 Brower and
Brueschke point out that the tribunal's awards often seem "somewhat lax" when
keeping strict conceptual distinctions between acts constituting "expropriation",
"deprivation", or "appropriation". According to them, the main reason for this attitude
4,8 See Mouri, supra note 10, at 70-99; and Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 376-83.
439
See, e.g., American International Group, Inc. and American Life Insurance Company v. Islamic
Republic of Iran and Central Insurance of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No 93-2-3, 19 December 1983,
(1985) 4 Iran-US CTR 96; or Amoco International Finance case, supra note 43 1.
440
See Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 377-8.
See, also, M Brunetti, 'The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter 11, and the Doctrine
of Indirect Expropriation', (2001) 2 Chic. JIL 203, at 205.
441
Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 383.
442
Mouri, supra note 10, at 172-4.
See, e.g., SEDCO, Inc. v National Iranian Oil Company and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US
CT, Award No. 309-129-3, 7 July, 1987, (1988) 15 Iran-US CTR 23; and Component Builders, Inc.,
Wood Components Co. andMoshofsky Enterprises v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Maskan Iran
and Insurance Company of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 431-395-3, 10 August, 1989, (1991) 23
Iran-US CTR 3, at 25-7.
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was the fact that a decision of the tribunal was "immediately and automatically
satisfied from the Security Account, regardless of [its] theoretical basis".443
The establishment of the date of the taking was a difficult task for the judges.
Most of the indirect expropriation cases presented before the tribunal corresponded to
claims of creeping or constructive takings. This date was important not only in
relation to the jurisdictional deadline fixed in the constitutive treaty of the Iran-US
CT444, but also for the valuation of the property taken, the determination of the
exchange rate of the currency in which the compensation was to be paid, and the
moment from which the interest was to run on the award.445 International Technical
Products gave a solution to this problem in the following terms:
Where the alleged expropriation is carried out by way of a series of interferences in
the enjoyment of the property, the breach forming the cause of action is deemed to
take place on the day when the interference has ripened into more or less irreversible
deprivation of the property rather than on the beginning date of the events. The point
at which interference ripens into a taking depends on the circumstances of the case
and does not require that legal title has been transferred.446
In this case, the Iran-US CT considered expropriation claims to be outstanding
"on the date of the taking of property". This standard was later followed by several
other awards.447
441
Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 380.
444 The tribunal had jurisdiction over claims and counterclaims that were outstanding on the 19th of
January, 1981.
Art. II para. 1 of the Claims Settlement Declaration. See note 432, supra.
445 Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 430-1.
446 International Technical Products Corporation and ITP Export Corporation v. The Government of
Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Iran-US CT, Award No. 196-302-3, 24 October, 1985, (1987) 9 Iran-
US CTR 206, at 240-1.
447
See, e.g., International Systems & Controls Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Iran-
US CT, Award No. 256-439-2, 26 September, 1986, (1988) 12 Iran-US CTR 239, at 263; and Reza
Said Malek v. The Government ofthe Islamic Republic ofIran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 534-193-3, 11
August, 1992, (1996) 28 Iran-US CTR 246, at 288-9.
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4.1.2. Other measures affecting property rights
The international minimum standard, applicable under the Claims Settlement
Declaration, offered Iranian and US nationals a protection that went beyond that
traditionally offered by the law of expropriation. This instrument gave the Iran-US
CT jurisdiction over disputes arising not only out of expropriations, but also out of
"other measures affecting property rights". The tribunal found deprivations that fitted
this description in a number of cases where the level of the interference did not
amount to an actual taking.448 This phrase was given a broad meaning, and a variety
of measures -whether actions or omissions, and irrespective of their form of
execution- were considered to be able to affect the property of Iranian or US
nationals. Even the failure to exert due diligence in the protection of the foreign
investor, or a tortious act affecting his property, were exceptionally accepted as
included in this phrase.449 According to Mouri, in general:
the Tribunal's awards based on the phrase 'other measures affecting property rights'
required a threshold showing that the State committed serious, specific, and
unreasonable acts of interference with the actual use and benefit of a particular
property or with the fundamental property rights of a given claimant, with
irreversible deprivative consequence similar to that arising from expropriation.450
Heiskanen points out that the Iran-US CT resorted to "other measures"
exceptionally, and that only few claims were resolved solely on this basis, while the
448
Mouri, supra note 10, at 67-8: and Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 379.
449
See, e.g., Schering Corporation v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 122-38-3,
11 April 1984, (1985) 5 Iran-US CTR 361; and Alfred L. W. Short v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-
US CT, Award No. 312-11135-3, 14 July 1987,(1988) 16 Iran-US CTR 76.
Cf. Lillian Byrdine Grimm v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 25-71-1, 22
February, 1983, (1984) 2 Iran-US CTR 78, at 79; and International Systems & Controls Corporation
case, supra note 447, at 263-4.
See, in general, Mouri, supra note 10, at 119-29.
450
Mouri, supra note 10, at 129.
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bulk of them involved takings.451 The tribunal found the Iranian authorities liable for
subjecting the claimant to "other measures" in TAMS. An equally owned entity called
TAMS-AFFA had been created in 1975 by TAMS, a US partnership, and an Iranian
firm (AFFA)452, for the sole purpose of performing engineering and architectural
services on the Tehran International Airport. TAMS-AFFA's articles of partnership
established the joint control of the entity by its partners. This meant that any decision
should require the consent of at least one member appointed by TAMS and one
member appointed by AFFA, and that the authority to sign documents creating
obligations for TAMS-AFFA was vested in two individuals, one appointed by each
partner. At the beginning of 1979, the Tehran International Airport project stopped
almost completely as a result of the Iranian revolution. The government of Iran
appointed then a temporary manager for AFFA, who also assumed as manager of
TAMS-AFFA and started to sign by himself checks on its behalf, as well as making
personnel and other decisions without consulting TAMS. Negotiations took place
during 1979 between the US company and the manager of TAMS-AFFA with some
success, but this trend was reversed after the hostage crisis occurred at the end of the
same year, and TAMS-AFFA stopped reporting to the foreign investor and
responding to its letters and faxes. The Iran-US CT considered TAMS to be deprived
of its property interests in TAMS-AFFA from this moment. However, no taking was
found. The tribunal concluded that Iran was responsible for "other measures"
affecting the claimant's rights.453
Foremost Tehran is another example of a lesser interference with the property
of a foreign investor. That is to say, one that did not amount to an expropriation. In
451
Heiskanen (2003), supra note 60, at 179; and Heiskanen (2007), supra note 60, at 219.
452 Aziz Farmanfarmaian and Associates.
453 See Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) case, supra note 436, at 225.
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this case, a US group of companies (Foremost) owned a percentage in an Iranian joint
stock company (Pak Dairy).454 After expatriating its personnel in Iran, Pak Dairy
declared dividends in 1979, 1980 and 1981, and paid them to Iranian stockholders,
while refusing to pay them to the foreign investor.455 One of Foremost's main
representatives in Iran was ousted by the government from the board of directors in
1980 and replaced by an Iranian national acting on the instructions of his state. That
same year, Pak Dairy's board informed Foremost its decision of making no payments
to foreign shareholders. The US group claimed before the tribunal that a taking of its
interest in the company had occurred as a "cumulative result of a number of instances
of interference with the exercise of its rights as a shareholder".456 The Iran-US CT
established that the non-payment of dividends to Foremost was an interference with
its rights, compensable under the rubric of "other measures affecting property rights".
The tribunal supported its conclusion by reference to the Sporrong case, decided by
the European Court of Human Rights in 1982, where a violation of Article 1 of the
First Optional Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights was found in
the form of a lesser interference with the protected peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.457
In Eastman Kodak, a US investor established in Iran a corporation to act as
distributor of its products and to operate a finishing photo laboratory (Rangiran).458
With the advent of the Iranian revolution in 1978, Eastman Kodak's expatriate
management personnel left the country. Rangiran continued functioning with Iranian
454 Sherkat Sahami Labaniat Pasteurize Pak.
455
Exceptionally, the stock dividend declared in 1980 was distributed to Foremost too.
456 See Foremost Tehran, Inc. et al case, supra note 325, at 224.
457 See ibid., 251-2.
See, also, Chapter 3 supra.
458
Rangiran Photographic Services Co.
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nationals appointed by the foreign investor, who where later joined by a couple of US
nationals that returned to assume management functions in Iran. After the hostage
crisis in 1979, these last remaining expatriate officers left the country, and Rangiran's
accounts in Iranian banks were frozen by order of the government of Iran. A worker's
council conformed by employees of the company was then instructed to assume the
supervision of Rangiran and an Iranian national was appointed as its manager by the
state. The shareholders of the company decided in 1980 to place it in liquidation. The
worker's council accepted this decision, but later Iran sealed Rangiran's office
building, preventing the personnel from working until the company appointed a
liquidator acceptable to the government. The board of liquidators appointed by the
shareholders of the company declared Rangiran as bankrupt, an action that was later
confirmed by a court in Tehran. In its partial award the Iran-US CT found no
expropriation, especially because "the Claimant, as majority shareholder, was able
effectively to decide to liquidate and to declare Rangiran bankrupt".4''9 Nevertheless,
expressly following the Sporrong case and the award in Foremost, the tribunal was
satisfied that Eastman Kodak's claim for expropriation "must be taken to include a
claim for a lesser degree of interference with its property rights" and concluded that
Iran's actions amounted to "other measures".460
Karubian was yet another award based on "other measures affecting property
rights". In this proceeding, the Iranian state enacted land-reform acts in 1979 and
1982 by which certain undeveloped plots should become government property. The
implementation and enforcement of these norms remained contingent upon the
determination that the respective immovables were in fact undeveloped, but no such
459 Eastman Kodak Company, Eastman Kodak International Sales Co. and Kodak (Near East) Inc. case,
supra note 325, at 169.
460 Ibid.
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action was taken regarding Mr. Karubian's properties. The uncertainty as to the status
of these plots produced doubts over the ownership of the lands, since the
correspondent title deeds were susceptible of being cancelled at any time. Quoting
both Foremost Tehran and Eastman Kodak, the Iran-US CT found no expropriation
resulting from the Iranian legislation. The tribunal concluded, nonetheless, that the
uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the properties would have made it difficult
for the claimant to find a buyer for his plots. This situation represented an impairment
of his right to dispose of them and adversely affected Karubian's property under the
Claims Settlement Declaration.461 The facts of this case bring to mind those of the
Sporrong case and it came as no surprise that the Iran-US found no expropriation out
of the state's legislation, but "other measures affecting property rights".
4.2. The problem of indirect takings
The findings on expropriation of the Iran-US CT depended on the
circumstances that surrounded the respective claim and the type of property that was
taken.462 Almost in all of these cases, the tribunal applied customary international
law.463 In Harza Engineering, the Iran-US CT agreed with the claimant's assertion
"that a taking of property may occur under international law, even in the absence of a
formal nationalization or expropriation, if a government has interfered unreasonably
with the use of property".464 Other cases in which this standard was followed include
461 Rouhollah Karubian v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No.
569-419-2, 6 March, 1996, (1996) 8/III WTAMMl.
462 See Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 378-9.
463
Brunetti, supra note 440, at 205.
464 Harza Engineering Company v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 19-98-2, 30
December 1982, (1983) 1 Iran-US CTR 499, at 504.
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Ataollah Golpira and International Technical Products,465 The description of the
standard was different in other decisions. For instance, in the interlocutory award of
Starrett, the Iran-US CT stated that under international law "measures taken by a
State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered
so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated".466 TAMS, on the
other hand, considered a taking to occur "whenever events demonstrate that the
owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this
deprivation is not merely ephemeral".467 According to Brower and Brueschke, this
requirement "is somewhat ambiguous but generally should be taken to mean that the
deprivation is not of such a temporary or short duration that compensation should not
be awarded".468 In Gianoplus, the Iran-US CT came out with yet another description,
when it declared that "[u]nder appropriate circumstances government interference
depriving an owner of effective use and control of property may give rise to a claim
for expropriation".469 This standard of "effective deprivation" had already been used
by the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory and Oscar Chinn cases.470
465 Ataollah Golpira v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 32-211-2, 29 March,
1983, (1984) 2 Iran-US CTR 171, at 177; and International Technical Products Corporation and ITP
Export Corporation case, supra note 446, at 238-9.
466 Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc. case,
supra note 426, at 154.
See, also, Foremost Tehran, Inc. et al case, supra note 325, at 244.
467
Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) case, supra note 436, at 225.
See, also, Phelps Dodge Corp. and Overseas Private Investment Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iran-US CT, Award No. 217-99-2, 19 March, 1986,(1987) 10 Iran-US CTR 121, at 130.
468 Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, note 1763 at 378.
469 Constantine A. Gianoplus v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award
No. 237-314-1,20 June, 1986,(1988) 11 Iran-US CTR 217, at 221.
See, also, Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc.
case, supra note 426, at 156.
470
See Sedigh, supra note 8, at 644-6.
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4.2.1. Constitutive acts
All the nuances in the wording employed by the tribunal might suggest that
there was more than one applicable standard. It is clear, however, that the case-law of
the Iran-US CT did not focus on semantics, but on the impact of the alleged taking.
Brower explains that the standard applied explicitly and implicitly by the tribunal
required an unreasonable interference with the foreigner's property caused by actions
attributable to the host-state.471 What in fact constituted this unreasonable interference
varied depending on the circumstances of the respective case, to the point where -
according to Brower and Brueschke- it is impossible to discern in Iran-US CT's case-
law a single standard for determining when an expropriation has occurred.472 Sedigh
even concluded that "the boundary between regulation and expropriation becomes the
unreasonableness of an interference, and the unreasonableness of an interference
would depend on the nature of the affected property and the means used".473 Such a
conclusion would imply that the Iran-US CT adopted a police-powers solution, when
it actually applied the sole-effect rule in most expropriation claims. In other words,
the tribunal's answer to the threshold question called for something more than just an
unreasonable interference.
The finding of a formal or informal expropriation by the Iran-US CT required
the establishment of two facts by the claimant. The first one was that a taking of
possession, a transfer of property, or its distribution by the state had occurred. The
471
Brower, supra note 420, at 644.
472 Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 440.
See, also, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 85.
473
Sedigh, supra note 8, at 682.
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second one was the denial of its use to the owner.474 The Iran-US CT applied both
requirements to cases involving the indirect taking of physical properties and business
operations. In those cases involving the seizure of tangible objects, the tribunal had
no difficulties in finding a taking from the date that the owner's access to his property
was obstructed, if the correspondent act was attributable to the Iranian government.475
In this respect, even acts performed by the judiciary were considered to be susceptible
of producing expropriatory effects.476 The tribunal's conclusion in Dames and More,
that a "unilateral taking of possession of property and the denial of its use to the
rightful owners may amount to an expropriation even without a formal decree
regarding title to the property"477, is an example of the application of these conditions
to a particular claim of this type.478 Concerning companies and business operations,
the Iran-US CT replaced the first requirement -i.e. the taking of possession, transfer
or distribution of the property by the state- with that of irreversible control by the
state over the business or company, and the second requirement -the denial of the
property's use to the owner- with that of deprivative consequences of such control
Mouri, supra note 10, at 88.
475
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476
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477
Dames & More v. The Islamic republic of Iran et al, Iran-US CT, Award No. 97-54-3, 20
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over virtually all of the value of the owner's property.479 In ITT, Jugde Aldrich held
that:
while assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically
and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the
government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion
is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of
fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely
ephemeral.480
481 •This rule was followed by the Iran-US CT in other awards. In this context,
the tribunal assessed the appointment ofmanagers and supervisors by the Iranian state
pursuant to newly-enacted legislation as an "important", "significant", or "relevant"
factor, but not conclusive at the moment of establishing whether an expropriation had
occurred.482 The decisive element for making this finding was, as Aldrich explains,
that the deprivation of property produced as a consequence of such a measure was not
transitory.483 In the words of the interlocutory award of SEDCO, when there is "no
reasonable prospect of return of control, a taking should conclusively be found to
have occurred as of that date".484 According to Brower and Brueschke:
given the factual nature of the Tribunal's inquiry its decisions have never fixed on a
mechanical standard for determining whether or when the appointment of managers
has effected a taking. It has considered many factors, including whether the owner
has been excluded from the ordinary dissemination of financial information and
income distributions, as well as the scope of functions assumed by the Government-
appointed managers.485
479
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The Iran-US CT often recognised that an ephemeral interruption of control
would not constitute by itself an expropriation.486 In practice, however, the tribunal
generally considered the correspondent assumption by the government-appointed
individual to be definitive or permanent rather than provisional or temporary, as
labelled by the Iranian state. Exceptionally, the tribunal did find an interference to be
temporal in Motorola,487 Aldrich points out that:
by the time the first claims for expropriation or other takings of property began to be
decided by the Tribunal in late 1983, the interference with property rights had
endured for at least three years or more, and the continuation of strained relations
between Iran and the United States gave the Tribunal little reason to believe that such
interference would soon end. Consequently, the often difficult question of when
allegedly temporary interference with the rights of property owners should be
considered to have ripened into a compensable taking or deprivation of those rights
488
rarely troubled the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
In most cases involving the interference of the control over property, the
tribunal came to the conclusion that the respective expropriation occurred precisely at
this moment, i.e. when the manager or supervisor assumed his duties.489
Besides the physical seizure of property or its deprivation through the
appointment of managers or supervisors, the Iran-US CT found an expropriation in
cases involving, for instance, involuntary or forced transactions490; the refusal of the
Iranian government to return property subject to a lease491; the loss of goods left with
that state492; and its failure to grant a re-export permit for equipment in Iran.493
486
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4.2.2. Claims that were rejected
In a number of cases, no taking was found by the Iran-US CT. Expropriation
claims were rejected, for instance, when the challenged act was not attributable to the
Iranian state.494 As Heiskanen recalls:
The adoption of the effects doctrine did not mean that the Tribunal automatically
attributed all irregularities that occurred in Iran during the Islamic Revolution to the
Government of Iran. The Tribunal stressed that the key issue in drawing the line
between the deprivation of a property right and the materialization of a political
risk was the atrributability of the loss to the Government; if the loss could not be
495
attributed to the Government, there could be no liability.
On this regard, the Iran-US CT followed the traditional requirements of state
responsibility in international law, today included in Article 2 of the Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the ILC in
2001.496 Various failures of proof also prevented some claimants from obtaining a
finding in their favour.497 In certain cases, they were not the owners of the allegedly
taken properties.498 In others, the claimant retained some control over the property.499
494 See Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT,
Award No. 259-36-1, 13 October, 1986,(1988) 12 Iran-US CTR 335.
495 Heiskanen (2007), supra note 60, at 224.
496
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(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
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The Iran-US CT sometimes awarded partial compensation under other measures
affecting property rights in this type of situations. The tribunal further refused to find
the Iranian state responsible for the taking of minority shareholders' property, as a
consequence of the nationalisation of the majority shareholders' assets.500 A similar
situation was found in relation with the nationalisation of the banking institutions in
Iran. The mere assumption of control over these entities was not considered a taking
of the funds in the respective bank accounts or an interference with the banking
transactions normally provided by them.501 Exceptionally, the tribunal held the
Iranian state responsible for a taking when it found that a specific measure adopted by
the government-controlled bank had a serious deprivative impact on the claimant.502
Regarding the expropriatory effect of state regulations, the Iran-US CT
declared in the interlocutory award of SEDCO that it is "an accepted principle of
international law that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence
of bona fide 'regulation' within the accepted police powers of States".503 At first
sight, this might seem a police-powers solution. However, in the same case the
tribunal recognised that the duty to compensate will arise if this regulation damages
the property to a "substantial or excessive degree".504 This is a clear sole-effect
approach. The only claim rejected by the Iran-US CT on grounds of police-powers
was Emanuel Too. In this proceeding, an Iranian national owned an insured motel and
restaurant in Turlock, California. In 1980 the motel-restaurant was destroyed by fire,
the cause of which was identified as arson. Mr. Too contended that he had been the
500 See Ataollah Golpira case, supra note 465.
501 See William L. Pereira Associates case, supra note 478.
502
Mouri, supra note 10, at 147.
503 SEDCO. Inc., andSediran Drilling Company case, supra note 428, at 275.
504
Ibid., note 25 at 275.
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victim of "unknown prejudiced Americans", who had previously threatened him.505
The police and fire departments in Turlock investigated the incident without arriving
to any final conclusions. The insurance company did not pay out the proceeds of the
respective policy to the claimant, and the motel-restaurant was subject to a forced
sale. The Internal Revenue Service of the US (IRS) sold at public auction a liquor
permit held by Mr. Too and the proceeds were used to pay part of overdue
employment taxes owed by the claimant. The claimant was also the owner of a cold-
storage trailer found in the state of Arizona. The authorities of that state made efforts
to inform Mr. Too of that fact and that there was an impeding auction for abandoned
property. The claimant did not try to recover the trailer and it was sold at auction by
the State of Arizona. Mr. Too argued that he had been wrongfully expropriated by the
US. In a wording that reminds that of SEDCO, the Iran-US CT quoted the American
Law Institute's Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
506, and declared that:
a State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage
resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly
accepted as within the police power of States, provided it is not discriminatory and is
not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the State or to sell it at a
distress price.507
According to the tribunal, the IRS' action was not aimed at Mr Too because he
was an Iranian, nor was it "deliberately intended to cause him to abandon the property
to the State or to sell it at a distress price".508 The action of the IRS was the result of
Mr Too's failure to pay taxes withheld by him to his employees' salaries, and there is
no state responsibility from a lawful levy for overdue taxes. As to cold-storage trailer
505 Emanuel Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and the United States ofAmerica, Iran-US
CT, Award No. 460-880-2, 29 December, 1989, (1991) 23 Iran-US CTR 378, at 379.
506 See Chapter 6 infra.
507 Emanuel Too case, supra note 505, at 387.
508 Ibid., at 387-8.
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left in Arizona, "[tjhere is no question that the disposition of abandoned property is
commonly accepted as a lawful action within the police powers of States, again
provided that such a disposition does not discriminate against aliens".509 No taking
was therefore found.
Exchange control restrictions were a problem related with that of state
regulations. In several cases it was claimed that these measures constituted an
expropriation.510 The Iran-UC CT did not preclude the possibility of characterising
them as a taking, but subjected this determination to their harmony with the
International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agreement. There was no award in which
such harmony was not found.511
4.3. Conditions of legality and their consequence
The Iran-US CT recognised the three traditional requirements of a lawful
taking: i.e., public purpose, non-discrimination, and compensation. Its jurisprudence,
however, mostly did not support due process of law as an independent condition of
legality.512 In any case, the tribunal judged the legality of an expropriation by
reference to international law.513 In Amoco, the Iran-US CT declared that:
[cjonformity with domestic law is not usually cited as a condition for an
internationally lawful nationalization, and the Treaty specifies no such condition. It is
therefore doubtful whether it is one of the requisites of international law. The case
law on this point is not very helpful. Violation of domestic law, when invoked, is
509 Ibid., at 388.
510 See Hood Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Markazi Iran and Bank Mellat, Iran-
US CT, Award No. 142-100-3, July 13, 1984, (1986) 7 Iran-US CTR 36.
511
Mouri, supra note 10, at 148.
512 See, in general, Pcllonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 60-72; and Mouri, supra note 10, at
320-47.
513 See Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 502-3.
115
most often analyzed as evidence of the lack of fulfilment of one of the conditions
imposed by international law, such as the existence of a public purpose.514
The interpretation given by the tribunal to general interest and non¬
discrimination clearly favoured the economic-sovereignty of the state. The national
authorities' assertion that the expropriatory measure was adopted on the public
purpose, on a non- discriminatory basis, created a strong presumption for the Iran-US
CT that these conditions had been duly fulfilled.515 This wide margin of appreciation
is similar to that given to the state in the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights concerning Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol.516 It was best illustrated in
Amoco, where the Iran-US CT declared that:
[a] precise definition of the 'public purpose' for which an expropriation may be
lawfully decided has neither been agreed upon in international law nor even
suggested. It is clear that, as a result of the modem acceptance of the right to
nationalize, this term is broadly interpreted, and that States, in practice, are granted
extensive discretion.517
In fact, there was virtually no award in which a taking was found unlawful
based specifically on the lack of this condition.518 For example, the Iran-US CT stated
in the same case that the nationalisation of foreign investment, to obtain revenues
from the exploitation of natural resources for the development of a country, "has not
generally been denounced as unlawful and illegitimate".519 This discretion of national
authorities was not, however, considered absolute by the tribunal. Not only it
expressly declared that a state has no right to expropriate a foreign investment only
for financial purposes, but also considered a taking exclusively aimed at avoiding
contractual obligations of the state -or of an entity controlled by it- to be unlawful
514
Amoco International Finance case, supra note 431, at 225.
515
See, e.g., American International Group, Inc. case, supra note 439, at 105.
516 See Chapter 3 supra.
517 Amoco International Finance case, supra note 431, at 233.
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Mouri, supra note 10, note 968 at 325.
519 Amoco International Finance case, supra note 431, at 233.
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under international norms, as it would be contrary to the principle of good faith and to
the "well-settled rule that a State has the right to commit itself by contract to foreign
corporations".520 For this conclusion, the tribunal referred to Aminoil, 521
4.3.1. The effect or impact of the measure
The state is liable to pay compensation for a taking. This duty is based on the
loss or damages suffered by the foreign investor as result of the correspondent
measure. Neither the doctrines of acquired rights, pacta sunt servanda or unjust
enrichment were found by the Iran-US CT to constitute the basis of this obligation.
Regarding this last theory, though, the tribunal declared in Sea-Land that it "is widely
accepted as having been assimilated into the catalogue of general principles of law
available to be applied by international tribunals", for:
The concept of unjust enrichment had its origins in Roman Law, where it emerged as
an equitable device 'to cover those cases in which a general action for damages was
not available'. It is codified or judicially recognised in the great majority of the
522
municipal legal systems of the world [...].
• • • 523The Iran-US CT quoted the Lena Goldfields arbitration on the issue.
According to Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, non-payment did not render the
expropriation illegal in the Iran-US CT's case-law, provided that some indication of it
521 American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil) v. Kuwait, Reuter, Sultan, and Fitzmaurice, arbitrators,
Award, 24 March 1982, (1982) 21 /LA/976.
522 Sea-Land Service, Inc., v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ports and Shipping
Organization, Iran-US CT, Award No 135-33-1, 22 June 1984, (1986) 6 Iran-US CTR 149, at 168.
523
Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v. Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, Stutzer and Scott arbitrators, Award, 3
September 1930, reprinted in A Nussbaum, 'The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfield's, Ltd. and
the Soviet Government', (1950) Cornell LQ 31.
See, in general, Mouri, supra note 10, at 315-9.
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was made at the time of the taking.524 The tribunal adopted a sole-effect solution on
the problem of intent, and generally found that worthy economic or social objectives
motivating an expropriation did not exempt the host-state from the obligation to pay
compensation. The tribunal was apparently influenced in this respect by the decisions
of the Chorzow Factory case and the Norwegian Shipowners' claim.525 As Aldrich
points out, Article II paragraph 1:
explicitly gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over claims that arouse out of both
'expropriations' and 'other measures affecting property rights', thereby suggesting
clearly that neither the terminology nor the intent of actions attributable to either
Government would affect the Tribunal's jurisdiction to award compensation if the
526
actions had adversely affected a claimant's property rights.
Already in 1983, he had declared in ITT that "[t]he intent of the government is
less important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of [these]
measures [...] is less important than the reality of their impact".527 A couple of
months later, the Iran-US CT recognised in Starrett that state measures rendering
property-rights useless must be deemed expropriatory under international law, even
though the state did not purport to have taken them.528 In 1984, the tribunal came to
the opposite conclusion in Sea-Land. The claimant was a US corporation engaged in
international transportation by water of containerised cargo. Since 1978, Sea-Land
encountered increasing difficulties in the continued use of a cargo facility built and
operated by it in the port of Bandar Abbas, Iran, due to unexplained absence of
government officials in charge of customs, immigration, health, etc. These difficulties
led to the suspension and eventual termination of its operations. The Iran-US CT
concluded that the country was in a state of upheaval following the 1979 revolution,
524
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 70.
525 See Mouri, supra note 10, at 258-9.
526
Aldrich, supra note 420, at 173.
527 ITT Industries, Inc. case, supra note 480, Concurring Opinion of Judge Aldrich, at 352.
528 Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc. case,
supra note 426, at 154.
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and nothing suggested that the Iranian authorities had embarked on a policy of
intentional disruption or non-cooperation with Sea-Land. According to the tribunal, a
finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, a deliberate governmental
interference with the foreign investor depriving it of the use and benefit of its
investment/29 No intentional course of conduct directed against Sea-Land was found,
and the expropriation claim was dismissed. The Iran-US CT referred its finding to
Oscar Chinn.5}0 Judge Holtzmann disagreed with this conclusion and expressly
declared that:
the critical question is the objective effect of a government's acts, not its subjective
intentions. Acts by a government which have the effect of depriving an alien of his
property are considered expropriatory in international law, whatever the
government's intentions.531
The police-powers finding in Sea-Land obtained no support in subsequent
awards.532 In TAMS, and Payne, the tribunal repeated the sole-effect statement of
Judge Aldrich in ITT, i.e. that the intent of the government is less important than the
effects of the measures on the owner, and that the form of the measures of control or
interference is less important than the reality of their impact.533 Phillips was no
exception. The Iran-US CT again declared that "a government's liability to
compensate for expropriation of alien property does not depend on proof that the
expropriation was intentional".534 The interlocutory award in SEDCO and the award
in Phelps Dodge also reproduced Judge's Aldrich words.535 Phelps Dodge was a US
corporation who had invested in an Iranian company established for the purpose of
529 Sea-Land Service, Inc. case, supra note 522, at 166.
530 Oscar Chinn case, supra note 425, at 86.
531 Sea-Land Service, Inc. case, supra note 522, Opinion of Judge Holtzmann, at 207.
532
Aldrich, supra note 434, at 603; or Aldrich supra note 420, at 206-7.
533
Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) case, supra note 436, at 225-6; and Thomas Earl
Payne case, supra note 430, at 10-1.
534
Phillips Petroleum Company Iran case, supra note 427, at 115.
535 See SEDCO, Inc., andSediran Drilling Company case, supra note 428, at 274-5; and Phelps Dodge
Corp. and Overseas Private Investment Corp. case, supra note 467, at 130.
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manufacturing and selling various wire and cable products. During 1979 and 1980,
there was a progressive erosion of the claimant's ability to exercise its ownership
rights. At the end of 1980, the management of the company was transferred to
agencies of the Iranian government and the control of its factory was directly
assumed by these authorities. The Iran-US CT found that Phelps Dodge was deprived
of virtually all of the factory's value from this moment, and added:
The Tribunal fully understands the reasons why the Respondent felt compelled to
protect its interests through this transfer of management, and the Tribunal
understands the financial, economic and social concerns that inspired the law
pursuant to which it acted, but those reasons and concerns cannot relieve the
536
Respondent of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss.
The Iran-US CT confirmed this view in Birnbaum. This case settled the claim of
a US national who alleged to have been expropriated of his ownership interest in an
Iranian architectural and engineering partnership (AFFA)537, liquidated by the state of
Iran. The tribunal found that the ownership interests of Mr. Birnbaum were taken on
the date the provisional manager appointed by the Iran authorities effectively took
control of the company. The Iran-US CT expressly declared that "[t]he Respondent's
reasons and concerns for taking control of AFFA cannot relieve it from responsibility
to compensate the Claimant for the taking", and that "a government cannot avoid
liability for compensation by showing that its actions were taken legitimately
pursuant to its own laws".538
536
Phelps Dodge Corp. and Overseas Private Investment Corp. case, supra note 467, at 130.
537 Abdolaziz Farmanfarmaian & Associates.
538 Harold Birnbaum case, supra note 489, at 270.
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4.3.2. Compensation and its standard
In Phillips, the Iran-US CT held that the distinction between lawful and
unlawful takings was relevant in relation to restitution as an available remedy for the
affected claimant.539 The tribunal was, nevertheless, normally reluctant to grant
restitution because it could not ensure specific performance. This reluctance also
reflected, as Brower and Brueschke explain, "the customary practice that restitution is
generally available only where the taking is found to be unlawful and the fact that the
Tribunal [...] never found Iran's taking of American property to have been
unlawful".540 The 1955 Iran-US Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights (Iran-US FCN) established the applicable standard of compensation for lawful
takings of nationals of either country in the territory of the other. In a clear reference
to the Hull Formula, Article IV paragraph 2 provided that the property of these
nationals:
shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the
prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively
realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and
adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the
determination and payment thereof.541
The tribunal did not restrict its analysis to this treaty provision. Numerous
awards and separate opinions of several judges also addressed the issue of the
standard of compensation in customary international law. Westberg points out that
one of the reasons for this situation was the Iranian challenge to the validity of the
treaty in some early disputes:
539
Phillips Petroleum Company Iran case, supra note 427, at 122.
540 Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, at 476-7.
541 Available at <http://www.parstimes.com/law/iran_us_treaty.html> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
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Choosing in these cases to avoid the question of the Treaty's status, the Tribunal
ruled the question irrelevant on reasoning that the treaty provisions on compensation
were synonymous with the requirements of customary international law.542
The first award to do so was ITT. Judge Aldrich's concurring opinion to this
award concluded that the applicable rules of customary international law were not
significantly different from those of the treaty: "[i]n either case, a taking of property
must be accompanied by the prompt payment of just compensation which is effective
and adequate to compensate fully for the value of the property taken".543 Judge
Aldrich made express reference to the Norwegian Shipowners claim and Chorzow
Factory case. His position was later confirmed by American International, TAMS,
Phelps Dodge, SEDCO. Sola Tiles and Petrolane544. The standard of appropriate
compensation was only applied exceptionally by the Iran-US CT in Ebrahimi,545 In
spite of it, the tribunal awarded the claimants in this case an amount described by
Aldrich as one that could reasonably be considered full compensation.546
The duty to pay compensation for both expropriations and nationalisations was
expressly recognised in the INA case. In this award, the tribunal acknowledged that
although nationalisations "are not per se unlawful", a lawful one would, nevertheless,
542
J Westberg, 'Compensation in Cases of Expropriation and Nationalization: Awards of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal', (1990) 5/11 ICSID Rev. 256, note 68 at 271.
543 jjj [nc{ustries fnc case^ SUpra note 480, Concurring Opinion of Judge Aldrich, at 354.
544 See American International Group, Inc. and American Life Insurance Company case, supra note
439, at 102-6; Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) case, supra note 436, at 225; Phelps
Dodge Corp. and Overseas Private Investment Corp. case, supra note 467, at 132; SEDCO, Inc., v.
National Iranian Oil Company, and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Second Iran-US CT, Interlocutory
Award No ITL 59-129-3, 27 March, 1986, (1987) 10 Iran-US CTR 180, at 189; Sola Tiles, Inc. case,
supra note 478, at 234-7; and Petrolane, Inc., Eastman Whipstock Manufacturing, Inc., and Seahorse
Fleet, Inc. case, supra note 493, at 99.
545 See Shanin Shain Ebrahimi, Cecilia Radene Ebrahimi and Christina Tandis Ebrahimi v. The
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and National Iranian Oil Company, Iran-US CT, Award
No. 560-44/46/47-3, 12 October, 1994, at paras. 88-98. Available at
<http://uk.westlaw.com/search/default.wl?rs=WLUK7.07&fh=_top&sv=Split&mt=ScotsLaw&db=IN
T-IRAN&vr=2.0&rp=%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&sp=ukatedu-000> (last visited 30 August, 2007).
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Aldrich, supra note 420, at 238.
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also "impose on the government concerned the obligation to pay compensation".547
The tribunal then applied the treaty standard, which it considered to be similar to that
of customary international norms. The Iran-US CT went on to declare obiter that,
regarding lawful large-scale nationalisations, international law had undergone a
"gradual reappraisal, the effect of which may be to undermine the doctrinal value of
any 'full' or 'adequate' (when used as identical to 'full') compensation standard".548
This declaration triggered separate opinions by Judges Lagergren and Holtzmann.
The former argued that international law recognised a flexible standard allowing for
partial compensation in cases of large-scale nationalisations. The latter was
emphatical in denying this change in the law.549 INA's approach was not followed by
other decisions.550
According to the case-law of the Iran-US CT, the standard of full compensation
was applicable not only for expropriations and nationalisations, but also for lawful
and unlawful takings. Regarding expropriations that involved contract rights, the
tribunal found that the valuation should also take into account the legitimate
expectations of the foreign investor.551 Punitive damages were not awarded by the
tribunal, not even when the expropriation was found not to be in conformity with
customary international law.552 Before the establishment of the Iran-US CT, the
547 INA Corporation, v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US CT, Award No. 184-
161-1, 13 August, 1985, (1987) 8 Iran-US CTR 373, at 378.
548 Ibid.
549 See Westberg, supra note 542, at 273-5.
550 See Brower and Brueschke, supra note 10, note 2326 at 491.
551 See Mobil Oil Iran et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and The National Iranian Oil Company,
Iran-US CT, Award No. 311-74/76/ 81/150-3, 14 July, 1987, (1988) 16 Iran-US CTR 3; and Phillips
Petroleum Company Iran case, supra note 427.
See, in general, Mouri, supra note 10, at 399-403.
552
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award in Sapphire553 had already recognised the full compensation standard,
comprising the loss suffered -damnum emergens- and the profit lost -lucrum
cessans.554 The unrestricted application of this distinction has been criticised in
doctrine, for the concepts of damnum emergens and lucrum cessans stem from the
law of damages, and not from the law of expropriation.55'7 Amoco was the sole award
of the Iran-US CT to depart from the otherwise uniformly applied principle of full
compensation. In this case, the tribunal concluded that the taking was lawful and that
the Iran-US FCN's requirement of compensation was applicable. Nevertheless, it
sought the aid of customary rules for interpreting and implementing this condition
and embarked on an extensive analysis of the Chorzow Factory case. The analysis led
the Iran-US CT to conclude that compensation for a lawful taking includes damnum
emergens -this is, the value of the expropriated property-, but not lucrum cessans -i.e.
lost profits -, while an unlawful taking would require both.556
According to Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, the tribunal equated damnum
emergens to the going concern value of the company taken, with "a somewhat broad
meaning, also encompassing elements (notably 'commercial prospects') which also
might be argued to fall under lucrum cessans'" 551 In his concurring opinion to this
award, Judge Brower considered the tribunal's finding to be "a misreading of
Chorzow Factory and a misunderstanding of economics". He argued that the ICJ's
case presented a simple scheme: lawful takings would entitle the claimant to damnum
emergens and lucrum cessans, while unlawful expropriations to restitution of the
553 This was an arbitration between a Canadian firm and the National Iranian Oil Company, regarding
the nationalisation of Iran's oil industry in 1952.
554 See Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, Cavin, sole arbitrator,
Award, 15 March 1963, (1967) 35 ILR 136.
555
Marboe, supra note 27, at 728.
See Chapter 5 infra.
556 See Amoco International Finance Corporation case, supra note 431, at 214, 222-4, 244, & 246-52.
557
Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 125.
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property taken or, if this is impossible or impracticable, to damages equal to damnum
emergens and lucrum cessans, plus any consequential damages.558 The finding in
Amoco was rejected implicitly in Starrett and explicitly in Phillips.559 In this last case,
the tribunal expressly declared that the distinction between lawful and unlawful
expropriation under customary international law, as evidenced in the Chorzow
Factory case:
is relevant only to two possible issues: whether restitution of the property can be
awarded and whether compensation can be awarded for any increase in the value of
the property between the date of taking and the date of the judicial or arbitral decision
awarding compensation. The Chorzow decision provides no basis for any assertion
that a lawful taking requires less compensation than that which is equal to the value
of the property on the date of taking.
Full compensation was not applied, nonetheless, to those cases involving "other
measures affecting property rights". The applicable standard in these proceedings was
that established for lawful expropriations in Amoco. This is, damnum emergens, but
not lucrum cessans.561 The different standard established for "other measures"
allowed the Iran-US CT to find an interference with the foreign investor's right of
property in those cases where its members were reluctant to grant the claimant a full
compensation. As Aldrich explains, it was questionable:
whether either the Foremost or the Kodak award would have rejected liability for a
taking or deprivation of property rights if the Claims Settlement Declaration had not
permitted the Tribunal to give the claimants partial compensation under the guise of
compensation for 'other measures affecting property rights'.562
He adds:
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Certainly, it was my impression that Judges Lagergren and Virally, the chairmen of
the Tribunal chambers for Foremost and Kodak, respectively, generally sought what
they considered to be equitable results and were not always comfortable with the full
compensation standard that the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the United States and
Iran made applicable to all takings of property rights.563
4.4. Conclusion
The Iran-US CT acknowledged the traditional international minimum standard
of treatment in its application of the protection against expropriation and other
measures affecting property rights established in its constitutive treaty. It is not
unusual to find in the tribunal's decisions a reference to customary international law.
It is also not unusual to find a reference to statements of international claims
commissions, the PCIJ, arbitral tribunals and the ICJ in the area of expropriation of
foreign property. The Iran-US CT recognised the three conditions for a lawful taking.
The broad interpretation given to the requirements of public purpose and non¬
discrimination gave host-states a wide margin of appreciation at the moment of
adopting regulatory measures, similar to that enjoyed by the parties of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Its assertion that the respective measure was adopted
in the general interest of the national community, on a non-discriminatory basis, was
a strong presumption for the Iran-US CT that these two conditions had been fulfilled.
As to other measures affecting property rights, the tribunal considered this phrase to
include not only measures within the scope of the concept of expropriation, but also
other acts and omissions that seriously and unreasonably interfered with the property
of an alien. Irreversible deprivative consequences, similar to those arising out of a
taking were, nevertheless, generally required. The Iran-US CT supported its "other
563 Ibid.
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measures" findings on the notion of lesser interferences found in Article 1 of the First
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Most of the cases brought before the Iran-US CT involved claims of creeping or
constructive expropriations. This situation made difficult the determination of the
date of the taking. The tribunal's solution consisted on establishing, on a case-by-case
basis, the moment at which the interference had ripened into a more or less
irreversible deprivation of property. A finding on expropriation also depended on the
circumstances that surrounded the respective claim. The threshold applied by the
tribunal was that of a non-ephemeral and unreasonable interference, depriving the
owner of the effective use and control of his property. That is to say, the moment
when the foreign investor's fundamental rights of ownership were rendered so useless
that they must be deemed to have been taken. According to the tribunal, any
expropriation, whether formal or informal, required the determination that a taking,
transfer, or distribution of the property by the host state had occurred, and that the
owner had been denied the use of its investment. In cases of expropriations of
companies and business operations, these conditions were replaced by the host state's
irreversible control of the respective entity and the deprivative consequences of this
control over the property of the foreigner. Almost without exception, the Iran-US CT
upheld the sole-effect rule and concluded that the intention of the state is less
important than the consequence of the measure. National authorities are therefore
liable to compensate an expropriated foreign investor whether the respective measure
was motivated by worthy economic or social objectives or not. The tribunal
exceptionally recognised a police-powers exception, but from a sole-effect
perspective. It acknowledged that a state is not liable for economic injury as a
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consequence of bona fide regulation, within their accepted regulatory powers.
However, if this regulation damages the alien's property to a substantial and
excessive degree, then the host state will be responsible to pay compensation.
The Iran-US CT only distinguished lawful from unlawful takings concerning
restitution as an applicable remedy. The term "just compensation", used in the Iran-
US FCN, was generally understood by the tribunal as equivalent to the full value of
the expropriated property. The Iran-US CT found this standard of full compensation
to be similar to that of customary international law, and was applied in a majority of
the cases of expropriations and nationalisations, either lawful or unlawful. Aliens
affected by other measures received a lower amount. This different standard enabled
the tribunal to compensate a foreign investor for a lesser interference in those
situations where the measure did not amount to a taking.
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5
BILATERAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
A century before international human rights tribunals and the Iran-US CT
dealt with expropriation claims, FCNs had already guaranteed the protection of US
nationals investing abroad. By the end of the 1950s, another type of bilateral treaty
came to replace them. More ambitious than FCNs in their scope of investment
protection, and at the same time less exacting in their terms, BITs were at first only
concluded between developed and developing countries that needed funds or
materials to boost their economies. The change of attitude towards private property
and foreign investment in former second-world countries and third-world states, led
to the conclusion of BITs between developing countries, and between some
developed states. The wide network of concluded BITs establish an international
minimum standard, comprising the protection against takings, fair and equitable
treatment, full protection and security, and most-favoured nation treatment, as well as
national treatment. This network includes today even the reluctant Latin American
countries, commonly associated with the Calvo doctrine, the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, and the dated NIEO.
BITs follow the three traditional conditions of a lawful taking, i.e. public
purpose, non-discrimination, and compensation. They also add a fourth requirement:
due process of law. Property is called investment and is defined in BITs. This notion
is important to the expropriation provision, for anything within its contours will be
129
protected against it. Direct and indirect takings are mentioned, but not defined in
BITs. The development of the concept of indirect expropriation is left to the case-law
of international arbitral tribunals established under the dispute settlement provisions
of these treaties. The awards of ad hoc and ICSID panels normally refer to other
judicial decisions in the field of expropriation. The case-law of the Iran-US CT is
frequently relied upon, as well as that of international arbitral panels established
under the settlement provisions of investment codes and investment agreements.
International human rights tribunals are also quoted, particularly the case-law on
deprivations of property of the European Court. These awards have not only
influenced the interpretation of BITs by international tribunals, but have also led to
developments in treaty-law itself.
The investment protection in FCNs, their failure, and the comparative success
of BITs, are analysed in this chapter. It deals with the four requirements of a lawful
expropriation in the latter, and addresses the interaction between the concepts of
investment and indirect taking in them. The evolution of these concepts in recent
BITs is also explained. The present chapter illustrates their interpretation and
application by ad hoc and ICSID arbitral panels with references to several awards on
indirect expropriation. Finally, it studies the evolution of the answers given to the
threshold question in BIT arbitrations, focusing on the sole-effect and police-powers
rules adopted in these judicial decisions.
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5.1. Failure and success
FCNs are the forerunners of BITs.564 International agreements of different
titles are encompassed under this generic name. The 1785 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce between Prussia and the US is an FCN.565 Another example is the 1955
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the
US.566 As these titles suggest, FCNs were mainly aimed at promoting trade and
shipping, and only exceptionally included provisions protecting the property of aliens.
This type of treaties was especially favoured by the US, which concluded FCNs in
different waves since the 18th century.567 Throughout almost two hundred years, it
established a vast network of bilateral treaties, first with European and Latin
American states, and later with countries of Asia and Africa.
The investment provisions in early FCNs were limited to an absolute standard
• 568of treatment that guaranteed the "special protection to the persons and property" or
"full and perfect protection for [...] persons and property"569 of each contracting
party. The first expropriation provisions in FCNs are already found in the late 19lh
564
See, in general, K Vandevelde, 'The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States',
(1988) 21 Cornell ILJ 201, at 203-8; J Salacuse, 'BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries', (1990) 24/111 IL 655, at
656-7; K Vandevelde, 'U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: the Second Wave', (1993) 14 Mich. JIL
621, at 624-5; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 3-4; Guzman, supra note 223, at 652-3; D
Blumemwitz, 'Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000),
Vol. IV; and Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 209-11.
565 Available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/germany/prusl785.htm> (last visited
31 March, 2008).
566 See note 541, supra.
567 Vandevelde (1988), supra note 564, at 204.
The first FCN was the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and the US, available at
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/france/frl788-l.htm> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
56R Art. XIII of the 1858 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Bolivia and
the US, available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/bolivia/bolivia01.htm> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
569 Art. IX, para. 3, of the 1859 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Paraguay
and the US, available at <http://www.marad.dot.gov/Programs/Treaties/Paraguay.html> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
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century. They forbade the seizure of "vessels, cargoes, merchandise and effects",
belonging to nationals of the other party, without payment of "equitable and sufficient
compensation".570 In the first half of the 20th century, FCNs expressly established the
requirement of due process.571
After the Second World War, a new wave of FCNs were negotiated and
concluded by the US. The protection of foreign investment was now the main
objective, and a detailed takings provision guaranteeing prompt, adequate and
effective compensation was included.572 This time, however, developing countries
were reluctant to accept the international minimum standard requested by the US for
its nationals.
5.1.1. Ad-hoc investment treaties
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) adopted in 1955
the Resolution on International Investment for Economic Development, urging for the
conclusion of bilateral treaties providing for its protection and security.573 Following
this resolution, European countries started to negotiate and conclude a new type of
international agreement, dealing exclusively with foreign investment: BITs. The
570 Art. VIII of the 1870 General Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Consular Privileges between El
Salvador and the US; and Art. VIII of the 1846 General treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and
Commerce between New Granada and the US, as quoted in Vandevelde (1988), supra note 564, at
205.
This guarantee was later broadened to property in general.
Ibid.
571 See Art. I, para. 6, of the 1928 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights between
Austria and the US.
572 An e.g. of this new model was Art. IV paragraph 2 of the 1955 Iran-US FCN.
See Chapter 4 supra.
573 L Loppacher and W Kerr, 'Investment Rules. The U.S. Agenda in Bilateral Trade Agreements',
(2006) 7/1 JWIT39, at 45.
This area was not covered by GATT.
Guzman, supra note 223, at 653.
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theory of economic development behind BITs was different from that in FCNs. The
latter relied on a simple view, summarised by Reisman and Sloane in these terms:
Merely put foreign investment into an underdeveloped economy, and, provided the
host state refrains from expropriating the investment, it will generate a reasonable
profit while the host state will experience the benefits of the multiplier effect.574
BITs require from the host-state much more than just refraining from taking the
property of aliens. Their aim is to develop in capital-importing states the minimal
administrative and legal framework that promotes and protects investment in capital-
exporting countries.575 The success of BITs was gradual. The reason for this positive
reception is not entirely clear. According to Salacuse:
it may lie in the fact that the European countries were less demanding than was the
United States with respect to guarantees on such matters as free convertibility of local
currency, abolition of performance requirements, and protection against
expropriation. Moreover, the special relationship between European countries and
their former colonies may have predisposed some newly independent nations to look
favorably on concluding investment treaties with their previous colonial rulers.576
The good results of the European experience encouraged the US to launch its
own BIT programme in 1977577. The last FCNs concluded by the US were the 1966
Treaties of Amity and Economic Relations with Togo, and Thailand. The first US
BIT was that with Egypt, concluded in 1982. Today, BITs are one of the most
important instruments for US investment abroad.578
The starting point of BITs are models, prototypes or draft treaties designed by a
developed state, generally on the basis of the failed 1967 Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-




Salacuse, supra note 564, at 657.
577 See Vandevelde (1988), supra note 564, at 208-11; and Vandevelde (1993), supra note 564, at 624-
7.
578
Loppacher and Kerr, supra note 573, at 46.
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operation and Development (OECD).779 This explains the homogeneity of BITs. A
review of them confirms the regular assertion of most of their elements in standard
terms. Besides takings, both the European and US models cover the same areas:
admission, treatment, and dispute settlement. The US model contains, however, more
detailed rules than the European version. Unlike the latter, the treatment provisions of
the US model are not only applicable after the investment has been establishment; the
pre-establishment phase of the investment is also covered.580 These differences are
explained, in part, by the fact that the US version has included, since its first model, a
• • 581mixture of provisions taken from modern FCNs and European BITs.
The titles in most BITs openly declare a duality of purposes that illustrates the
complementary interests of capital-exporting and capital-importing states: the
• •• • • 5 82 i
reciprocal encouragement or promotion of investments, and their protection. The
first objective was originally pursued by developing states. Since many third and
former second-world countries had poor records concerning the respect of the right of
private property, BITs were an unambiguous sign addressed to the international
society revealing a crucial transformation of the respective state's policy towards
570 See Chapter 6 infra.
See, also, Salacuse, supra note 564, at 662-4; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 1-3 & 13;
Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 300-1; and P Juillard, 'MAI : A European View', (1998) 31 Corn. IDMl,
at 477.
The OECD is an international organisation with 30 member states "sharing a commitment to
democratic government and the market economy".
See <http://www.oecd.org>
580 M-F Houde and C Yannaca-Small, 'Relationships between International Investment Agreements',
in OECD, Working Papers on International Investment (2004), Nr. 1, at 4.
581 See Vandevelde (1993), supra note 564, at 626.
582
See, e.g., the 1968 Denmark-Indonesia BIT, called "Agreement concerning the encouragement and
reciprocal protection of investments", available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/denmark_indonesia.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008);
and the 1994 Estonia-Israel BIT titled "Agreement [...] for the promotion and reciprocal protection of
investments", available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/estonia_israel.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
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foreign investment.583 Whether this goal has been achieved in practice is open to
question. The second purpose answered initially to the concerns of developed
countries: protecting the foreign investor from eventual abuses by the host state in the
exercise of its authority. An impartial device to settle controversies, as well as
enforcement mechanisms for the treaty provisions, is an essential part of the
protective purpose of BITs. Almost all of these international agreements have dispute
settlement provisions regulating not only conflicts between the parties over the
interpretation or application the respective treaty, but also those between the foreign
investor and the host-state over the observance of its provisions, known as investment
disputes.
BITs normally refer the conflicts between the investor and state to pre-existing
arbitration rules, after a period of consultation between the parties.585 The majority of
BITs make a reference to ICSID, an autonomous international organisation within the
World Bank group that facilitates the settlement of investment disputes through
conciliation and arbitration. The applicable procedural rules in these cases are those
5Sj
Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 214-5.
See, also, Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 12; V Been and J Beauvais, 'The Global Fifth
Amendment: NAFTA's Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest for an International
"Regulatory Takings" Doctrine', (2003) 78 NYU LR 30, at 118-20 & 126; and Reisman and Sloane,
supra note 41, at 116.
584
Some authors have concluded that BITs have little positive effect on the FD1 that flows to
developing countries:
See, e.g., J Tobin and S Rose-Ackerman, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in
Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties', (2004) 293 Yale Law and
Economics Research Paper, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557121>
(last visited 31 March, 2008);
or J Tobin and S Rose-Ackerman, 'When BITs have some bite', (2006) Yale Law School Draft
Working Paper, available at
<http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/When_BITs_Have_Some_Bite.doc> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
See, also, Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 123-4.
Others are of the opinion that a higher number ofBITs raises the FDI flows to developing countries:
See, e.g., E Neumayer and L Spess, 'Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries?, (2005) LSE Research Online, available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cffn?abstract_id=616242> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
5S5 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 119.
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contained in ICSID's constitutive treaty, the 1965 Washington Convention. Some
BITs refer to arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL, or to the Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).587 Ad hoc arbitration is also a
possibility in certain situations.588 The settlement mechanism for an investment
dispute is available on the basis of the host-state's unilateral promise contained in an
investment code, or most often in a BIT589, and not on its contractual relationship
with the claimant.590 This is one of the biggest innovations in contemporary
international law, but one that took some time before it was exercised by its main
beneficiary, the foreign investor.591
Clear legal rules designed not only to supplant local legislation and institutions,
but also to prevent controversial international customs to arise, are regularly included
in BITs as part of their protective purpose.592 This objective has allowed capital-
exporting states to counter unwanted trends in customary international law and guide
586 An e.g. of this type of dispute settlement provision is Art. 8 of the 1990 France-Nigeria BIT,
available in French at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_nigeria_fr.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, Art. 9 of the 1994 Lithuania-The Netherlands BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands Iithuania.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
587 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 129.
E.g. Art. 8 of the 1993 Ukraine-UK BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_ukraine.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, Art. 9 of the 1999 Albania-Finland BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/finland_albania_eng_fn.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008);
or Art. 9 of the 2002 Bahrain-Thailand BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/thailand_bahrain.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
588
See, e.g., Annex B to the 1998 Australia-Lithuania BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/australia_lithuania.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
589 Or even in an EIA.
See Chapter 6 infra.
590 See J Paulsson, 'Arbitration Without Privity", (1995) 10/11 ICSID Rev. 232.
591 The first claim under the dispute settlement provisions of a BIT was only brought by one in 1987.
Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 565.
See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v. Republic ofSri Lanka, ICSID case No. ARB/87/3,
Award, 27 June, 1990. Available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AsianAgriculture-Award.pdf>
(last visited 31 March, 2008).
592
Salacuse, supra note 564, at 661.
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the interpretation of treaty provisions by arbitral panels. In the case of expropriation,
one of the main objectives of the US programme was to oppose historical challenges
to the Hull formula, which had gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s.593 More
recently, following the experience of NAFTA and recent BIT arbitrations, the new
US model has expressly rejected the sole-effect rule, allowing those arbitral panels
called to settle claims of indirect takings against the US to apply a wide police-
powers exception.
This last situation illustrates the ironic fate of those treaties designed to protect
the interests of nationals investing abroad. Notwithstanding the ultimate failure of
FCNs and the success of BITs, both types of treaties share a common characteristic:
unexpected consequences, in practice, for the interests of the capital-exporting state
that supported their conclusion. For example, while an FCN allowed the US to
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals and bring an action against
Italy before the ICJ in the ELSI case594 and another one provided the standard of
compensation under which the expropriation claims were assessed in the Iran-US
CT595, the FCN with Japan helped this country to gain access to the internal market
and basic exemptions in the US596, another one was the basis of an action brought
against the US before the ICJ in the Nicaragua case597, and the FCN with Iran
allowed the this country to bring a claim against the US before the ICJ in the Oil
Platforms case.598 Concerning BITs, the same provisions designed to protect the
investment of developed states in developing countries, have been used by foreign
593 Vandevelde (1993), supra note 564, at 625.
594 See Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A. (ELSI) case, supra note 12.
595 See Chapter 4 supra.
596
Sornarajah, supra note 68, at 57.
597 See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US),
International Court of Justice, Judgment, 27 June 1986, (1986) 25 ILM 1023.
598 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), International Court of Justice, Judgment, 6 November 2003, (2003)
42 ILM 1334.
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investors in the former to challenge the sovereign regulatory measures adopted by the
i 599
respective host-state.
5.1.2. Lawful takings under BITs
The protection against the expropriation of foreign property is the most
important guarantee of BITs. All of them contain such a stipulation in a similar, if not
identical, wording.600 A lawful taking is consistent with the treaty. Under BITs, it
requires a public purpose, a non-discriminatory basis, the payment of compensation
to the foreign investor, and due process of law. The first BIT ever concluded already
considered these four conditions in its expropriation provision.601 The latest BIT
models have not innovated on this issue.602 Unfortunately, this distinction between
lawful and unlawful takings is rendered meaningless in practice, for both types of
expropriation will receive the same standard of compensation. The Iran-US CT, for
instance, generally did not differentiate between them at the moment of awarding
compensation.603 Neither do BITs. The applicable standard is the Hull formula or
similar ones, whether there is a breach of the treaty or not.
There is no definition of "public purpose" in international law.604 BITs refer to
the first requirement of a lawful expropriation not only in these terms605, but also as
599 Even nationals of developing countries have lodged claims against developed states.
See, e.g., Emilio Agustin Maffezini and The Kingdom ofSpain, ICSID case No. ARB/97/7, Award, 13
November 2000, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-Award-English.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
600
Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 476.
601 See Art. 3 para. 2 of the 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT.
See, also, note 196, supra.
602 See Art. 13 para. 1 of the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
m See Dinstein, supra note 8, at 864.
See, also, Chapter 4 supra.
604
Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 104.
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public "policy"606 or "interest".607 This condition is aimed at preventing the host state
• • 608from adopting measures only for private reasons, not for the collective good. The
prohibition of discrimination in case of expropriation is normally included in BITs
with no further qualification.609 Both requirements may overlap at times -Mouri
explains- since "a taking which is not for a public purpose is to some extent
discriminatory".610 According to the Third Restatement, the discrimination prohibited
by international law implies unreasonable distinction.611 This circumstance may be
difficult to determine in practice. The crucial test will rest in the good faith of the
state adoption the challenged measure.612 The rule on non-discrimination applied to
expropriations forbids the state to take the property of nationals of a specific state or
to give the deprived foreigner a differential treatment as to the procedure and the
amount of compensation.613 The national and most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN)
clauses in BITs, as well as the FET provision, reiterate this requirement of non¬
discrimination. Dolzer and Stevens explain that the inclusion of this standard in the
expropriation provision is "presumably justified by the assumption that the treatment
605
See, e.g., Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1982 Cameroon-UK BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/does/bits/uk_cameroun.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
606 See, e.g., Art. 3 para. 2 of the 1978 Benin-Germany BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_benin.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
607
See, e.g., Art 5 para. 1 of the 1982 Belgium-Sri Lanka BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/beIg_lux_srilanka.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
608 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 105.
6<w
Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 389.
See, e.g., Art. 5 para. 2 of the 1993 Algeria-France BIT, cited at note 216, supra.
See, also, Art. 6 para. 1 of the 2004 Iceland-Lebanon BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/lebanon_iceland.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
610
Mouri, supra note 10, at 328.
61' American Law Institute, supra note 51, at 200.
612 A Maniruzzaman, 'Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in
International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview', (1998) 8 JTLP 57, at 67.
6,3
Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 388.
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clauses refer to subsisting investments and that therefore these general clauses might
no longer be applicable once an expropriatory measure has taken effect".614
The uncertainty on the standard of compensation in customary international law,
derived from the long standing dispute between capital-exporting and capital-
importing states, led virtually all BITs to address the issue expressly.615 A majority of
these treaties subscribe to the Hull formula.616 Almost all BITs concluded by Latin
American states, for example, implicitly reject the "appropriate" standard by
incorporating a provision that requires the payment of prompt, adequate or just and
effective compensation in case of expropriation.617 The adoption of the Hull formula
is done either by referring expressly to a "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation618, by describing the compensation due in case of expropriation in
conformance with the meaning of this set of words619, or by including a different
formula -like, just compensation- accompanied by a specific method of valuation that
makes it similar in practice to the former.620 There is no different standard for
nationalisations and expropriations.




See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 5, at 315; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 97; Sacerdoti, supra
note 8, at 395; Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 135; and UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 245.
The non-binding 1992 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment,
designed to complement BITs, provides for appropriate compensation, but then immediately adds that
it will be deemed as such "if it is adequate, effective and prompt". Guideline IV, Sections 1 and 2,
available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WorldBank.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See Chapter 6 infra.
617 See A Escobar, 'Introductory Note on Bilateral Investment Treaties Recently Concluded by Latin
American States', (1996) 11/1ICSID Rev. 86, at 90.
618
See, e.g., Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1993 Finland-Korea BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_finIand.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, Art. V para. 1 of the 1996 Chile-Ecuador BIT, available in Spanish at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chile_ecuador_sp.pdf> ( last visited 31 March,
2008).
619 See, e.g.. Art VI paras. 1 and 2 of the 1991 Hungary-Norway BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/hungary_norway.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
620
See, e.g., Art. 4 of the 1987 The Netherlands-Oman BIT, available at
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Prompt does not mean immediate, but it does mean with no deferment. This
term is generally used in BITs to resolve disputes on the amount of the compensation.
By adding this word, it is implied that interests are included in its payment and they
accrue from the date of the taking621. Adequate is normally defined as "market" or
"fair market" value before the expropriation took place.622 "Genuine" or "real" are
usually considered to indicate the same standard.623 BITs hardly ever include an
express regulation on the methods of calculation of this value.624 Not even last
generation BITs regulate such methods expressly.625 Effective means in a form usable
by the foreign investor, i.e. in a freely convertible currency with no restrictions
regarding its transfer.626 In other words, the Hull standard requires the payment of the
fair market value of the expropriated asset ("adequate"), speedily ("prompt"), and in a
convertible currency ("effective").627 The concept of due process derives from the
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_oman.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
See Chapter 2 supra.
621
Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 481.
See Art. VI para. 2 of the 2000 Chile-Colombia BIT, available in Spanish at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/chile_colombia_sp.pdf> ( last visited 31 March,
2008).
622
See, e.g., Art. 6 para.l of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
623 Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 593.
624 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 110; and Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 398.
For this reason, the 1992 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment
suggests that for a going concern, with a proven record of profitability, the valuation should be made
on the basis of the discounted cash flow value, used for establishing the present value of the expected
future earnings of the business. For a non-going concern with lack of profitability, it should be made
on the basis of the liquidation value. And for other assets, on the basis of the replacement value or the
book value, in case such value has been recently assessed or has been determined as of the date of the
taking. "Going concern", "discounted cash flow value", "liquidation value", "replacement value", and
"book value" are all defined in this provision.
See Guideline IV, Section 6, cited at note 616, supra.
See, also, Chapter 6 infra.
625
E.g., Art. 13 para. 2 of the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT only says that the "[v]aluation criteria shall
include going concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and other
criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value".
See note 51, supra.
626
Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 482.
See, e.g., Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1997 Czech Republic-Ireland BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_ireland.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
627 Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 589.
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 1778 Constitution of the USA, and has a
defined content only in US law.628 It is, nevertheless, used in the BITs of other
countries as well. In fact, nearly all of these treaties include the requirement.629 Due
process of law refers to the expropriation procedure, and indicates that the foreign
investor has a right to prior notification and to a fair hearing before the taking
occurs.630 Some BITs allude to expropriatory measures taken "under domestic legal
procedures" or "in a legally established manner".631 Due process also suggests that
the measure must be adopted by an unbiased official after a reasonable period of
time.632 In some BITs, this requirement involves the availability of judicial review of
the expropriatory measure.
Against the background of a large number of homogenous treaties, the question
of the influence of BITs on the customary law of expropriation has been asked several
times. In doctrine, the positions range from those considering BITs to evidence
international customs634, to those denying them any influence on the latter.635 The
See, also, Sacerdoti, supra note 33, at 123.
628 G Fletcher and S Sheppard, American Law in a Global Context. The Basics (2005), 59-60; and
UNCTAD (2004), 245.
629 See, e.g., Art. 7 para 1 of the 1991 Australia-Vietnam BIT available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iiaydocs/bits/australia_vietnam.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
See, also, Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1998 China-Swaziland BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_swaziland.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
620 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 106.
631
See, e.g., Art. 6 para. 1 of the 1995 Norway-Peru BIT, available in Spanish at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/norway_peru_esp.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
See, also, Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1998 Japan-Russia BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/russiajapan.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
632 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 106.
633
See, e.g., Art. 5 para 1 1975 Singapore-UK BIT, cited at note 199, supra.
See, also, Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1995 Denmark-Mongolia BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/denmark_mongolia.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
634
See, e.g., Mann, supra note 9, at 249-50; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 117; Brownlie,
supra note 15, at 520; Lowenfeld, supra note, at 185, at 128; Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 488;
Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, note 158 at 150; S Hindelang, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate - The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary
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geographical scope of BITs, comprising both developed and developing states,
strongly supports the first of these views today. EIAs, widely concluded in the last
years, corroborate this conclusion.636 It would seem that, in the long run, developed
states were successful in confirming the Hull rule and preventing a new custom to
arise, through state practice. At least in international investment law, the appropriate
compensation standard is still relevant, for instance, in the case-law on
nationalisations of the European Court of Human Rights.637
5.2. Treaty law, judicial decisions
The individual and social aspects of property are present in the interaction of the
investment and the takings provisions in BITs. A measure may or may not amount to
an expropriation, depending on how investment is defined.638 In other words,
anything contained in this concept will be protected from direct and indirect takings.
The notion of investment identifies the tangibles and intangibles to which the
respective treaty applies. It also establishes the nature of the obligations created by
it.639 BITs normally include a definition of investment followed by an open-ended list
of examples that acknowledges the dynamic nature of this concept in international
International Law Revisited', (2004) 5/V JWIT 769, at 798-809; and J Salacuse and N Sullivan, 'Do
BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain', (2005)
46/1 Harv. IL.J 67, at 112-5.
635
Kishaiyian, supra note 198, at 329 & 372-375; Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 395-7; Guzman, supra
note 223, at 643-4, 666-9, 678-80, & 684-7; Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 205-6; and Cassese, supra
note 71, at 524-5.
636 See Chapter 6 infra.
637 See Chapter 3 supra.
638
UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 136.
639 P Muchlinski, 'The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?',
(2000) 34 IL 1033, at 1040; and UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 113.
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law.640 But it also creates uncertainty. For this reason, recent treaty models have
included long and detailed lists of examples in their definitions641, and sometimes
even an exhaustive list instead of a definition.642
BITs recognise, since the early 1960s, the well-accepted principle of
international law that an expropriation may materialise in a direct or indirect form.643
Treaty-law often refers to takings as "expropriations" or "nationalisations". It also
often describes them as state actions that have an "effect equivalent to"644 or are
"tantamount to"645 expropriation or nationalisation. These formulas give a hint on
how to construe the respective treaty on the problem of intent.646 Occasionally, BITs
refer to takings as "deprivations" or "dispossessions", of a "direct or indirect"
character.647 None of these concepts is normally defined in the correspondent
treaty.648 Last-generation BITs try to minimise this vagueness by outlining the
expropriatory measures included in the correspondent provision. They also offer a
640
Salacuse, supra note 634, at 664.
The lack of a definition of investment in the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States also recognises the non-static character of this
notion, giving BIT and EIA draftsmen a great degree of flexibility.
Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 569.
641
See, e.g., Art. 1 of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
642
See, e.g. Art. 1 of the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
643
Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 382.
See, e.g., Art. 3 of the 1961 Switzerland-Tunisia BIT, available in French at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tunisia_switzerland_ff.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
644
See, e.g., Art. 6 of the 1988 Italy-Malaysia BIT, available in Italian at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/italy_malasyia_it.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, Art. 4 para. 2 of the 1997 Brazil-Cuba BIT, available in Portuguese at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Brazil_cuba_por.pdft> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
645 See, e.g., Art. 4 para. 2 of the 1981 Germany-Somalia BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_somalia.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
See, also. Art. 5 para. 1 of the 1997 Jordan-USA BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usJordan.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
646 Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 722.
647
See, e.g., Art. 4 of the 1987 Belgium-Malta BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/bel_lux_malta.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, Art. 4 para. 1 of the 1995 Albania-Sweden BIT, available at:
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sweden_albania.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16 at 98.
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police-powers solution on the question of intent, different from the sole-effect one of
former BITs.649
5.2.1. The expropriation of investments
Indirect or portfolio investment was not protected by customary international
law in the past. Any risk related with it was regarded as commercial, leaving the alien
as the sole responsible for the respective contingency. The situation was different for
FDI. Potential interferences with it by the host state were considered political risks
and received the protection of customary international law through the principles of
state responsibility and diplomatic protection.650 Today, BITs cover both portfolio
investment and FDI. The ideologically charged notion of property, rarely mentioned
in the sources of international law, is now referred to as investment and defined in a
large network of treaties.
The concept of investment can be found in those articles related with the scope
of application of the respective BIT. A general definition is normally followed by a
list of examples that includes movable and immovable property; interests in
companies, such as shares, stocks and debentures; claims to money and titles to
performance; intellectual property rights; and business concessions and similar
rights.651 The fact that the definition of investment in BITs is broad does not imply
649
See, e.g., Annex B.13 (1) of the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
See, also, Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 722-3.
650
Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 8.
651 See Salacuse, supra note 634, at 664; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 26; and Rubins, supra
note 189, at 292-3.
E.g. of such a provision include:
Art. 8 para. 1 of the 1966 Germany-Uganda BIT, available at
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that foreign investors have an absolute right of entry under these treaties. Many BITs
limit the benefits of its provisions to investments approved by the state parties.652
Others specify that an investment is covered only if it is made in accordance with the
laws and regulations of the host state.653 A further qualification refers to the moment
when the investment was made. Recent treaties, however, offer protection to
investments made after their entry into force, as well as those made before that
time.634 The latest US BIT model, for example, uses an elaborate formula for its
definition of investment. It comprises, among other things, a number of contracts and
authorisations, so that the breach of these agreements or the withdrawal of these
licenses or permits would constitute an expropriation.655 The same provision contains
an explanatory footnote clarifying that the characterisation of licenses, permits or
similar instruments as investments depends on the rights of the holder under domestic
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iiaydocs/bits/germany_uganda_eng_gr.pdf> (last visited 31
March, 2008);
Art. 1 para. 3 of the 1973 Egypt-Switzerland BIT, available in French at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_switzerland_fir.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008);
Art. 1 (a) of the 1976 Indonesia-UK BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_indonesia.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008);
and Art. 1 para. 1 of the 1989 Bulgaria-France BIT, available in French at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ffance_bulgaria_fr.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
Only exceptionally, BITs will cover FDI and not portfolio investment.
E.g., Art. 1 para. 1 of the 1991 Denmark-Poland BIT, after giving a general definition of investment
and the correspondent exemplary list, adds that it:
shall refer (...] to all investments in companies made for the purpose of establishing lasting economic
relations between the investor and the company and giving the investor the possibility of exercising
significant influence on the management of the company concerned.
Available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/denmark_poland.pdf> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
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See, e.g., Art. 1 para. 3 of the 1971 Malaysia-Netherlands BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_malaysia.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
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See, e.g., Art. 1 para. 1 of the 1991 China-Czech Republic BIT, available at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_china.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
654 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 45-6.
See, e.g., Art. 1 para. 1 of the 1994 Italy-Lithuania BIT, available in Italian at
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/italy_lituania_it.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
655 See Art. 1 of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
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law.656 This and other declarations are the result of the abundant case-law on
investment disputes.657
The tests applied by international tribunals to determine that the indirect taking
of an investment has occurred are inconsistent. The severity of the impact on owner's
property, the degree of interference, and the intention of the governmental action
coexist uneasily in the case-law on expropriation.658 The severity of the impact and
the degree of interference are related. The former refers to the ability of the foreign
investor to use, enjoy, and dispose his property.659 The latter, excludes mere
restrictions on this ability.660 In general, arbitral panels established under investment
codes, investment agreements and BITs have applied the substantial interference
standard, i.e. the destruction of such ability.661 ICSID tribunals, for example, have
required the total dispossession of at least one of the patrimonial attributes of
property, to consider a measure or group of measures challenged to amount to an
indirect expropriation.662 As Kriebaum points out: "[t]he investor need not be
deprived of its physical property, but it has to be deprived of the economic benefit of
its investment".663 Normally, international arbitral panels will focus on the effect of
the respective measure and not on the intent of the government behind its adoption.664
656 Note 3 to Art. I of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
657 The cumulative number of treaty-based investor-to-state claims, including NAFTA arbitrations, was
219 by November 2005. 132 have been brought before ICSID tribunals and 87 before other arbitral
panels.
UNCTAD, supra note 214, at 1-2.
658 See Gutbrod and Hindelang, supra note 51, at 63-6.
659 Ibid., 63.
660
Madalena, supra note 62, at 78.
661 U Kriebaum, 'Partial Expropriation', (2007) 8/1JWIT69, at 69-72.
662
Kunoy, supra note 95, at 485.
Even if they have delayed effects.
Ibid., 487.
663
Kriebaum, supra note 661, at 71.
664
See, e.g., Kunoy, supra note 95, at 469.
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A police-powers solution has only been endorsed exceptionally in NAFTA and BIT
arbitrations.
The uncertainties surrounding the indirect expropriation of foreign investments,
particularly the potential and actual application of the sole-effect rule on investments
in the US, has led the national authorities of this country to add the following
declaration in an annex to its latest BIT model:
1. [The takings provision] is intended to reflect customary international law
concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.
2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless
it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or property interest in an
investment.
3. [The takings provision] addresses two situations. The first is known as direct
expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
4. The second situation addressed by [the takings provision] is known as indirect
expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent
to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case,
fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or
series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has
occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
• .. 665
expropriations.
This annex confirms the broad concept of property and tries to avoid the debate
that arose in NAFTA arbitrations in relation to the meaning of measures "tantamount
to nationalization or expropriation".666 The relation between the takings provision and
customary international law is aimed at more conservative interpretations by arbitral
panels. Most importantly, the annex gives the international standard of treatment a
665 Annex B of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
666
See Chapter 6 infra.
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particular national content: that developed in the US regulatory takings doctrine. It
names the three factors put forward by the US Supreme Court in the Penn Central
case for the determination of an indirect expropriation.667 This is, the economic
impact of the measure, the interference with the investor's legitimate expectations,
and the character of the governmental action. Even though the US model refers to the
economic impact of the measure, it expressly rejects a sole-effect solution. In fact, it
openly adopts a police-powers exception for non-discriminatory regulatory measures
aimed at public purposes, which can easily be interpreted as a police-powers rule.668
The latest Canadian model follows the US approach in similar terms, but not the new
British, Mexican and Spanish versions.669
Articles 12 and 13 of the US BIT, paragraphs 2 and 3, respectively, should be
read in relation to the police-powers rule contained in its Annex B. They declare that
nothing in this treaty shall be construed to prevent the contracting parties from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with its
provisions, which they consider appropriate to ensure that the investment activity in
their territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental or labour
concerns. The footnote in Article 1, providing that "[t]he term "investment" does not
include an order or judgment entered in a judicial or administrative action" also
follows the US regulatory takings doctrine, where judicial decisions cannot constitute
expropriation.670
667 See Chapter 6 infra.
668 Fortier and Drymer, supra note 8, at 318-9.
669 See Arts. 10 and 11, and Annex B.13 (1) of the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
See, also, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News, 16 May, 2006,
available at <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mayl6_2006.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008); and
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News, 2 November, 2006,
available at <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_nov2_2006.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008);
referring to the 2006 Mexico-UK BIT; and the 2006 Mexico-Spain BIT.
670 Note 4 to Art. 1 of the 2004 Uruguay-USA BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
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5.2.3. Some claims before arbitral panels
Investment disputes generally confirm the customary minimum standard of
treatment which protects aliens from expropriation. Following the case-law of the
PCIJ, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Iran-US CT, these awards adopt
a traditional definition of property, including tangibles as well as intangibles.671 Both
actions and omissions can lead to a finding of indirect expropriation. This view is
consistent with that of the 2001 ILC's Articles on State Responsibility.672 Early
international arbitrations based on the settlement provisions of investment agreements
concluded between the host-state and the alien illustrate the interaction of a broad
concept of property and that of indirect taking. Benvenuti et Bonfant, for instance,
refers to a series actions and omissions of the Congolese authorities considered in
1980 to have the cumulative effect of a de facto expropriation of an Italian
investor.673 In Biloune, the investment involved the development of a hotel resort
complex in the city of Accra, Ghana, by the joint venture of a Syrian national and a
governmental entity. The work was well advanced when state officials issued an
order to stop it. According to them, a building permit was lacking. The authorities
demolished part of the complex, and the foreign investor was arrested, held in
See note 51, supra.
See, also, Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 79.
671 See Chapters 3 & 4 supra.
612 See Crawford, supra note 24, at 77.
Olguin is a rare example in which the tribunal refused to recognise omissions as constitutive of indirect
expropriation.
Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic ofParaguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award, 26 July 2001,
para. 84, available in Spanish at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/01guin-award-sp.pdf> (last visited
31 March, 2008).
677 See Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfant srl. v. The Government of the People's Republic of the Congo, ICSID
Case No. ARB/77/2, Award,'8 August 1980, (1982)21 ILM 740.
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custody without charge, deported from Ghana, and not allowed to return. The site was
closed and the project remained uncompleted. Mr. Biloune claimed damages for the
taking, denial of justice, and violation of human rights. The tribunal decided that it
only had jurisdiction over the controversy which the parties had agreed to submit to
arbitration. This is, the investment dispute. In relation to the alleged lack of permit,
the panel concluded that though the letter of the law supported the contention that the
work could not go forward without it, the practice with regard to this site indicated an
exception to this rule.674 Concerning the conjunction of the stop work order, the
demolition, the arrest, the detention, and the deportation of Mr. Biloune without the
possibility of re-entry, the tribunal concluded that these measures prevented the
foreign investor from pursuing an approved project, thus constituting a constructive
expropriation of the foreign investor's contractual rights on it and, accordingly, the
taking of the value of his interest in the joint venture.675
Recent cases have relied on the minimum standard of treatment as well. A
BIT arbitration concluded in 2000 that the physical seizure of the assets of a British
investor, by an Egyptian public company, amounted to a de facto expropriation.
Quoting TAMSf76, the arbitral panel in Wena Hotels found Egypt responsible for the
"non-ephemeral" deprivation of the alien's "fundamental rights of ownership"
derived from this seizure.677 The tribunal agreed with Amco's assertion that "a case of
expropriation exists not only when a state takes over private property, but also when
the expropriating state transfers ownership to another legal or natural person", and
674 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of




676 See Chapter 4 supra.
677
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic ofEgypt, ICSID case No. ARB/98/4, Award, 8 December 2000,
(2002)41 ILM 896, at 914-5, paras. 98-101.
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that a taking "also exists merely by the state withdrawing the protection of its courts
from the owner expropriated, and tacitly allowing a de facto possessor to remain in
possession of the thing seized".678
Transfer of property to the state adopting the measure has not been considered
a necessary condition for finding an indirect taking. However, its appropriation
constitutes prima facie proof of an expropriation.679 Olguin and Lauder are
exceptions to the general trend on transfer of property in indirect takings.680 This last
arbitration and CME were settled in 2001 with only days of difference. Both tribunals
described indirect expropriation as measures that do not involve an overt taking, but
effectively neutralise the benefit or enjoyment of the alien's property.681 Each panel
reached, however, opposed findings over the same facts, on the basis of different
interpretations of the concept of property. In Lauder no taking was found. The panel
came to this conclusion by applying a restrictive view of the rights attached to
property.682 Conversely, the notion of investment invoked by the tribunal in CME was
very broad. It included the income producing potential of property rights.683 From this
perspective, the destruction of the commercial value of the investment was equated to
678
Ibid., 914, para. 97.
In Amco, however, the revocation of an investment license was not considered a taking, but a breach of
a sui generis legal relationship -comparable to a contract- between the alien and Indonesia. The arbitral
panel found a violation by the host state of a principle similar to that of pacta sunt servanda in
international law, on one hand, and of the respect due for the acquired rights of the US investor,
derived from that legal relationship, on the other. The proceedings in Amco where instituted under the
relevant settlement provision of an investment agreement between the foreign investor and the host-
state, and the relevant provision of an investment code of the Indonesia.
See Amco Asia Corporation et al v. The Republic ofIndonesia, ICSID case No. ARB/81/1, Award, 21
November 1984, (1985) 24 ILM 1022, at 1030, & 1033-5, especially paras. 189, 244 & 248.
679 Newcombe, supra note 50, at 8.
680 See Eudoro Armando Olguin case, supra note 672, para. 84; and Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech
Republic, UNCITRAL arbitration, Award, 3 September, 2001, para. 203, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdT> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
681 See Ronald S. Lauder case, supra note 680, paras. 200-1.
See, also, CME Czech Republic B. V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL arbitration, Partial Award, 13
September 2001, para. 604, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
682 Paulsson and Douglas, supra note 8, at 150.
683 Ibid.
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its deprivation. Paulsson and Douglas explain that CME's solution is normally
favoured in investment disputes, exposing "the limitations of a purely legal or
formalistic concept of property [common in direct takings case-law] that is not
sensitive to the economic rights or expectations associated with the property".684
Another BIT arbitration where an indirect taking was found is Middle East
Cement. This case referred to a de facto revocation of a license by Egypt, and the
seizure and auction of a ship, among other claims. A Greek investor was allowed by
decree to import, and store cement in a quay near the El-Abadia Port in Suez, as well
as to pack and dispatch it within the country. After some years, the authorities
prohibited by another decree certain imports of cement, directly affecting the alien's
activity. The applicable BIT mentioned "business concessions conferred by law or
under contract" within its definition of investment. The tribunal had no doubt that
licenses were included in this phrase685, and had no problems in finding that the
measure adopted by Egypt deprived the foreign investor of the use and benefit of its
• ... 686
investment, even though it retained nominal ownership of the respective rights.
Egypt was also found responsible for the administrative seizure and auction of a ship
of the Greek investor, after the enactment of the decree that tacitly revoked its license.
These measures were considered in 2002 by the tribunal to have effects "tantamount
to expropriation".687 The other claims of the Greek investor were rejected.
684
Ibid., 152-3.
685 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 1CSID case No.
ARB/99/6, Award, 12 April 2002, paras. 100-1, available at





5.3. The question of intent
Most judicial decisions of ad hoc and ICSID panels follow the sole-effect rule,
awarding compensation for the effective deprivation of the foreign investor. Host-
states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in this case-law, similar to that recognised
by the European Court of Human Rights and the Iran-US CT.688 Arbitral panels will
normally refrain from challenging the motives of national authorities. Goetz, for
instance, stated that in the absence of manifest error, an international tribunal should
not substitute its own judgment for the host state's discretionary evaluation of the
public purpose involved in the adoption of a particular measure.689 The panel in this
BIT-based arbitration concluded that the revocation of the French national's free zone
benefits by the government of Burundi completely deprived the claimant of the utility
of his investment, thus amounting to a measure having an effect similar to a taking.690
Contradictions on this issue, however, are not uncommon. They appear even
within a single judicial decision. Biloune expressly declared in 1989 that "[t]he
motivations for the actions and omissions of Ghanaian governmental authorities are
not clear[,] [b]ut the Tribunal need not establish those motivations to come to a
conclusion in the case".691 After a few lines, the same ad hoc panel implicitly refuted
its sole-effect approach by recognising a police-powers rule in the form of a broad
exception worded in these terms:
such prevention of [the foreign investor] from pursuing its approved project would
constitute constructive expropriation of [the alien's] contractual rights in the project
688
See Chapters 3 & 4 supra.
689 Antoine Goetz et consorts c. Republique du Burundi, Affaire CIRDI ARB/95/3, Sentence, 10
February 1999, para. 126, available in French at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Goetz-Award.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
690
Ibid., para. 124.
691 Biloune andMarine Drive Complex Ltd case, supra note 674, at 209.
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and, accordingly, the expropriation of the value of Mr Biloune's interest in [the
company], unless the Respondents can establish by persuasive evidence sufficient
justification for these events.692
Recently, international tribunals established under BITs have shown a certain
inclination to asses the public purpose claimed by the host-state adopting the
challenged regulatory measure. This tendency reflects the debate in the context of
NAFTA, following a number of claims lodged against the US. It also jeopardises the
dominance of the sole-effect rule in ad hoc and ICSID panels.
5.3.1. Exceptions to an approach
SPP is an early example of the application of a sole-effect solution to an
expropriation claim. The investment in this case involved the development of tourist
complexes: one at the Pyramids area near Cairo, and another at Ras El Hekma, on the
Mediterranean coast of Egypt. The foreign investor was a Hong Kong corporation,
owning a joint venture with the Egyptian authorities, incorporated for the purpose of
developing the projects. The Pyramids project encountered political opposition in
Egypt, on the grounds that it posed a threat to undiscovered antiquities. As a result of
a series of governmental decrees and resolutions, the Pyramids project was cancelled.
SPP initiated an arbitration before the ICC, relying on the dispute settlement clause of
the investment agreement concluded with the host state. The tribunal established
Egypt's obligation to pay compensation to the claimant. The Egyptian authorities
appealed the ICC award to the French Cour d'Appel, which annulled it for
jurisdictional reasons. SPP then commenced arbitral proceedings under the
692 Ibid.
155
Washington Convention relying on the dispute settlement provision of the Egyptian
investment code. In the award issued in 1992, the tribunal recognised that the host-
state's cancellation of the project to protect antiquities "constituted a lawful exercise
of the right of eminent domain".693 Nevertheless -it added-, the rules of Egyptian and
international law governing the exercise of this right impose an obligation to
indemnify those affected by it. An obligation that "applies equally where antiquities
are involved".694 The panel quoted the Chorzow Factory case, and the judgments in
Amoco and Phillips695, for rejecting the argument of the respondent that expropriation
applies only to real property rights. SPP was granted compensation for the taking of
its contractual rights in the joint venture as a consequence of the cancellation by the
Egyptian authorities of the Pyramids project.696
The clearest statement of the sole-effect rule is found in one of the few
arbitrations dealing in recent years with a direct expropriation claim: Santa Elena. In
it, the tribunal made the following declaration:697
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was
taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the
environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the
taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of the
obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.
Expropriatory environmental measures -no matter how laudable and beneficial to
society as a whole- are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures
that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is
expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international,
the state's obligation to pay compensation remains.698
693 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited (SPP) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICS1D Case
No. ARB/84/3, Award, 20 May 1992, (1993) 32 ILM 933, para. 158.
694
Ibid., para. 159.
695 See Chapter 4 supra.
696 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited (SPP) case, supra note 693, paras. 164, 169 &
172.
697 This case was not based in a BIT and the dispute referred to the amount of compensation paid by
Costa Rica to the US investor.
698
Compahia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. case, supra note 39, para. 71.
156
The tribunal referred to TAMS in support of this view.699 It also said that:
[a] decree which heralds a process of administrative and judicial considerations of the
issue in a manner that effectively freezes or blights the possibility for the owner
reasonably to exploit the economic potential of the property, can, if the process thus
triggered is not carried out within a reasonable time, properly be identified as the
actual act of taking.700
A year later, the ad hoc panel in CME expressly acknowledged the police-
powers exception to the sole-effect rule of the Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).701 According to it, non¬
discriminatory measures of general application, which governments normally take for
the purpose of regulating economic activity in their territories, do not constitute a
taking.702 Then, in 2003, Generation Ukraine quoted TAMS and Santa Elena with
approval.703 This award expressly stated that the intent of the government is less
important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and that the form of the
measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.704
Predictability and the respect for legitimate expectations were stressed as elements of
the protection against expropriation.705 That same year, another ICSID panel initially
endorsed the sole-effect rule, only to implicitly refute it later.
TECMED involved a Spanish investor that bought a controlled landfill of
hazardous industrial waste in Mexico and was granted a renewable license to operate
it by the local authorities. The Mexican state later rejected the alien's application for
renewal, and requested the closure of the landfill. This resolution moved the foreign




701 See Chapter 6 infra.
702 CME Czech Republic B. V. case, supra note 691, para. 321.
703 Generation Ukraine, Inc. case, supra note 46, paras. 20.24-5.
704
Ibid., paras. 20.23 & 20.25.
705
Ibid., paras. 20.29, 20.37 & 23.
No taking was found in this case.
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its analysis of the expropriation claim from the standpoint of the sole-effect doctrine.
Quoting Metalclad706, the arbitral panel understood takings to materialise "through
actions or conduct, which do not explicitly express the purpose of depriving one of
rights or assets, but actually have that effect".707 To establish whether the resolution is
a measure equivalent to an expropriation under the terms of the BIT -the tribunal
said-, it should be first determined that the claimant was, due to this resolution,
"radically deprived of the economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the
rights related thereto -such as the income or benefits related to the Landfill or to its
exploitation- had ceased to exist".708 According to the panel:
This determination is important because it is one of the main elements to distinguish,
from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a regulatory measure,
which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state's police power that entails
a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that deprives those assets
709
and rights of any real substance.
The panel found support for this view in the wording of the BIT, covering
expropriations, nationalisations or "any other measure with similar characteristics or
effects".710 With quotes on the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Iran US CT -which included
Ivcher7U, Matosin, TAMS and Phelps Dodge7 ]j-, the panel reasoned that in an
indirect taking claim the decision-maker should not restrict itself to the evaluation of
See Chapter 6 infra.
707 Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican Status, ICSID case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May, 2003, paras. 113-4, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Tecnicas_001 .pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
708
Ibid., para. 115.
The tribunal referred to Pope & Talbot and the Third Restatement on this point.
See Chapter 6 infra
709
Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. , case, supra note 707, para. 115.
710 Ibid.
71' See Chapter 3 supra.
712 See ibid.
713 See Chapter 4 supra.
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whether a formal dispossession occurred, but should look beyond mere appearances
and determine the reality behind the situation that was denounced, for:
it is understood that the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are
an indirect de facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and if the
assets or rights subject to such measure have been affected in such a way that '...any
form of exploitation thereof...' has disappeared; i.e. the economic value of the use,
enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative action
or decision have been neutralized or destroyed. Under international law, the owner is
also deprived of property where the use or enjoyment of benefits related thereto is
exacted or interfered with to a similar extent, even where legal ownership over the
assets in question is not affected, and so long as the deprivation is not temporary. The
government's intention is less important than the effects of the measures on the
owner of the assets or on the benefits arising from such assets affected by the
measures; and the form of the deprivation measure is less important than its actual
effects.714
The arbitral panel in TECMED concluded that the measure adopted by Mexico
fulfilled these characteristics. Surprisingly, it then decided to approach the claim from
a police-powers perspective, using the fair balance test developed by the European
Court, and at least two of the three factors of the US Penn Central case for this
purpose.715 The tribunal declared that a state measure is expropriatory if it has a
negative financial impact and is proportional to the public interest protected.716 It
recognised that due deference is owed to the host-state's definition and
implementation of its public policy. The panel considered, however, that this
circumstance did not prevent it from establishing whether such measures were
reasonable "with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and the
legitimate expectations of who suffered such deprivation".717 Only the third factor of
the Penn Central case was missing from this assessment, i.e. the character of the
governmental action. In a direct reference to the case-law of the European Court, the
714
Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. , case, supra note 707, para. 116.
715 See Chapter 3 supra and Chapter 6 infra.
See, also Newcombe, supra note 50, at 17-20.
716 Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. , case, supra note 707, para. 122.
111 Ibid.
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tribunal added that there must be a balance between the charge or weight imposed on
the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by the conduct of the state, and
"[t]o value such charge or weight, it is very important to measure the size of the
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the state and whether such deprivation
was compensated or not".718 The panel reviewed the motives of the resolution -that is
to say, its public purpose- not to determine if it was legally issued, but to establish if
the BIT was violated. It concluded that the measure was adopted solely on political
considerations.719 No justification for the resolution was found, and compensation
790
was awarded for the taking to the foreign investor.
5.3.2. Conforming a trend?
The standard of substantial interference, as required in the Pope & Talbot
case, was upheld in Occidental, an UNCITRAL arbitration settling an investment
dispute in 2004. The tribunal concluded that "there has been no deprivation of the use
or reasonably expected economic benefit of the investment, let alone measures
affecting a significant part of the investment".721 The ICSID panel in CMS rejected a
claim of expropriation in 2005 from the standpoint of the sole-effect approach
advanced in TAMS, Metalclad and CME. Quoting Lauder, the CMS award defined
718 Ibid.
The tribunal quoted profusely from the case-law of the European Court for this purpose. Matos,
Mellacher, Pressos Compania Naviera, and James were mentioned in its decision.
See Chapter 3 supra.




721 Occidental Exploration and Production Co. (OEPC) v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNC1TRAL
arbitration, Award, 1 July 2004, para. 89, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
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indirect taking as measures that do not involve an overt expropriation, but that
effectively neutralise the enjoyment of the property.722 The standard applied in this
case was that of substantial deprivation, as developed in Pope & Talbot.723 No such
deprivation was found by the tribunal, persuaded by Argentina's argument that after
the measures adopted in response to the financial crisis in the country, the US
investor retained the full ownership and control of its investment.724
That year, an ad hoc tribunal held that certain acts and omissions of the Polish
authorities did amount to a deprivation of the claimant's investment. Eureko referred
to the failed privatisation of a wholly state-owned insurance company. The panel
considered that, though the Dutch investor was not deprived of its shares in the
company or of its dividends, the refusal of the authorities to conduct the agreed public
• • * 725
offering of shares was discriminatory and in blunt violation of its expectations.
TECMED, Metalclad126, and CME were mentioned in support for the arbitral panel's
finding that the contractual rights of Eureko were indirectly deprived by the host state
in breach of the Netherlands/Poland BIT.727 The question of intent was directly,
though controversially, addressed in Saluka. This BIT arbitration endorsed in 2006
the police-powers solution adopted months before in Methanex,728 The panel
expressly declared that:
722 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic ofArgentina, ICSID case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12
May, 2005, para. 261, available at <http://ita.law.uvie.ca/documents/CMS_FinalAward_000.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
722
Ibid., para. 263.
See Chapter 6 infra.
724 CMS Gas Transmission Company case, supra note 722, para. 263.
725 Eureko B. V. v. Republic of Poland, Ad hoc arbitration, Partial Award, 19 August, 2005, para. 241,
available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
See ibid., para. 242.
726 See Chapter 6 infra.
727 Eureko B. V. case, supra note 725, paras. 241 & 243.
728 See Chapter 6 infra.
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It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are
729
aimed at the general welfare.
•jin
In other words, "certain takings or deprivations are non-compensable".
According to this tribunal, international law has yet to draw:
a bright and easily distinguishable line between non-compensable regulations on
the one hand and, on the other, measures that have the effect of depriving foreign
investors of their investment and are thus unlawful and compensable in
international law.731
Saluka's solution forgets that compensation is a requirement of a lawful taking,
not just a consequence of the breach of an international obligation. The panel reached
such a conclusion, even though the provision of the applicable BIT was worded on
the traditional terms of the international law of expropriation, establishing the four
conditions for a lawful taking: public purpose, non-discrimination, payment of
compensation, and due process.732 Without further reasoning, the tribunal in Saluka
decided that the Czech Republic had not crossed the line that separates permissible
regulatory action from expropriation. As a result, the host-state was not held
responsible for breaching the treaty.733 This view has not been followed in later BIT
arbitrations.
Months after Saluka, two tribunals adopted TECMED's solution. In Azurix, the
panel complemented the sole-effect rule with the proportionality and the legitimate
expectations principles.734 LG&E confirmed the applicability of the fair balance test
729 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL arbitration, Partial Award, 17 March,
2006, para. 255, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saluka-PartialawardFinal.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
730 Ibid., para. 258.
731 Ibid,, para. 263.
732 See ibid., para. 245.
733 Ibid., para. 265.
734
Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICS1D case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July, 2006, paras.
310-2, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
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to investment arbitrations.735 No taking was found in any of these two BIT cases.736
The tribunal in Telenor openly avoided giving its view on the problem of intent, and
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of the standard of substantial
deprivation.737 The award of this BIT arbitration, however, expressly declared that to
answer the threshold question "the determinative factors are the intensity and duration
73 8of the economic deprivation suffered by the investor as the result of them". A
month later, the arbitral panel in ADC awarded compensation to the claimant for the
breach by the host-state of the requirements of a lawful taking. The claimants in this
case were companies incorporated in Cyprus, chosen in a tender process by the
Hungarian authorities to expand and operate the Budapest international airport. After
the renovation and construction work was over, the host state decided to change its
national aviation strategy. All the foreign investor's operations and related activities
in the airport were taken over effectively by a state entity, acting under a decree
issued by the governmental authorities.
ADC declared that a just compensation in case of deprivation is within the
legitimate and reasonable expectations of a foreign investor. In a rather uncommon
approach in investment disputes, the panel then decided to asses the requirement of
public purpose claimed by Hungary. The tribunal reasoned that this condition requires
some proven genuine general interest, for the mere reference to public purpose does
735 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. V. Argentine Republic,
ICSID case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on liability, 3 October, 2006, paras. 189 & 194-5, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ARB021_LGE-Decision-on-Liability-en.pdf> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
736 Azurix Corp. case, supra note 734, para. 322; and LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp.,
LG&E International Inc. case, supra note 735, paras. 198-200.
737 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID case No. ARB/04/15,
Award, 13 September 2006, paras. 65-7 & 79-80, available at




not "magically put such interest into existence".739 No public purpose appeared from
the conduct of the Hungarian authorities. Furthermore, no due process of law was
found in their conduct. For these reasons, compensation was awarded in favour of the
foreign investor. In 2007, another BIT-based panel approached the requirement of
public purpose in the same way as ADC, followed the sole-effect rule, and found an
indirect taking. Siemens involved a German investor in Argentina.740 The claimant
won a bidding process for the provision of an immigration control, personal
identification and electoral information system. A contract was subsequently awarded
and approved by decree for these purposes. The agreement came into effect and
production of national identity cards started, after some postponement not attributable
to the foreign investor. The Argentinian authorities detected a problem in some of the
cards printed and suspended their production and distribution. The investor was
prohibited from introducing any modification to correct this problem and a new
contract was agreed between the parties. An economic-financial emergency law was
then enacted and the government gave the foreign investor a new non-negotiable draft
proposal, with different terms from that of the formerly agreed document. The
original contract was finally terminated by decree in conformity with this law, and the
investor initiated arbitration proceedings under the Argentina-Germany BIT.
The tribunal in Siemens considered the contract to be included in the definition
of investment of the treaty. It further concluded that there was an interference in the
execution of the contract through governmental action that amounted to a creeping
739 ADC Affiliate Limited andADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic ofHungary, ICSTD
case No. ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October, 2006, para. 423, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
Particularly damaging on Hungary's plea of public purpose was its subsequent privatisation of the
airport, acquired by a company not related with the foreign investor.
740
Siemens was the fourth award against Argentina in 18 months.
See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News, 19 February, 2007,
available at <http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn/archive.asp> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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expropriation, in its "effect and permanence"741. The tribunal quoted the Norwegian
Shipowners's claim and confirmed the traditional sole-effect rule by recalling:
that Article 4(2) refers to measures that "a sus efectos" (in its Spanish original) would
be equivalent to expropriation or nationalization. The Treaty refers to measures that
have the effect of an expropriation; it does not refer to the intent of the State to
expropriate. [...] A different matter is the purpose of the expropriation, but that is one
of the requirements for determining whether the expropriation is in accordance with
the terms of the Treaty and not for determining whether an expropriation has
occurred.742
The panel analysed the public purpose claimed by the Argentinian authorities
and found no such requirement in the uncompensated measures adopted by it,
described in the award as "an exercise of public authority to reduce the costs to
Argentina of the Contract recently awarded through public competitive bidding, and
as part of a change of policy by a new Administration eager to distance itself from its
predecessor".7
Compahia de Aguas del Aconquija returned to a more traditional approach on
the problem of indirect takings later on that year. This BIT-based arbitration was
related to a concession agreement which unsuccessfully privatised the water and
sewage services of the Province of Tucuman. The panel found Argentina responsible
for expropriating the French investor. This award quoted profusely the case-law of
the Iran-US CT, other BIT arbitrations, and NAFTA panels to support its choice on
the problems of the degree of interference and of the motives behind it. Regarding the
former, the tribunal said:
it is not infrequent in cases of indirect expropriation that the investor suffers a
substantial deprivation of value of its investment. Numerous tribunals have looked
at the diminution of the value of the investment to determine whether the contested
measure is expropriatory. The weight of authority [...] appears to draw a
741 Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 6 February, 2007,
paras. 253, 260, 267 & 271, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-Argentina-






distinction between only a partial deprivation of value (not an expropriation) and a
complete or near complete deprivation of value (expropriation).
On the question of intent, Compama de Aguas del Aconquija adopted the sole-
effect rule, as found in 7/1MS, Phillips, Pope & Talbot, and Metalclad:
There is extensive authority for the proposition that the state's intent, or its
subjective motives are at most a secondary consideration. While intent will weigh
in favour of showing a measure to be expropriatory, it is not a requirement, because
the effect of the measure on the investor, not the state's intent, is the critical factor.
[...]
Also, the structure of Article 5(2) of the Treaty directs the Tribunal first to consider
whether the challenged measures are expropriatory, and only then to ask whether
they can comply with certain conditions, ie public purpose, non-discriminatory,
specific commitments, et cetera. If we conclude that the challenged measures are
expropriatory, there will be violation of Article 5(2) of the Treaty, even if the
measures might be for a public purpose and non-discriminatory, because no
compensation has been paid. 45
5.4. Conclusion
BITs have transformed the protection of foreign investment into one of the most
active fields of international-law making of the last decades. Countries in the
Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe and Oceania have concluded these treaties, most of
which are in force, embracing the international minimum standard described in them.
The extent of state practice is such, that the taking provisions in BITs can be fairly
considered to evidence customary international law. The dispute settlement clauses
have allowed international arbitral panels to add some flesh to the bony descriptions
of indirect expropriation in treaty-law. These clauses have enabled foreign investors
in developing countries to challenge state measures that interfere with their property.
744
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They have even enabled foreign investors in developed states to do so. For this
reason, last-generation US and Canadian BIT models have been modified to influence
the interpretation of international tribunals settling claims of indirect expropriation
against these contracting parties.
BITs and the case-law on investment disputes of ad hoc and ICSID panels adopt
a broad concept of property. These tribunals have applied various tests to establish
when the conduct of a state amounts to an indirect taking. Their awards focus on the
severity of its impact in the foreign investment, the degree of the interference, or the
intention of the host-state. Arbitral panels will normally require a substantial
interference, effectively and permanently depriving the foreign investor of the use,
enjoyment and disposition of his property. This deprivation can be the result of either
actions and omissions of the host-state, or both. Generation Ukraine, TECMED,
Occidental, Eureko, and ADC highlight the important role of the legitimate
expectations of the foreign investor in that determination. This element has been
emphasised in the latest Canadian and US BIT models too.
As to the intention of the host-state, arbitral panels have generally granted it a
wide discretion at the moment of identifying the public purpose involved in the
measure adopted. Consequently, they have refrained from challenging the state's
assessment. The sole-effect approach is dominant in ad hoc and ICSID panels. SEP,
Goetz, Santa Elena, Lauder, Generation Ukraine, CMS, Eureko, ADC, Siemens and
Compahla de Aguas del Aconquija have applied it. The most prominent exceptions to
this trend are found in TECMED and Saluka. The police-powers solution in the
former, later adopted in Azurix and partly in LG&E, mixed the fair balance test of the
European Court of Human Rights and some of the factors of the US Supreme Court
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case of Penn Central. The tribunal issued a confusing statement in TECMED. It
declared that its review of the public purpose was aimed at establishing whether the
BIT was breached, not at determining the legality of the expropriatory measure. Four
years later, the award in Siemens returned to a more traditional position. This award
expressly stated that the panel considered the purpose of the expropriation as one of
the requirements of a lawful taking, and not as an element for the determination of
whether the taking had occurred. Although it applied the sole-effect rule, the intrusive
approach on the issue of public purpose, also adopted in ADC, cast doubts to the pre¬
eminence of this view in future arbitrations. Time will tell if the sole-effect approach
applied in Companla de Aguas del Aconquija will remain the general rule in the
international law of expropriation.
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6
MULTILATERAL RULES ON EXPROPRIATION
From 1929 to 1998, several attempts to regulate the property of aliens in a
multilateral treaty failed at the League of Nations, the International Chamber of
Commerce; the OECD, the UN, and the World Bank, among other organisations.
The interest of the League ofNations and the International Chamber of Commerce in
foreign investment was brief. The UN dealt initially with expropriation at the
General Assembly, during the debates on the permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and the NIEO. After the 1970s, its involvement with the treatment of aliens
diminished significantly. The OECD played a leading role in the evolution of
investment treaty-law during the 1960s. It also had a centre-stage part in its
involution during the 1990s. The World Bank established in the 1960s and the 1980s
two of the most important organisations in the history of international investment
law: ICSID and MIGA. Additionally, it drafted a set of general guidelines for the
treatment of foreign investors, which filled the gap for multilateral rules on takings in
international law.
In the meantime, a couple of institutions in the US issued non-binding
instruments tackling the question of foreign investment. Both included an adaptation
of their domestic takings doctrine to international law, in the form of a police-powers
rule. NAFTA and the ECT incorporated investment provisions among their articles
in the 1990s, which repeat to a large extent the takings clause found in BITs.
Consequently, none of them openly opted for a sole-effect or a police-powers
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solution. Arbitral panels established under NAFTA have interpreted the undefined
concepts of indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to it mentioned in this
treaty. Early judicial decisions of these tribunals adopted a sole-effect approach.
Such a solution was convenient for the US government when other host-states were
in the dock. It became a threat when foreign investors started lodging expropriation
claims against the US. The reaction was swift. Rejecting a position defended for
more than a hundred years in the international fora, this country limited the
protection of aliens to a national treatment rule and included its domestic regulatory-
takings doctrine in recently concluded BITs and FTAs. The international minimum
standard has thus been implicitly discarded by the US.
The various instruments that emerged out of these failed efforts of
international organisations are studied in the present chapter. From the Havana
Charter to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. And beyond, for the
expropriation clauses of EIAs currently in force are briefly analysed too. NAFTA
case-law on indirect takings, particularly its answer to the threshold question, is
addressed in detail. The US takings doctrine is also explained, and its progressive
translation to international law is duly tracked down.
6.1. Unsuccessful attempts and soft-law
The creation of an international organisation focused on world trade was
proposed in 1944 at a conference on economic affairs, held in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, USA. Negotiations on its constitutive treaty took place within the UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the following years. During them, the
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issue of expropriation of foreign property was discussed. The second session of the
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee, held at Geneva in 1947, finished with a draft
establishing that "just compensation" should be paid in case of taking.746 This
provision was later deleted due to its lack of precision. The Charter for an
International Trade Organization (Havana Charter) finally signed in Cuba's capital in
1948 included only generally-worded articles on the regulation of international
747
investment.
Two unsuccessful initiatives to regulate foreign investment at a multilateral
level were undertaken before the Havana Charter. In 1929, the League of Nations
convened in Paris a diplomatic conference aimed at concluding an international
convention on the treatment of aliens and foreign enterprises. A year later, the Hague
Conference on the Codification of International Law included, among the issues to
discuss, the responsibility of states for damage caused in their territory to the person
or property of foreigners. Neither initiative achieved its objective, as Muchlinski
points out, "owing to the refusal of Latin American, East European and ex-colonial
states to accept the traditional international minimum standards of treatment insisted
upon by the capital-exporting states".748
746 G Jaenicke, 'Havana Charter', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EP1L (1995), Vol. II, 680.
See, also, Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 405.
In this conference, a draft of a multilateral treaty containing general principles of trade was completed
under the name of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As the negotiations of the
Havana Charter continued, GATT parties adopted a Protocol of Provisional Application to apply this
treaty from 1948 without waiting for the Havana Charter to be enforceable.
M Matsushita, T Schoenbaum and P Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization. Law, Practice, and
Policy (2004), 2.
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See Jaenicke, supra note 746, at 680; and Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, supra note 746,
at 1-2.
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P Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (1995), 573-4.
See, also, S Picciotto, 'Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the Draft
Multilateral Agreement on Investment', (1998) 19 UPenn. J1EL 731, at 742-3.
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Following the demise of the Havana Charter, private-sector bodies in Europe
made several efforts to conclude a multilateral treaty on foreign investment.
International organisations took part in this attempt as well. But while the failed
OECD Draft Convention of 1967 indirectly developed international investment law
through European BIT models, the abandonment of its Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) was an important set-back in the evolution of this branch of law
thirty years later. The World Bank group has been more successful. Its progressive
engagement with international investment law led not only to the creation of ICSID
in 1965 and MIGA in 1985, but also to the publication of its Guidelines on the
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment in 1995.
6.1.1. Early efforts to address expropriation
Although the Havana Charter was signed by fifty-four countries, a good
number in those days, it eventually failed to enter into force.749 The investment
articles of this treaty were reduced to two generally worded provisions, after the
payment of just compensation for takings was excluded from its final version.750
Article 11 established a broad protection of foreign investment in the form of a
negative obligation on the members of the International Trade Organization (ITO) to
avoid adopting unreasonable or unjustifiable measures within its territory, injurious
to the rights or interests of nationals of other members. The great value of foreign
investment in the promotion of economic development and social progress was
recognised in Article 12. It required ITO members to stimulate the flow of foreign
74g
Jaenicke, supra note 746, at 679.
750 Available at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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capital to their territories, while acknowledging the right of the host-state to regulate
its entry. Endorsing FCNs, the same provision encouraged the conclusion of bilateral
and multilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investment
among its members.
Because US support for the Havana Charter was decisive, other contracting
states decided to wait for its ratification in this country. President Truman submitted
this treaty to the US Congress in 1948. Two years later, his administration announced
that it would no longer seek the approval for the ITO.751 The Havana Charter was
abandoned in 1950, according to Lowenfeld, mostly for reasons not related with its
investment provisions.752 In his view, the US administration considered:
that support for the Havana Charter might impair support for higher-priority issues
of foreign affairs such as the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe [...] and
(from the summer of 1950 on) pursuit of the war in Korea.753
Not all authors agree with this position. Tschofen considers that among the
main reasons for the failure of the Havana Charter was its "unsatisfactory provisions
on foreign investment".754 Muchlinski recalls that these provisions caused
widespread opposition to the treaty among the business community in the US.755
Riesenberg is of the same opinion. US business interests had particularly strong
objections to Article 12, whose investment protection was considered to be "too
vague and too weak".756 Loppacher and Keer add that the same countries that had
pushed for investment to be included in the Havana Charter, including the US, began
to fear that the agreement, as negotiated, did not provide adequate guarantees against
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expropriation.757 Whatever the cause was, the abandonment of the Havana Charter in
the US led the other signatories to desist from securing its ratification in their
respective states.
The ICC, a non-governmental organisation based in Paris, drafted the
International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments in 1949. Among other
protections, this instrument provided that the expropriation of the property of aliens
should only be adopted with the appropriate legal procedure and fair compensation,
to be determined prior to the taking according to international law.758 Designed as a
model to be followed in the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties, the ICC
Code was presented to the UN for consideration by the governments and the
ECOSOC, but it was never adopted.739 Almost ten years later, the Society to
Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments -a private organisation based in
Cologne, Germany- drew up the International Convention for the Mutual Protection
of Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries. This draft, prepared under the
guidance of Hermann Abs, chairperson of the Deutsche Bank, was combined in 1957
with another one prepared under the leadership of the UK's attorney-general, Lord
Shawcross. Issued in 1959 as the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, and
commonly referred to as the Abs/Shawcross Draft, this instrument did not expressly
• • 760 •establish the right to expropriate, but acknowledged it by implication. According
to its authors, Article III of the draft was based on the idea that every state enjoys a
sovereign right to nationalise or expropriate all property situated in its territory. In
the case of alien property, they added, this right may only be exercised under certain
757
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conditions.761 Article III followed some of the requirements of a lawful
expropriation:
No Party shall take any measures against nationals of another Party to deprive them
directly or indirectly of their property except under due process of law and provided
that such measures are not discriminatory or contrary to undertakings given by that
Party and are accompanied by the payment of just and effective compensation.
Adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to the time of deprivation for
the prompt determination and payment of such compensation, which shall represent
the genuine value of the property affected, be made in transferable form, and be paid
762
without undue delay.
The comment on the Abs/Shawcross Draft explained that the purpose of this
provision was to restate the international minimum standard.763 The just
compensation mentioned in the draft closely resembled the Hull formula. It was, for
the authors, the same standard applied in the Norwegian Shipowners' claim and the
Chorzow Factory case, among other judicial decisions. The comment further
recognised that the Abs/Shawcross Draft closely followed US FCNs. In fact, it was
more protective than them and the multilateral efforts that foundered in the past.764
For instance, Article Ill's protection against direct and indirect takings had to be read
in connection to Article IX (b) of the same instrument. Adopting a broad concept of
investment, the circular definition of this provision stated: "'property' includes all
property, rights, and interests, whether held directly or indirectly".765 Article IX (b)
went on to explain that "[a] member of a company shall be deemed to have an
interest in the property of the company".766 From this perspective, Schwarzenberger
761 See 'Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors', (1960) JPL 119, at 121.
762 Art. Ill of the Abs/Shawcross Draft, available at
<http://www.unctad.Org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/137%20volume%205.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
767 See 'Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors', supra note 761, at 121.
764 S Metzger, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of Private Foreign Investment', (1960) 9
JPL 133, at 133-4.
765 Art. IX (b) of the Abs/Shawcross Draft.
See note 762, supra.
766 Ibid.
175
noted, the omission of the public interest requirement for lawful takings was all the
more surprising.767 The Abs/Shawcross Draft was submitted by the Federal Republic
• • 768of Germany to the OECD for "consideration and appropriate action". Never
concluded as a treaty, it was the basis of yet another unsuccessful attempt: the Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of the OECD.
6.1.2. Guidelines for a lack ofagreement
The OECD Draft Convention was prepared by a committee of this international
organisation. Though its publication was approved by a resolution of the Council of
the OECD in 1967, the draft failed to gain sufficient international support and was
never opened to signature. It was only recommended by this international
organisation to its members as a model for investment protection treaties. Muchlinski
points out that the opposition of less developed southern-European members of the
OECD prevented the convention from being adopted.769 Dolzer and Stevens add
another reason for the failure of the Draft Convention: the fact that it was originally
intended as a multilateral instrument applicable to all states, and not only to OECD
members.770 Negotiating a treaty within an international organisation formed by
developed states, aimed mainly at the protection of foreign investments in
developing countries, would also prove to be fatal thirty years later for the MAI.
767 G Schwarzenberger, 'The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical
Commentary', (1960) 9 JPL 147, at 156.
768
Tschofen, supra note 236, at 389.
769
Muchlinski, supra note 748, at 574; and Muchlinski, supra note 639, at 1036.
770
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Article 3 of the OECD Draft Convention referred to expropriation, declaring
that no party shall adopt any measure depriving directly or indirectly a national of
another party of his property, unless the host-state complied with the conditions of a
lawful taking: public interest, non-discrimination, payment of compensation, and due
process of law. In conformity with its official commentary, Article 3 was meant to
cover in particular "creeping nationalisations", defined as measures otherwise lawful,
applied in such a way as to "deprive ultimately the alien of the enjoyment or value of
• 771
his property", without any specific identifiable act of outright expropriation. The
commentary mentioned, as examples of this type of taking, excessive or arbitrary
taxation; prohibition of dividend distribution coupled with compulsory loans;
imposition of administrators; prohibition of dismissal of staff; and refusal of access
to raw materials or of essential export or import licenses.772 The same notes and
comments stressed that "[t]he taking of property, within the meaning of the Article,
must result in a loss of title or substance".773
In this context, the police-powers solution adopted by the OECD Draft
Convention is unexpected. Although nothing in the actual wording of Article 3
denoted such an approach, its commentary made this solution explicit, by stating that
the provision brought "within its compass any measures taken with the intent of
wrongfully depriving the national concerned of the substance of his rights and
resulting in such loss".774 This is a confusing statement. The notes and comments on
Article 3 had acknowledged before the right of the host-state to expropriate, and
expressly reconciled this right with its correspondent obligation to respect and
771 'O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property', (1968) 7 ILM 117, note 4 (b)
at 125-6.
772 OECD Draft Convention, note 4 (b) at 126.
773 Ibid.
774
OECD Draft Convention, note 4 (a) at 125.
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protect foreign property through the fulfilment of the four conditions of a lawful
taking.775 Why add "with the intent of wrongfully depriving" then? This confusion
still haunts the debate on indirect takings today.
As to other aspects of a taking, the official commentary followed recognised
rules of international law. Regarding indirect expropriations, it made clear that
whether the host-state's interference with property amounted to a deprivation
depended "on its extent and duration".776 In a position later adopted by the Iran-US
CT, the notes and comments explained that though a measure may purport to be
temporary, there comes a stage at which there is no immediate prospect that the
owner will be able to resume the enjoyment of his property.777 On the requirement of
public purpose, the commentary to Article 3 said that it implies that the expropriatory
measures must be adopted in the interest of the state or any of its political
subdivisions, not solely for private gain.778 Just compensation in Article 3 was
described in the terms of the Hull formula. Its notes and comments confirmed this
approach.779 Finally, the official commentary equated due process with the Anglo-
Saxon concept of rule of law or the Continental notion of rechtsstaat, containing
both substantive and procedural elements present not only in the domestic law of the
7X0 ... •
state concerned, but also in the principles of international law. The judicial review
of the expropriatory measure by an independent administrative or judicial tribunal
775
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was highlighted as an important safeguard included in this requirement of due
781
process.
More than two decades after the adoption of the OECD Draft Convention, the
UN abandoned its Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (TNCs).782
The legitimacy of the claims of capital-importing states for greater control over
TNCs was gradually accepted by international organisations, which began to study in
the 1970s how to balance the interests of foreign investors and of the host-states.783 It
was against this background that the UN Code of Conduct was negotiated within the
Commission on TNCs, established in 1974 by ECOSOC for the purpose of drafting
this instrument. The last version available of the UN Draft Code is the text submitted
in 1990 to ECOSOC by the chairman of the Commission on TNCs, reflecting the
status of the negotiations as at 19 8 6.784 In the end, this instrument was never adopted,
mainly because of strong disagreements between capital-importing and capital-
exporting countries over fundamental issues related to its content, legal status and
relationship with general international law.785 The UN Draft Code, nonetheless, still
informs issues of corporate responsibility debated in the negotiation of investment
treaties.786 It recognised the sovereign right to expropriate foreign property, directly
or indirectly, which must be exercised in accordance with international law. In
relation to the requirements of a lawful taking, the UN Draft Code mentioned not
only public purpose, the payment of compensation and due process of law, but also
the respect of specific undertakings not to expropriate, adopted by contract or other
781
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agreement, already recognised in the Abs/Shawcross Draft. Compensation was
described as prompt, adequate and effective, and as appropriate in an alternative
version. According to the UN Draft Code, expropriation claims should be settled
under the domestic law of the host-state and by its tribunals, respecting the
international obligations freely undertaken by the authorities of this country.787
Another instrument that informs the negotiation and application of investor
protections in BITs and EIAs is the Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment adopted by the World Bank group in 1992.788 Its Development
Committee, a joint body with the International Monetary Fund, decided in 1991 to
set-up a working group consisting of lawyers from each of the institutions of the
-70Q
World Bank for the purpose of drafting a legal framework to FDI. A report was
prepared by this working group and submitted a year later to the Development
Committee. It explained that the World Bank Group could not issue binding rules to
states, and that although a multilateral treaty could be drawn and opened for
signature, such a solution was not recommended, given the reluctance of states to
commit themselves to this type of instruments in the area of foreign investment. The
working group recommended the World Bank to issue non-binging guidelines
instead, based on the general trends identified in the review of existing legal
instruments, doctrine, available practice, and on the policies advocated by it in recent
See UN Code ofConduct, para. 54.
788 See note 616, supra.
See, in general, 1 Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank Guidelines
(1993).
789
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years. The resulting text was approved by the Development Committee for
circulation among the member states of the World Bank group.790
The preamble of the Guidelines expressly state their purpose and nature. They
are aimed at achieving a desirable overall framework of essential principles that
would promote FDI in the common interest of all of the World Bank's members. As
it declares, the Guidelines are "not ultimate standards but an important step in the
evolution of generally acceptable international standards which complement [BITs or
EIAs]".791 In fact, investment treaties take precedence to them in case of conflict
between the two.792 There is no doubt that the Guidelines fit the description of soft-
law found in the writings of some scholars.793 That is to say, instruments which are
normative in substance, but not in a legally binding form. Although the choice of
words in "soft-law" -attributed to McNair- is certainly poor, for it reveals a
contradiction in terms, the concept has generally been accepted in international
doctrine. Not without dissenters, though, most notably Klabbers and Weil.794 The
Guidelines encourage the admission of foreign investment, and at the same time
recognise the right of the host-state to make regulations governing its admittance.795
They also acknowledge the right of the state to expropriate "or otherwise take" -in
whole or in part- foreign investment, or to adopt "measures which have similar
790 See Muchlinski, supra note 748, at 598.
791
Preamble, para. 6.
See note 616, supra.
792 Guideline I, Section 1.
793 See C Chinkin, 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law',
(1989) 38/IV ICLQ 850; H Hillgenberg, 'A Fresh Look at Soft Law', (1999) 10/111 EJIL 499; P Birnie
and A Boyle, International Law & the Environment (2002), 24-7; C Chinkin, 'Normative
Development in the International Legal System', in D Sheldon (ed.), Commitment and Compliance.
The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2003); A Boyle, 'Soft Law in
International Law-Making', in M Evans (ed.), International Law (2006); and Boyle and Chinkin,
supra note 54, at 210-29.
794
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Klabbers, 'The Redundancy of Soft Law', (1996) 65 Nor. JIL 167.
795 Guideline II.
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effects", following these conditions: "in accordance with applicable legal procedures,
in pursuance in good faith of a public purpose, without discrimination on the basis of
nationality and against the payment of appropriate compensation".796 The latter is
described in the terms of the Hull formula.797 In case of nationalisation, the
Guidelines recommend the determination of its compensation through negotiations
between the host-state and the state of the expropriated foreigner, and failing this,
through international arbitration.798 Regarding the settlement of investment disputes,
the Guidelines declare that they should be normally settled through negotiations.
Failing this, through domestic courts or other agreed mechanisms, including binding
independent arbitration, agreed upon in writing, in which case they encourage states
to accept ICSID's jurisdiction.799
6.2. The US doctrine in international law
The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, passed in 1791, declares that
no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, nor shall it be
taken for public use, without just compensation. This provision is commonly known
as the takings clause.800 The inherent power of federal and state authorities to
expropriate privately owned property under these conditions is called eminent
domain.801 The takings clause was applied by the US Supreme Court exclusively to
796








Garner, supra note 11, at 1467.
801
Ibid., 541.
It is called compulsory acquisition of property in the UK.
Mann, supra note 9, at 188.
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the direct appropriation of property until the 20th century.802 After Lochner, this
tribunal used a combination of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments -the latter
insisting on the prohibition of deprivations without due process of law-, to construe
• 803
virtually any change in the law or its application that altered property as a taking.
The concept of regulatory taking emerged in Pennsylvania Coal. In this case, the US
Supreme Court recognised that regulation could amount to an expropriation
depending on the extent of the diminution of the property's value.804 According to
Lucas, however, this tribunal will normally get to this conclusion when the measure
eliminates all or substantially all this value.805 Concrete Pipe stated that the mere
• • 806
diminution, however serious, is insufficient to establish a taking.
The two per se rules in the US takings doctrine are that the permanent physical
occupation of property, or a one hundred percent destruction of its value as a result
of a regulatory measure, will require compensation.807 Outside these situations, an ad
hoc inquiry is needed for determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking. The
three factors that aid this inquiry were first articulated in Penn Central. This is, the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which it has
802 E Graham, Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment, and the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Issues Raised by Nongovernmental Organizations, (1998) 31 Corn. IU 599, at 604; and
R Stumberg, 'Sovereignty by Subtraction: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment', (1998) 31
Corn. ILJ491, at 557.
803 See Lochner v. People ofthe State ofNew York, (1905) 198 US 45.
See, also, Graham, supra note 802, at 604-5.
804 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, (1922) 260 US 393.
See, also, Graham, supra note 802, at 605-6; Stumberg, supra note 802, at 557; and E Shenkman,
'Could Principles of Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence be Helpful in Analyzing Regulatory
Expropriation Claims under International Law?', (2003) 11 NYU ELJ 174, at 174.
805 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, (1992) 505 US 1003.
See, also, Stumberg, supra note 802, at 557-8.
806 See Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern California, (1993) 508 US 602.
See, also, Stumberg, supra note 802, at 558.
807
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interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
• 808 •
governmental action. Nonetheless, as Been and Beauvais explain:
it is extremely difficult to prove a regulatory taking under U.S. takings
jurisprudence: U.S. Courts almost never find that a regulation has destroyed one
hundred percent of the value of the property, and they seldom find that a
regulation effects a taking under the Penn Central analysis.809
The investment chapters of the FTAs concluded in recent years by the US, as
well as its latest BIT model, include an international protection against expropriation
strongly rooted in this domestic regime. Timidly introduced in international
instruments at the second half of the 20th century, it was only after the regulatory
powers of developed states were challenged recently in investor-to-state disputes that
the US openly adopted the Penn Central factors in its treaties.
6.2.1. Different formulations for different approaches
The UN Secretariat requested Harvard University professors Louis Sohn and
Richard Baxter in 1961 to revise and update a draft convention on the international
responsibility of states for injuries to aliens prepared by this academic institution in
1929. Their work was done with the help of an advisory committee formed by
professors of other law schools and practising lawyers in the US, and was presented
to the ILC on the same year.810 According to its authors, the Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens -generally known as the
Harvard Draft- was based on the principle of an international minimum standard
governing the treatment of aliens. Its purpose was not only "to codify with some
808 See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, (1978) 438 US 104.
809 Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 61-2.
810
L Sohn and R Baxter, 'Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens',
(1961) 55 AJIL 545, at 545-6.
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particularity the standards established by international law for the protection of aliens
and thereby to obviate, as far as possible, the necessity of looking to customary
international law", but also to develop these norms when necessary by the
incorporation of "international standards of the principles of law or of justice
811
recognized by the principal legal systems of the world".
The Harvard Draft was by far the most detailed instrument regulating the
protection against expropriation in its time. The elements of a lawful taking included
in Article 10 were public purpose, and payment of compensation in conformity with
the Hull formula. The first requirement had to be "clearly recognized as such by a
o i
law of general application in effect at the time of the taking". The explanatory note
on Article 10 points out that this qualification was intended to preclude ad hoc
determinations of public purpose by government officials "acting without any
express authority in law".813 The same note observed that the content of this
condition had never been defined with any degree of precision in comparative law,
and that international tribunals had rarely embarked upon a survey of what in fact
constitutes public purpose.814 The second requirement was described in Article 10
and its explanatory note following Hull's formulation.815 If no compensation was
paid, damages would provide reparation for the unlawful taking. In case of a taking
adopted not for a public purpose or in violation of a treaty, restitution was the
ordinary remedy. The owner would have no obligation to accept the compensation
tendered. But if he did accept it, his claim to restitution of the property should be
8" Ibid., 547.
812 Harvard Draft, Art. 10, para. 1 (a) & para. 2.
813 Sohn and Baxter, supra note 810, at 556.
814
Ibid., 555-6
815 Harvard Draft, Art. 10 paras. 2 & 6.
See Sohn and Baxter, supra note 810, at 557-8 & 562-3.
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considered waived.816 The requirement of compensation was applicable also for
nationalisations. In this case, however, Article 10 allowed the host-state to pay it
over a "reasonable period of years", under certain conditions.817 The Harvard Draft
defined the concept of property applicable to this provision in broad terms,
comprising tangibles and intangibles818. Article 10 explicitly included in its coverage
not only outright takings, but also:
any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property
as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or
dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such
interference.
Several examples of indirect takings are mentioned in the explanatory note -
blocking the entrance of a factory to make impossible its operation by the alien;
denying entry visas for foreign technical personnel; the appointment ofmanagers and
inspectors interfering with the free use by the alien of its investment, among
others.820 The case-law of the Iran-US CT and early ad hoc arbitrations had to deal
with some of them.821 Although still possible, they seem rather dated today. Current
investment disputes are aimed mostly at challenging highly-sophisticated contractual
and regulatory schemes. The note also explained that whether an interference with
property constituted an expropriation depends upon the duration of the interference.
This determination might prove particularly difficult, considering that Article 10
expressly recognised the possibility of temporary takings.822 The unreasonableness of
• 823the interference was to be determined in conformity with general principles of law.
816
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The Harvard Draft followed, to some extent, the US regulatory-takings
doctrine. Article 10 described certain non-compensable state regulations in such wide
terms, that in practice it established a police-powers rule. According to this, an
uncompensated deprivation of property derived from the execution of tax laws; the
general change in the value of currency; the action of competent authorities in the
maintenance of public order, health, or morality; the valid exercise of belligerent
rights; or the normal operation of the laws of the state, was not considered wrongful
if it complied with the following requirements: it did not amount to a clear and
discriminatory violation of the host-state; it was not in breach of due process of law;
it was not an "unreasonable departure from the principles ofjustice recognized by the
principal legal systems of the world"; and it was not a result of the abusive exercise
of the regulatory powers of the host-state with the intention of depriving an alien of
his or her property.824 The explanatory note confirmed this approach when it
mentioned "the requisite intent" necessary in the adoption of a measure that amounts
825
to an expropriation.
The police-powers exception included almost twenty years later in the 1985
MIGA Convention826 was not worded in the terms of the Harvard Draft, but from a
sole-effect perspective. 27 MIGA is an international organisation, member of the
World Bank group, aimed at encouraging FDI into developing states mainly by
providing insurance to investors against political or non-commercial risks in these
See Sohn and Baxter, supra note 810, at 554.
823 Ibid., 559.
824 Harvard Draft, Art. 10 para. 5.
See Sohn and Baxter, supra note 810, at 561-2.
825 Ibid., 559.
826 In force since 1988.
827 See Newcombe, supra note 50, note 88 at 22.
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828 • • • • • •countries. Article 11 of its constitutive treaty describes expropriation and similar
measures as one of the covered risks, in these terms:
any legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to the host
government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a guarantee of his
ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with the
exception of non-discriminatory measures of general application which governments
829
normally take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in their territories.
Regarding the concept of property protected, the MIGA Convention did not
innovate either in relation with former international investment treaties: eligible
investments for coverage under this treaty can be both portfolio investment and
Fdi 830
The American Law Institute prepared the Third Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States in 1987.831 It adopted a police-powers rule closer
to the Harvard Draft's than to an exception from a sole-effect standpoint. Section
712, on state responsibility for economic injury to nationals of other states, mentions
three requirements for a lawful taking: public purpose, non-discrimination -i.e. no
unreasonable distinction- and payment of just compensation, described on the terms
of the Hull formula.832 The commentary on this section observes that although public
purpose is reiterated in most formulations of the protection against expropriation, this
condition has not figured prominently in international case-law "perhaps because the
833
concept [...] is broad and not subject to effective re-examination by other states".
828 It also advises developing governments on how to attract foreign investment, shares information by
means of online services, and mediates investor-to-state disputes.
See, in general, <http://www.miga.org> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
820 MIGA Convention, Art. 11 (a) (ii), available at
<http://www.unctad.Org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/16%20volume%201 ,pdf> (last visited
31 March, 2008).
8,0
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831 The American Law Institute is an NGO established in 1923 for the improvement of the law and the
administration of justice in the US.
832 American Law Institute, supra note 51, at 196-7 & 200.
833 Ibid., 200.
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That direct and indirect takings are included in this provision is confirmed in another
comment, which describes the latter as an unreasonable interference, preventing or
delaying the effective enjoyment of an alien's property.834 Nonetheless, the same
explanatory note adds:
A state is not responsible for loss of property or other economic disadvantage
resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other
action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police powers of states, if
835
it is not discriminatory.
Not surprisingly, the reporters' notes to Section 712 of the Third Restatement
stated that generally the line between compensable and non-compensable regulatory
actions in international law is similar to that drawn in the US case-law on the Fifth
Amendment.836
The issue of expropriation was addressed in a multilateral treaty two years after
the conclusion of the MIGA Convention. The 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -
as amended by its 1996 Protocol-, includes in Article VI the four requirements of a
lawful taking found in most BITs.837 Besides the conditions of public purpose, non¬
discrimination, compensation, and due process of law, it adheres to the Hull formula,
and refers to "expropriation, nationalisation or any measure equivalent thereto".
Nothing in the wording of this provision reflects a sole-effect or a police-powers
approach. Article I has a broad asset-based definition of investment, complemented





837 This treaty was concluded in 1987 by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand, and entered into force in 1990. Lao and Myanmar acceded to it in 1996.
Available at <http://www.aseansec.org/12812.htm> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
See, also, Tschofen, supra note 236, at 392; Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 290-1; and
<http://www.aseansec.org/12807.htm> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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investment are covered by the ASEAN agreement, but only if they have been
approved by the host-state, according to Article II. The effectiveness of the treaty
protections is guaranteed by Article X, which gives the foreign investor the
possibility of bringing a claim -after consultation- before ICSID, UNCITRAL or any
regional centre of arbitration in ASEAN, in order to settle investment disputes with
the host-state. These controversies can also be brought before the ASEAN Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, as provided in the 1996 Protocol.
The ECT also referred to expropriation in 1994.838 Concluded as a reaction to
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ECT was an international effort to integrate the
energy sector of former Soviet states with that of Western Europe and provide the
legal foundations for energetic security, based on an open and competitive market.
Today, it has more than 50 member-states in Asia and Europe. The investment
regime in ECT was largely based in UK BITs and NAFTA's Chapter 1 1.839 As a
consequence, the definition of investment is wide, followed by a list of examples that
comprise tangibles and intangibles, though limited to a specific sector of the
economy: energy.840 Article 13 repeats the four conditions of a lawful taking,
including the Hull formula, and mentions measures having an effect equivalent to an
expropriation or nationalisation. As with the ASEAN Agreement, neither a sole-
effect nor a police-powers solution is reflected in its wording. The settlement of
investor-to-state disputes is regulated in Article 26. It gives the claimant the choice
of initiating arbitrations proceedings under the Washington Convention, the
838 See note 220, supra.
The ECT is in force since 1998.
8,9
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Additional Facility Rules of ICSID841, the UNCITRAL rules, or before the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, after consultation.
6.2.2. Replacing the minimum for a maximum
The investment provisions of the 1992 NAFTA are found in Chapter 11, called
by some the investors' bill of rights.842 NAFTA was an expansion to the earlier 1988
Canada-US FTA. based in the US BIT-model then available. The Canada-US FTA
did not include the direct referral of investment disputes to international
arbitration.843 NAFTA provides for such possibility. Its Article 1120 gives the
investor the chance of opting among the Washington Convention, the Additional
Facility Rules of ICSID, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, following a period of
consultation between the disputing parties. The takings provision is Article 1110.
The requirements of a lawful expropriation included in it are, again, public purpose,
non-discrimination, payment of compensation, and due process of law.
Compensation is described in detail according to the Hull formula. Article 1110 also
adds another condition: the expropriatory measure must be adopted in accordance
with FET, and full protection and security. As to the investment protected by the
international standard, NAFTA contains an innovative definition. While BITs
841 These rules authorise the ICSID Secretariat to administer conciliation and arbitration proceedings
between host-states and foreign investors for disputes which fall outside the scope of the Washington
Convention.
842 Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 40.
NAFTA entered into force in 1994.
See note 216, supra.
842 Instead, these disputes had to be brought before to an intergovernmental commission, which had
the discretionary power to refer them later to arbitration.
See Arts. 1801-06 of the Canada-US FTA, (1988) 27 ILM 281.
See, also. Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 51-2.
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normally provide an illustrative list of assets, Article 1139 establishes a closed or
exhaustive one, with specific exclusions. In other words, what is not in this definition
is not covered by the treaty. The list in NAFTA includes tangible and intangible
844
property.
Direct and indirect nationalisations and expropriations are expressly mentioned
in Article 1110, as well as measures tantamount to them. Measure is defined in
Article 201, paragraph 1, as any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice.
Like other investment treaties, NAFTA gives no concept of expropriation and
nationalisation, whether direct or indirect. This was a deliberate omission. The
strategy of its drafters was to leave the solution to the problem of how to distinguish
non-compensable regulation and indirect takings to the arbitration panels. As one of
the principal US negotiators in NAFTA recalls:
If the United States Supreme Court and arbitral tribunals could not do it in over 200
years, it was unlikely that the negotiators were going to do it in a matter of weeks
with one line in a treaty.845
No clear solution is found in the treaty on the problem of intent. In conformity
with Article 1114, nothing in Chapter 11 shall be construed to prevent a contracting
party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with
it, that this party considers appropriate to ensure that the investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.846 This
provision might well be interpreted as a police-powers rule, or a police-powers
exception from a sole-effect perspective. In both cases, however, confined to
environmental measures.
844
See Art. 1139 ofNAFTA, cited at note 216, supra.
845
D Price, quoted in Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 55.
See, also, AlQurashi, supra note 49, at 901 & note 45 at 904.
846
Art. 1114 para. 1, ofNAFTA, cited at note 516, supra.
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The investment provisions in NAFTA, particularly their application by arbitral
panels, have strongly influenced other FTAs of the US and its recent BITs. These
treaties normally include references to the four requirements for a lawful
expropriation, adopt the Hull formula, and merely mention indirect expropriation and
measures equivalent to it. Measure is sometimes defined. The covered investment in
them comprises both tangibles and intangibles, but unlike NAFTA, the list that
describes it is not exhaustive. The latest US BIT-model and its FTAs do not only
follow NAFTA. They are also drafted in conformity with the guidelines of the 2002
Trade Promotion Act of the US, enacted in the wake of the award in Metalclad,
while Methanex was still pending and other arbitrations threatening US interests
loomed in the horizon. Section 2102 (b) (3) of this statute, on foreign investment,
declares the following:
Recognizing that United States law on the whole provides a high level of protection
for investment, consistent with or greater than the level required by international
law, the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign
investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign
investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not
accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than
United States investors in the United States, and to secure for investors important
rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal
principles and practice, by— (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and
compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and
.. 847
practice.
This statement is remarkable. By giving foreigners in the US no greater
substantive rights than its domestic investors, the father and main advocate of an
absolute minimum standard of treatment in international law has adopted a relative
maximum standard linked to a specific national treatment. Such a limitation goes
against the system of protection established at present in most BITs and EIAs,
847 The 2002 Trade Promotion Act is available at
<http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/TPAA_2002.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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consisting on the complementary application of the international and national
principles.
The principle of non-discrimination, as both a minimum and maximum
standard of treatment, was developed in Latin America by the end of the 19th
century.848 Today, the prohibition of discrimination is part of the international
minimum standard advanced by the US and recognised in most treaties and several
judicial decisions of international tribunals. The statement of the 2002 Trade
Promotion Act is, in substance, identical to one of the principles of international law
adopted by the First International Conference of American States held in 1889-90,
which said:
A nation has not, nor recognizes in favour to foreigners, any other obligations or
responsibilities than those which in favour of the natives are established in like cases
by the constitution and the laws.
Paulsson singled out this principle as one of the early formal recognitions of the
Calvo doctrine in state practice.849 The statement of the Trade Promotion Act also
matches Article 9, paragraph 2, of the 1934 Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, identified by Garcia-Amador as one of the most prominent
examples of the Calvo doctrine in treaty-law.850 It is even close to the Calvo clause
interpreted in North American Dredging Company of Texas, which established that:
The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in any other capacity, may be
engaged in the execution of the work under this contract either directly or indirectly
[...] shall not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the interests and the business
connected with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce the same than
those granted by the laws of the Republic [of Mexico] to Mexicans, nor shall they
851
enjoy any other rights than those established in favour of Mexicans.
Francioni, supra note 81, at 269.
849
Paulsson, supra note 82, at 21.
850 See Garcia-Amador, supra note 86, at 521.
See, also, Chapter 2 supra.
851
Shea, supra note 78, at 200.
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A US official document employing the wording of one the most fought-upon
Latin American doctrines on the treatment of aliens surely represents a turning point
in this area of international law. The reasons behind this radical change of mind in
US authorities is found in the report of the Senate Finance Committee on the bill
from which the Trade Promotion Act's provisions derived. As this document
explains:
one concern expressed about investment agreements currently in force is that the
concept of what constitutes an expropriation may be interpreted more broadly than
the concept of what constitutes a 'taking' under U.S. law. U.S. takings law has
evolved through more than two centuries of decisions by the Supreme Court and
lower courts. While there is no fixed set of criteria, that jurisprudence has given rise
to certain guidelines, such as criteria for determining when a government regulation
(as opposed to a physical appropriation of land) amounts to a compensable 'taking'.
By contrast, certain complaints under NAFTA chapter 11 have urged arbitrators to
find expropriations where the applicable tests under U.S. law may not support
compensation for a taking. While there is unlikely ever to be a perfect overlap, and
U.S. courts themselves differ on these issues, section 2 (b) (3) (D) directs negotiators
to draw on the guidelines developed in U.S. takings jurisprudence in seeking to
refine the concept of expropriation for purposes of international investment
agreements. This should help ensure that investment agreements do not confer on
foreign investors in the United States a right to compensation for expropriation that
differs substantially from the right to compensation for takings that U.S. citizens
already enjoy.852
After the Trade Promotion Act was enacted, the US has signed and ratified
FTAs and BITs which include a description of indirect expropriation in the form of
the three Penn Central factors developed in US regulatory-takings doctrine. In this
way, international tribunals are guided towards a police-powers solution in those
• • • • • 853indirect takings cases where the US is involved under any of these treaties. Among
the US treaties that include such a statement, as well as other clarifications that
spring from the same doctrine, are the 2003 Chile and Singapore FTAs854; the 2004
852
Quoted in Sampliner, supra note 8, at 37.
853 See Fortier and Drymer, supra note 8, at 317-9; and UNCTAD, supranote 373, at 107-8. .
854 See 2003 Chile-US FTA, Chapter 10, and Annexes 10-A and 10-D, cited at note 209, supra',
and 2003 Singapore-US FTA, Chapter 15, and the letter exchanges on customary international law
and on expropriation, available at:
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Australia, Central America and Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), and Morocco
FTAs855; and the 2006 Oman FTA.856 Following the US doctrine, these treaties also
exclude judicial or administrative actions from the open-ended definition of
investment. Most FTAs and BITs concluded by countries other than the US have not
yet included the qualifications put forward by this state in its treaty-models.857 The
• • • 8582006 Panama-Singapore FTA is still an exception to this trend.
6.3. NAFTA arbitrations and the demise ofMAI
The protection of foreign investments from expropriation by Mexican
authorities was the main concern of the US government at the moment of signing
NAFTA.859 Nevertheless, the cases brought before arbitral panels under this treaty
have gone on other directions too. Taking-claims have been lodged not only against
Mexico, but also against Canada and the US. These actions usually refer to an
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html>
(last visited 31 March, 2008).
855 See 2004 Australia-US FTA, Chapter 11, and Annexes 11-A and 11-B, available at
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_lndex.html>
(last visited 31 March, 2008);
2004 CAFTA-DR, Chapter 10, and Annexes 10-B and 10-C, available at
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html> (last visited 31 March, 2008);
and 2004 Morocco-US FTA, Chapter 10, and Annexes 10-A and 10-B, available at
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_lndex.html>
(last visited 31 March, 2008).
856 See 2006 Oman-US FTA, Chapter 10, and Annexes 10-A and 10-B, available at
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
857
See, e.g., 2003 Mexico-Uruguay FTA, Chapter XIII, available in Spanish at
<http://www.sice.oas.Org/Trade/mexurufta_s/Text3_s.asp#CAPITULO_Xlll> (last visited 31 March,
2008);
2004 Chile-South Korea FTA, Chapter 10, available in Spanish at
<http://www.direcon.cl/index.php?accion=tlc_corea_01_va> (last visited 31 March, 2008);
and 2005 Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and Malaysia, Chapter 7, available at
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/malaysia/epa/content.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
858 See 2006 Panama-Singapore FTA Chapter 9, available at
<http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/PAN_SGP/PAN_SGP_e/Text_e.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
859
Loppacher and Kerr, supra note 573, at 46.
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indirect rather than a direct expropriation, challenging the host-state's regulatory
power in sensitive areas like the protection of the environment or public health, and
taxation, among others. Moreover, the arbitral panels' interpretation of concepts like
investment and measures, closely related to Article 1110, have expanded the scope of
the protection afforded by this provision. NAFTA tribunals have gone beyond what
the negotiators of the treaty originally considered an investment, regarding even a
company's market share as part of this concept.860 The definition of measure in
Article 201 of NAFTA has also been interpreted broadly, comprising legislative and
. . , # o/: i
administrative action, judicial decisions included.
The experience of NAFTA arbitrations affected the OECD's MAI, as well as
any future attempt to regulate investment in a multilateral treaty. The MAI drowned
not only in the opposition of developing states, but also in the growing apprehension
of developed countries and NGOs towards international claims directed against the
host-state's exercise of its regulatory powers. For the first time, the treatment
expected from developing countries with regards to foreign investors is demanded
from developed states too. This new international context has come to threaten the
network of BITs and EIAs concluded worldwide. In the past, the opposition to the
international minimum standard came exclusively from second and third world
countries. At present, NGOs headquartered mostly in developed states have joined
their fray. In an incredible twist of events, the US government has endorsed the
national treatment standard, so strongly objected by it for more than a hundred years.
Such an unusual framework explains the, until not so long, unlikely fact that Canada
860 G Akpan, 'The Investment Provisions of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and
the NAFTA. Old Wine in a New Skin or Something Else?', (2005) 6/VI JWIT 873, at 877.
861
Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 41.
See, also, Madalena, supra note 62, at 73.
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and Mexico advocated a police-powers solution to the problem of indirect takings in
their written submissions to the tribunal in Methanex\ a proceeding where the
respondent was the US, upholding the same approach.862
6.3.1. Two rules for one standard
The arbitral panel that rejected the takings claim in Pope & Talbot followed a
sole-effect approach. Canada had argued that regulations constitute an exercise of
police-powers which is beyond the reach ofNAFTA's rules on expropriation, unless
adopted in a discriminatory manner. The tribunal considered the formulation of
Canada to go too far. Quoting the Third Restatement, the award declared that
regulations can indeed be exercised in a way that would constitute creeping
expropriation.863 A blanket exception for regulatory measures would create, it said, a
"gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation"864. Nonetheless,
Pope & Talbot avoided espousing the claimant's position on the issue. The US
investor had argued that the phrase "measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation" in Article 1110 broadens the ordinary concept of takings under
international law, in the sense that it would require compensation for measures
affecting property without regard to the magnitude or severity of that effect. The
panel rejected this contention and plainly stated: "'Tantamount' means nothing more
than equivalent. Something that is equivalent to something else cannot logically
862 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, NAFTA, UNCITRAL arbitration, Final
Award, 3 August, 2005, Part II, Chapter C, paras. 31-2. Available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MethanexFinalAward.pdF> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
863
Pope and Talbot. Inc. v. The Government ofCanada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL arbitration, Interim
Award, 26 June, 2000, para. 99. Available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Pope-
InterimAward.pdU (last visited 31 March, 2008).
864 Ibid.
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encompass more".865 Pope & Talbot consequently applied the test of substantial
deprivation, citing both the Harvard Draft and the Third Restatement for this
purpose.866
A second NAFTA award settled an expropriation claim in 2000. Metalclad was
a US investor that bought a Mexican company to develop and operate a hazardous-
waste landfill located in the municipality of Guadalcazar, in the state of San Luis
Potosi, Mexico. After getting authorisations from the Mexican federal state, the
national ecological institute, and the state of San Luis Potosi, the claimant was
refused a construction permit by the municipality of Guadalcazar. Its request for
reconsideration of the denial of the permit was also rejected by the municipality,
which then effectively prevented Metalclad from opening the finished landfill. The
claimant unsuccessfully lodged an administrative complain, as well as a
constitutional action. The governor of the state of San Luis Potosi finally issued an
ecological decree declaring a natural area for the protection of a rare cactus
encompassing the landfill.
The panel found a violation of Article 1110. According to it, the exclusive
authority regarding a hazardous-waste landfill resided with the Mexican federal state,
which permitted or tolerated the conduct of Guadalcazar in relation to Metalclad, and
participated or acquiesced in the denial of its right to operate the landfill,
notwithstanding the fact that the project had been fully approved and endorsed by
federal authorities. As a result, Mexico's conduct amounted to a measure equivalent
to expropriation in breach of NAFTA.867 Referring to Biloune, the tribunal held that
865 lb id., para. 104.
866
Ibid., para. 102.
867 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, NAFTA, ICSID case No. ARB(AF)/97/l,
Award, 30 August, 2000, paras. 104-5. Available at
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the actions of the municipality effectively and unlawfully prevented the claimant's
operation of the landfill. These measures, together with the representations of the
Mexican federal government, on which Metalclad had relied, "and the absence of a
timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial by the Municipality of the local
construction permit", were equivalent to an indirect taking. The ecological decree of
the governor of the state of San Luis Potosi was considered by the tribunal as a
further ground for a finding of expropriation.868 Metalclad based its conclusions in
one of the most famous statements of the sole-effect doctrine in international case-
law:
expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged
takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title
in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part,
of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not
869
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.
A third decision rejected a takings claim before the end of 2000, implicitly
endorsing the sole-effect rule. S.D. Myers declared that:
The general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting
to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the
subject of legitimate complaint under Article 1110 of the NAFTA, although the
870
Tribunal does not rule out that possibility.
The panel differentiated expropriations from regulations in their effects: the
former tends to involve the deprivation of ownership right, while the latter a lesser
interference871. S.D. Myers accepted the possibility of partial or temporary takings,
and agreed with Pope & Talbot's conclusion that the phrase "measure tantamount to"
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
868
/NW., paras. 106-9 & 111.
869
Ibid, para. 103.
870 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL arbitration, Partial Award,
13 November, 2000, para. 281. Available at




means "equivalent to", adding that the drafters of NAFTA intended the word
"tantamount" to embrace the concept of creeping expropriation, "rather than to
expand the internationally accepted scope of the term expropriation".872
Two years later, the arbitral panel in Feldman turned down another
expropriation claim. As in Metalclad and S.D. Myers, the tribunal adopted the sole-
effect doctrine. It said:
If there is a finding of expropriation, compensation is required even i/[sic] the taking
is for a public purpose, non-discriminatory and in accordance with due process of
873
law and Article 1105(1) [on FET, and full protection and security].
The award explained the difference of regulation and indirect takings by
formulating a police-powers exception from a sole-effect standpoint:
The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental authorities may force a
company out of business, or significantly reduce the economic benefits of its
business, are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to
infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory
regimes, among others, have been considered to be expropriatory actions. At the
same time, governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through
protection of the environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or
withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels,
imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable governmental regulation
of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek
compensation, and it is safe to say that customary international law recognizes
this.874
The panel relied heavily on the Third Restatement and its comments to this
respect. Feldman referred also to Azinian, when it stated that:
not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an
investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law or change in the
application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular
business, is an expropriation under Article 1110. Governments, in their exercise of
regulatory power, frequently change their laws and regulations in response to
changing economic circumstances or changing political, economic or social
872 Ibid., paras. 283 & 285-6.
See, also, Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 52-3; Sampliner, supra note 8, at 6; Shenkman,
supra note 804, at 177-8; and Newcombe, supra note 50, at 22-3.
871 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, NAFTA, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/l, Award, 16 December,
2002, para. 98. Available at




considerations. Those changes may well make certain activities less profitable or
•
* 875
even uneconomic to continue.
Regarding the phrase "measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation",
the award followed Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers.*16 On the level of interference
necessary to amount to an expropriation, the tribunal quoted Metalclad, but had its
doubts as to whether the lack of transparency alone rises to the level of a violation of
NAFTA and international law.877
The claimant in GAMI was not successful either. According to the panel in this
case, Pope & Talbot may suggest that the "impairment" of the value of the property
of an investor would not be equivalent to its taking.878 Quoting not only S.D. Myers
and Metalclad, but also TAMS and Santa Elena, the tribunal supported the
879
proposition that the partial destruction of the value may amount to expropriation.
A NAFTA tribunal embraced the police-powers rule a year later. In Methanex, a
Canadian investor in the US claimed compensation for the losses caused by the state
of California's ban on the sale and use of a gasoline additive, to which its main
product was a feedstock. Methanex alleged damages to "a substantial portion of [its]
customer base, goodwill, and market for methanol in California", as a result of the
ban.880 On this regard, the award agreed with Pope & Talbot's broad concept of
property. Nevertheless, it concluded that items such as goodwill and market share
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878 GAMI Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States, NAFTA, UNCITRAL
arbitration, Award, 15 November, 2004, para. 128. Available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Gami.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
879
Ibid., para. 131.
880 Methanex Corporation case, supra note 862, Part IV, Chapter A, para. 2.
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881how they might stand alone, in a case like the one before the Tribunal". The
tribunal considered the taking-claim within the limits of the phase "measure
tantamount to" expropriation, and analysed it from a police-powers perspective,
worded in these terms:
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter
alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable
unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the
then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would
882
refrain from such regulation.
This statement limits indirect takings to those measures that go against specific
commitments made by the host-state to the foreign investor. The panel quoted Revere
Cooper and Waste Management on the issue of a government's assurances,
representations or undertakings given to aliens, but forgot that compensation is one
of the requirements of a lawful expropriation under international law.883 In the
tribunal's declaration, public purpose, non-discrimination, and due process of law are
the elements that differentiate a regulation from an indirect taking, rather than
conditions of a lawful one. Although the panel starts its statement by saying "as a
matter of general international law", such an interpretation owes more to the US
regulatory-takings doctrine than to international norms. At the end, the tribunal found
that no commitments were given to Methanex by the host-state. It declared that the
California ban was made for a public purpose, was non-discriminatory and followed
a due process. The panel concluded that "[f]rom the standpoint of international law,
the California ban was a lawful regulation and not an expropriation".884
881
Ibid., Part IV, Chapter D, para. 17.
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6.3.2. A good idea wrongly executed
The MAI's negotiations took place within the OECD between 1995 and 1998,
when the first NAFTA arbitrations were being settled. More precisely, among its
then 29 members, mostly developed states885, and the Commission of the European
Community. 8 non-OECD members participated only as observers.886 Other non-
OECD members were informed on a regular basis about the status and substance of
the negotiations. The MAI had been planned as a multilateral treaty open to all
OECD members and non-OECD members, based on three pillars: investment
liberalisation, investment protection, and dispute settlement.887 It followed, and
improved, the investment protections ofNAFTA and the ECT.888 BITs, modelled on
the 1967 OECD Draft Convention, were also an important source for the
international minimum standard included in it. The MAI had a clear leaning towards
foreign investors and was promoted as an effort to transform these protections into
multilateral rules, with some additional provisions.889 The concept of property
included in its consolidated text was broad.890 Chapter II, Article 2, defined
investment as every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an
alien. Some OECD members and NGOs expressed their concerns over the inclusion
885
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Flungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New
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536.
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Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8, at 816.
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Muchlinski, supra note 639, at 1036 & 1038.
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MAI, Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, 22 April 1998, available at
<http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987rle.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
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of investments indirectly owned.891 An interpretative note was added to this
provision, stating that in order to qualify as an investment under the MAI, "an asset
must have the characteristics of an investment, such as the commitment of capital or
• • OQ7
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk". The
definition was followed by an illustrative list, including tangibles and intangibles in
wide terms. Portfolio investment and FDI were protected, and the commentary to the
consolidated text explained that this exemplary list of assets covered "all recognised
and evolving forms of investment".
Chapter IV, Article 2, was the expropriation provision. It protected foreign
investments against direct and indirect takings, as well as "any measure or measures
having equivalent effect". The four requirements of a lawful taking, normally found
in BITs and EIAs, were mentioned in this provision. The first one was described as
"a purpose which is in the public interest". According to the commentary, the terms
"public purpose" and "public interest" have similar meanings, but derive from
different legal traditions. The wording chosen was considered to be consistent with
them.894 Chapter IV, Article 2, employed the Hull formula at the moment of
describing the payment of compensation, and due process was construed as expressly
including the judicial review of the expropriatory measure by a competent and
independent authority of the host-state.
Concerns over the limits of indirect takings led to an explicative note in the
commentary to this provision, stating that the violation of criminal laws resulting in
891
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the total or partial loss of an investment would not be deemed an expropriation,
"provided those laws and their application are non-discriminatory and otherwise
consistent with the standards of this agreement".895 This approach conforms to the
police-powers exception acknowledged by the sole-effect doctrine. The 1998 report
by the Chairman of the negotiating group added that the takings provision was
intended to incorporate into the MAI existing international norms, and that the
reference to expropriation or nationalisation, and measures tantamount to either,
reflected the fact that international law requires compensation for a taking without
regard to the label applied to it, even if the title to the property is not taken. In other
words, as the report said, it did not establish "a new requirement that Parties pay
compensation for losses which an investor or investment may incur through
regulation, revenue raising and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken
by governments".896 A declaration adopted by the OECD Council of Ministers that
same year further stated that "the MAI would establish mutually beneficial
international rules which would not inhibit the normal non-discriminatory exercise of
regulatory powers by governments and such exercise of regulatory powers would not
• • 8Q7
amount to expropriation".
The commentary to the consolidated text explained that the phrase "measure or
• • • 898
measures having equivalent effect" meant, in general, creeping expropriation.
Regarding the practical consequence of distinguishing between a lawful and an
unlawful taking, it said that the former would be subject to the Hull formula, while
895
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See, also, Graham, supra note 802, at 611.
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the latter would give rise to a right of restitution under customary law.899 Such a view
is not found expressly stated in BITs or EIAs, but has been endorsed in doctrine.900
To effectively protect the property of aliens, the MAI included a dispute settlement
device for investor-to-state controversies. Chapter V gave the investor the choice,
commonly found in BITs and some EIAs, to submit the respective controversy to the
domestic courts or administrative tribunals of the host state, or to international
arbitration under ad hoc, ICSID, UNCITRAL, or the ICC rules.
Though the protection of foreign investment in the MAI was not particularly
new in international law, it failed in the end mainly for the lack of a representative
body of states in the negotiations that undermined the global character of the draft
treaty.901 One of the main reasons for the adoption of the MAI was to liberalise and
protect foreign investment in developing countries. However, these states were not
adequately represented in the negotiating process from the beginning. The OECD,
rather than the World Bank or the World Trade Organization, was not the best forum
for drafting such a multilateral treaty. On the other hand, NGOs resented not being
invited to participate in the negotiations and criticised the secretiveness of the whole
process.902 In this context, the clear inclination of the MAI towards foreign investors,
derived from BITs and EIAs, became suspicious and a prime target of criticism for
developing states and NGOs, which related the treaty with the widespread anti-
globalisation campaigning against international economic organisations.903 The
growing opposition even distressed European governments, eager not to upset their
899
Ibid., para. 6, at 30.
900 See Chapter 1 supra.
901 See Juillard, supra note 579, at 478-9; Picciotto, supra note 748, at 741-2; Muchlinski, supra note
639, at 1039; and R Geiger, 'Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons from the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment', (2003) 11 NYU ELJ 94, at 98.
902
E.g., the consolidated negotiating text was a restricted internal document of the OECD, only
published in the internet in 1997, after it was leaked out
903 Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8, at 816; and Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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electorates.904 The timing of the MAI was also not the best. At the end of the 1990s,
claims of indirect takings were lodged against developed countries in the context of
NAFTA. Ethyl and Metalclad, for instance, affected the negotiations.905 There were
other problems too. For example, the right of entry and establishment, borrowed
from NAFTA and US BITs, was only accepted with significant general and country-
specific exceptions, resulting in what was called a "Swiss cheese" agreement.906
Several countries had expressed their concern to the liberalisation of the media sector
to foreign investment, fearing an "Americanisation" of this industry. The cultural
exception to the national treatment standard of the MAI became a deal breaker for
these states, particularly to France.907 Eventually, it was the Prime Minister of this
country, Lionel Jospin, who declared in 1998 that his government would take no
further part in the negotiations of the MAI. Few days later, the OECD announced
that it would not proceed with them.908
6.4. Conclusion
The attempts to regulate expropriation in a multilateral treaty span from the
beginning of the 20th century to its end. Various instruments emerged from these
efforts. Early ones, like the 1949 ICC Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign
904
Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 292.
905 See Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 35-6; Geiger, supra note 901, at 96-7; Sornarajah, supra
note 3, at 293; LTNCTAD, supra note 19, at 241-2; Akpan, supra note 860, at 874; and Newcombe,
supra note 50, at 1-3.
See, also, Ethyl Corporation v. The Government ofCanada, NAFTA, UNC1TRAL arbitration, Award,
24 June 1998, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Ethyl-Award.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008); and Metalclad Corporation case, supra note 867.
906
Picciotto, supra note 748, at 760; and Muchlinski, supra note 639, at 1042.
907 See Vallianatos, supra note 891, at 718-9; and Muchlinski, supra note 639, at 1948.
908 See Muchlinski, supra note 639, 1048-9; and Geiger, supra note 901, at 95-6.
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Investments or the 1959 Abs/Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad,
implicitly or explicitly recognised the international minimum standard and briefly
referred to takings. The first of these instruments to adopt an open police-powers
approach was the 1967 OECD Draft Convention. Its text was highly influential in the
BITs subsequently concluded by Western European states. Nevertheless, none of
these countries followed in their treaties the police-powers solution included in the
commentary of the OECD Draft. Inspired on the domestic takings doctrine of the US,
the 1961 Harvard Draft and the 1987 Third Restatement also adopted a police-
powers rule regarding the issue of indirect expropriation. The 1990 UN Draft Code
of Conduct of TNCs and the 1992 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment, followed the traditional requirements of a lawful
expropriation, but did not refer expressly to the problem of intent in indirect takings.
Multilateral treaties that mention or regulate expropriation, effectively
concluded and in force today, have usually not adopted either a sole-effect or a
police-powers solution in explicit terms. The 1985 MIGA did opt for the sole-effect
rule, but neither the 1987 ASEAN Agreement nor the 1992 ECT are openly inclined
to any of these two approaches. The 1992 NAFTA is silent on the issue too. Not its
case-law, however. The protections included in NAFTA, originally aimed at
guaranteeing the investments of nationals of Canada and the US in Mexico, have also
been used by aliens in the former countries, thus challenging regulatory measures
adopted by developed states. Arbitral panels established under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA have generally approached the question of indirect takings from a sole-
effect perspective. Examples of this solution can be found in Pope & Talbot,
Metalclad, S.D. Myers, and Feldman. The police-powers rule followed by the
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tribunal in Methanex is still an exception to this trend, though an exception whose
impact is still felt throughout the international society.
The response of the US to the threat posed by international claims directed
against it, within the context of the sole-effect approach endorsed by NAFTA
awards, was made official in the 2002 Trade Promotion Act. After this statute, BITs
and FTAs concluded by the US have incorporated its domestic takings doctrine,
expressly naming the Penn Central factors as a guideline to decision-makers facing
claims of indirect expropriation. The international minimum standard, the US
flagship in its approach to the protection of aliens under the law of nations, has been
replaced by a national treatment standard limited to that granted by the US to those
foreigners investing within its territory. By modifying its latest BIT model version,
Canada has followed on the footsteps of the US. These efforts to introduce the
police-powers rule in international law has been well-received by those developing
countries involved in BIT or EIA arbitrations. NGOs, mainly those concerned with
the protection of the environment, have joined this heterogeneous group favouring
the police-powers rule. As a consequence, the future of the international minimum
standard, and the sole-effect solution to the threshold question that forms part of it,
seems more uncertain that ever.
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FROM TAKINGS TO FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
The international law of expropriation has a long history, much longer than
that of international investment law, the branch to which it currently belongs. In the
past, the debate on takings was centred on the problem of compensation. It was not
until the second half of the 20th century that the concept of indirect expropriation
came to the fore, relegating the issue of compensation to a second place of
importance. The network of BITs and EIAs recently concluded and currently in force
explains this new state of affairs. The exercise of the host-state's regulatory power
can be challenged today by a foreign investor under the settlement provisions of these
treaties. International tribunals have generally felt uncomfortable looking at in the
intention of the host-state behind the adoption of its sovereign measures. As a
consequence, the police-powers doctrine has rarely been followed by judges and
arbitrators at the moment of establishing the limits between non-compensable
measures and indirect takings. The sole-effect rule, conversely, has provided a clear
guideline which allows decision-makers to abstain from such an exercise when faced
with this thorny question. For this reason, it has been generally adopted in
international case-law.
The US and European states upheld the sole-effect rule when its application
was restricted to African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Now, that any host-
state can see its regulatory policy challenged by an expropriation claim, it has fallen
into disgrace. Not just developing countries and NGOs favour a police-powers rule at
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present, then: developed states have started to support it too. But does this solution
conform to the international law of expropriation? The potential application of the
police-powers rule has compounded the uncertainty that surrounds the application of
the international norms on expropriation. To avoid being left with no compensation,
claimants have turned to another dormant provision in investment treaty law: the FET
clause. The strategy is simple. Confronted with an eventual reluctance of arbitrators
to award compensation for a taking, foreign investors add to their claims alleged
breaches to other treaty protections. The FET provision is usually mentioned among
these. The aim of the claimants is to obtain compensation for lesser interferences.
That is to say, for those measures affecting property which do not amount to an
expropriation. The ubiquity of the FET clause in current investment arbitration is
such that the focus in international investment law has begun to shift once again. This
time, from the problem of indirect takings to that of FET.
The present chapter assesses the sole-effect/police-powers debate from the
standpoint of international law. It also deals with other compensable measures under
investment treaties. Particularly, FET -its origin, meaning, and scope. The study of
the constitutive elements of this protection is followed by that of the relation between
FET and the minimum standard in customary international law. The boundaries of
indirect takings and FET, as well as the interaction of the two concepts, are analysed
as well.
7.1. Changes in international case-law
Schreuer recalls that "[e]ven before the introduction of pertinent treaty
provisions, international courts and tribunals have treated indirect takings and
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equivalent measures in the same way as direct expropriations".909 These tribunals,
however, rarely addressed this question before the 1980s. For years, the only clear
references to the international law of expropriation were found in the Norwegian
Shipowners claim and the Oscar Chinn case, regarding indirect takings, and the
Chorzow Factory case, concerning restitution and compensation.910 It was not until
the 1970s that international tribunals dealt with this area of law again. The Libyan oil
concession cases and the Aminoil arbitration illustrated the uncertainties that
surrounded the question of nationalisation and its compensation.9" Nonetheless, they
did not refer to indirect takings.
The problem of expropriation came before the ICJ in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. and the Barcelona Traction cases, but the substantive matter remained undecided
due to lack of jurisdiction.912 It reappeared in the ELSI case, where a claim of
disguised expropriation was rejected. Once again, the ICJ avoided giving any insight
on the issue, concluding that the alleged deprivation could not be attributed to the
state authorities.913 By then, the European Court of Human Rights and the Iran-US
CT had already started settling expropriation claims. Their decisions originated the
first comprehensive case-law on takings available in international law. In the
909
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following years, arbitral panels established under the dispute settlement provision of
investment codes, investment agreements, BITs and EIAs, would further enlarge this
jurisprudence.
7.1.1. National agendas, comparative solutions
Judges and arbitrators facing claims of indirect expropriation apply the
sources of international law described in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. For this
purpose, they resort to the judicial decisions of other international tribunals, as a
subsidiary mean for the determination of the rules of law. Judgments of the European
Court and the Iran-US CT have therefore influenced the awards of ad hoc and ICSID
panels. Sornarajah calls this process cross-fertilisation. In investment treaty
arbitration, it derives from the fact that many of the members of tribunals settling
controversies have already sat in the Iran-US CT or other arbitral panels dealing with
investment disputes. This trend has been strengthened by the publication and ready
availability of judicial decisions, the growing esprit de corps among arbitrators, and a
body of law predisposed to development by case-law.914
No jurisprudence constante arises out of these intertwined decisions,
however. It is not only the different jurisdiction of international tribunals that
prevents judges and arbitrators from giving a structured response to the problem of
indirect takings.915 It is also the ad hoc nature of most of the tribunals dealing with
914 See J Commission, 'Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration. A Citation Analysis of a
Developing Jurisprudence', (2007) 24/11 J1A 129, at 135-42.
915 See Sornarajah, supra note 3, note 6 at 317, & 351.
See, also, Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra note 8, at 56; and C Gibson and C Drahozal, 'Iran-United
States Tribunal Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration', (2006) 23/VI JIA 521.
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expropriation claims and the system of res judicata in international law which cause
this situation.916 More precisely, the lack of a system of stare decisis -i.e. one that
abides by precedents.917 The principle of res judicata is a feature of the ICJ, as well as
of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Iran-US CT, and ad hoc and
ICSID arbitration. While Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that the decisions of
the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case, Article 53 (1) of the Washington Convention declares that the award
of ICSID panels is only binding on the parties to the investment dispute. The
principle of res judicata is also established, with different wording, in Article 44 and
46 (1) of the European Convention; Article IV of the 1981 Claims Settlement
Declaration, establishing the Iran-US CT; and Art. 32 (2) of the 1976 UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.918
In spite of these provisions, international tribunals normally consider the
judicial decisions of other tribunals as authoritative statements, giving them great
weight in practice.919 Judges and arbitrators refer and quote regularly the judicial
decisions of other international tribunals to a degree unseen in domestic jurisdictions
were the principle of res judicata is also applied. The steady reliance on case-law by
arbitrators in international investment disputes has derived in what has been called a
soft-precedent jurisprudence.920 Regarding the question of indirect takings, this
jurisprudence has resorted largely to a sole-effect solution, not only in the Iran-US
1,16 B Kunoy, 'The Notion of Time in ICSID's Case Law on Indirect Expropriation', (2006) JIA 337, at
337.
917
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918 The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are available at
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
919 See Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 54, at 293-300.
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CT, ad hoc and ICSID arbitral panels, but also in NAFTA arbitrations.921 The police-
powers rule adopted in Methanex, and later in Saluka, cast a shadow of doubt over
such a trend.
Sornarajah recognises three moments in the post-colonial protection of aliens
in international law:
In [the first] period, there was an effort to construct theories [...] which sought to
remove the foreign investment process from the scope of the host state's control. [...]
The second phase was the reaction of the host states to these attempts through the
efforts to relocalise the process. In this period, the host states articulated norms like
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the competing standard of
appropriate compensation for nationalisation [and the NIEO] [...] The third phase is
one of accommodation of these principles through efforts to make bilateral
investment treaties which set out the rules of investment protection as between the
922
parties to these treaties.
These periods cover the establishment of the international minimum standard,
its challenge by the national treatment standard, and the interaction of the two
principles in treaties that enshrine, in practice, the supremacy of the former over the
latter. But, as the same author admits, "[i]n international life, nothing seems final. It
923would be brash to say that one regime has had a final triumph over another". So
there is now a fourth period, heralded by the attempt of the US to transform
international minimum standard into a national one. An essential part of this attempt
is the support of the police-powers approach over the sole-effect rule.
Although the police-powers doctrine dates back to the Oscar Chinn case, it was
not until NAFTA arbitrations challenged regulatory measures in the US that it
became a serious contender to its more traditional counterpart, the sole-effect rule.
The undefined terms of indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to it, once
promoted by US negotiators and drafters, opened the door to a bulk of regulatory -
921 See Chapters 4, 5 & 6 supra.
922
Sornarajah, supra note 68, at 62.
923 Ibid., 52.
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taking claims.924 As Sands claims, "[t]he rules which were intended to constrain
others became constraining of their creators". 25 Because amending treaties is more
difficult than modifying domestic legislation, this situation has gained some
permanence.926 The US reacted to it by discarding the position on the treatment of
aliens that its authorities had previously defended for more than a century in the
international fora. In Sands words:
The US is belatedly recognizing that foreign investment is a two-way street, and that
the US too is vulnerable to challenge. This is forcing a rethink as to the real purpose
927of the international rules on expropriation.
This reaction must be seen within the broader context of the relations of the US
and the law of nations, for this deflection from well-accepted and frequently-observed
norms currently involves other areas of international law too. Particularly, trade law;
the protection of the environment; international criminal law; the use of force; and
international humanitarian law.928 Other developed countries have joined the US in its
attempt to replace the sole-effect approach for a police-powers rule. These states, like
the US, had accepted the application of the international minimum standard and the
sole-effect rule in the past, when investment disputes referred to the implementation
of treaty provisions in favour of their nationals investing in developing countries.
The uncertainty produced by this new scenario is worsened by the implicit, and
sometimes explicit, endorsement given by some NGOs and developing states to the
US and other developed countries. These NGOs have formed an unexpected alliance
with mainly capital-exporting, pro-globalisation governments. Each part,
924 Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 120 & 128.
925 P Sands, Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking ofGlobal Rules (2005), xi.
926 Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 138-9.
927
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See, also, Sornarajah, supra note 3, at 26.
928
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nevertheless, approaches the issue from different angles. While NGOs are concerned
about sustainable development and the protection of the environment, among other
things, developed states care about the encroachment of their sovereignty. Developing
countries also fear a diminution in their regulatory powers. These states are normally
weak and very sensitive to any threat to their already limited sovereignty. More so,
when it involves a potential confrontation with affluent TNCs.
The factual association among developed and developing states and NGOs
gives more weight to the claim of the US, for it adds a much needed touch of
legitimacy to the attempt of replacing the international standard for the national
treatment offered by its domestic legislation. With or without NGOs and developing
states, nevertheless, an important caveat should be made. Been and Beauvais
expressed it in the following terms:
even if it were possible to tie international compensation requirements to U.S. takings
jurisprudence, this would not be a desirable solution from an international standpoint.
[A]ny effort simply to equate NAFTA's Chapter 11 with the Fifth Amendment would
ignore differences between domestic and international contexts that render the
reasons for affording regulatory takings protections within any given country
929
inapplicable in the context of international investment agreements.
The same caveat which is applicable to the translation of domestic solutions to
international problems is also pertinent regarding the indiscriminate translation of
concepts advanced by one international tribunal to another.930 These courts and
arbitral panels are born and exist within a certain context: that provided by their
respective constituent treaty. From this perspective, not only the attempt of the
tribunal in TECMED to bring some of the factors of the US doctrine to international
investment law must be rejected. Its intention to transfer the fair balance test of
929 Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 141.
See, also, Shenkman, supra note 804, at 180-2 & 196-7.
930 See Paulsson and Douglas, supra note 8, at 147-8.
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European human rights law to this branch of international law, followed later by
Azurix and LG&E, must also be discarded.931 The principle of proportionality was
developed by the European Court of Human Rights within the three-rule system of
Article 1 of the First Protocol. The possibility of distinguishing among lesser
interferences, controls of the use, and deprivations of property is simply not available
in the international law of expropriation, as it stands today.
The same reasoning is applicable to Kriebaum's version of the proportionality
principle. Inspired in the case-law of the European Court, Kriebaum has suggested an
alternative to what she calls the "all or nothing" paradigm in international investment
law. This paradigm requires full compensation for an indirect taking, leaving the
tribunal "no discretion to apportion the economic burden resulting from the measure
between the investor and the State".932 In her opinion, the application of the
proportionality principle would allow investment panels to give property-owners less
compensation than the fair market value, if there is a special interest of the host-state
to interfere and, at the same time, this causes no excessive burden for the
individual.9'3 The difference between TECMED's solution and Kriebaum's is that,
while the former applied the balance test at the moment of establishing whether a
taking had occurred, the latter applies it at the moment of establishing the amount of
compensation due.934 But Kriebaum forgets that most BITs and EIAs currently
provide for a prompt, adequate and effective compensation or other formulas similar
to Hull's. And modifying this large network of treaties is not an easy task, for it
involves across-the-board negotiations throughout the international society.
93' See Chapter 5 supra.
932
Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 720.
933 Ibid., 730.
934 Ibid., 728-30 & 744.
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7.1.2. The problems of intention and degree
The concept of sovereignty still lies at the heart of the law of nations. In the
often-quoted passage of the Isle of Palmas case, Judge Huber equated sovereignty
with independence, defining it as the right to exercise the functions of a state within a
portion of the globe, to the exclusion of any other state.935 Based on this notion,
international tribunals will normally not question the public purpose requirement
claimed by a host-state, except in the most evident cases of abuse.936 According to the
Third Restatement, "[presumably, a seizure by a dictator or oligarchy for private use
could be challenged under [the public purpose] rule".937 Letco offers a good example
of an evident case of abuse. This arbitration referred to the successive reduction of the
territorial scope of a concession by Liberia, which the tribunal concluded to have "the
effect of greatly reducing the concession area and of effectively rendering the
• 1 QOO f
investment by LETCO useless". No public purpose was found in the measures
adopted by the host-state. On the contrary, "evidence was given to the Tribunal that
areas of the concession taken from LETCO were granted to other foreign owned
companies [ran] by people who were 'good friends' of the Liberian authorities".939
Most expropriation cases, however, do not present such an open disregard for this
requirement.
935 Isle of Palmas (The Netherlands v. US), Huber, sole arbitrator, Award, 4 April, 1928, (1928) 2
RIAA 829, at 838.
936 See G White, Nationalisation of Foreign Property (1961), 146; Pellonpaa and Fitzmaurice, supra
note 8, at 63; Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 104; Sacerdoti, supra note 8, at 387; and
Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 727.
937 American Law Institute, supra note 51, at 200.
938 Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (Letco) v. The Government of the Republic ofLiberia, ICSID




There is no internationally agreed-upon definition of public purpose, policy or
interest. What in fact constitutes it will rest, to a large extent, with the respective host-
state.940 To question the existence of public purpose in a specific situation would
entail evaluating the motivation of a sovereign state-policy. For this reason,
international tribunals generally abstain from such an assessment. Otherwise, arbitral
panels with even less structural independence and democratic legitimacy than
domestic judges would be second-guessing decisions of the executive or the
legislative, without the necessary protections and institutional credibility to review
them.941 The European Court of Human Rights has supported this view. It has
refrained from challenging the host-state's motives not only in its judgments on
deprivations of property, like the James case, but also on those related with lesser
interferences and controls of its use.942 The Iran-US CT also granted an extensive
discretion to the host state in Amoco and other of its judgments.943 Ad hoc and ICSID
panels, until recently, have consistently followed this trend too.944
Public interest or utility is an old principle of international law. It was identified
by Grotius as one of the two conditions for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. The other was the payment of compensation.94^ Today, non-discrimination
and due process complete the conditions of a lawful expropriation. There is no
distinction between direct and indirect taking to this effect. Kriebaum sees a major
departure from the traditional approach on the international law of expropriation in
940 See American Law Institute, supra note 51, at 200.
941 Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 105-6 & 108.
See, also, Sands, supra note 925, at xvii & 122-3.
942 See Chapter 3 supra.
943 See Chapter 4 supra.
944
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the position of those that consider public purpose as an element of the existence of an
indirect taking, rather than an element of its lawfulness.946 In her view:
If the approach of the Methanex and Saluka tribunals were to be followed, this
would lead to a considerable gap in international investment protection: any non
discriminatory measure, taken in the public interest that interferes with property
rights will no longer be an expropriation regardless of its consequences.947
This conclusion is similar to that arrived at in Compania de Aguas del
Aconquija: "If public purpose automatically immunises the measure from being found
to be expropriatory, then there would never be a compensable taking for a public
purpose".948 The concept of indirect taking would loose its current meaning.949
Compensation is an essential part of the minimum standard of protection granted by
international law to those investing abroad. In the law of expropriation, the
deprivation of an alien's property must be compensated by the host-state, even if
there is a legitimate general interest involved in the adoption of the expropriatory
measure. As Schreuer points out:
the fact that a measure is in the public interest and non-discriminatory cannot be the
answer to the question whether an expropriation has occurred. An expropriation may
take place under perfectly legitimate circumstances. Arbitrariness, bad faith, lack of
proportionality and other improprieties are not constitutive elements of expropriation.
Their absence does not mean that an expropriation could not have taken place.950
Higgins supports this view.951 So does Dinstein, among others.952 Focusing on
the effects of the measures adopted, in order to establish whether a regulation
amounts to a taking, does not deprive the intent of the domestic authorities from
946
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947 Ibid.
See Chapter 1 supra.
948
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. (Vivendi II) case, supra note
744, para. 7.5.21.
949
Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 727.
950
Schreuer, supra note 909, at 110-1.
951
Higgins, supra note 5, at 331.
952
Dinstein, supra note 8, at 869.
See Chapter 1 supra.
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playing a role in this determination. However, this role is quite different from that
attributed to it by the supporters of the police-powers doctrine. Reisman and Sloane
explain that:
Even though a state's responsibility to pay compensation for expropriation does not,
in any event, 'depend on proof that the expropriation was intentional', the
manifestation of that intent at some level of the state's government generally
953
furnishes a tribunal with a useful demarcation.
Newcombe agrees with them. According to him, the intent will be relevant in
the determination of whether a government measure is expropriatory or not, for a
tribunal is more likely to find a taking where there is clear evidence of intent to
expropriate. As he adds, "[t]hat intent is not a necessary element of expropriation
simply means that a government cannot use lack of intent as a defence to a claim of
expropriation".954
The term police-powers is a source of significant confusion.955 In international
law, the state has a right to regulate the society it governs.956 Nevertheless, the state
can only interfere with property to the point of deprivation, without paying
compensation, in exceptional circumstances. For instance, in those described under its
criminal law. In certain cases of imminent and grave danger to the public health, the
authorities might also adopt measures that deprive the owner of its property without
paying compensation. Examples like these illustrate the meaning of police-powers
from a sole-effect perspective.957
The main question regarding indirect takings is that of the moment in which a
regulatory measure becomes compensable. The answer to it does not lie in the
953 Reisman and Sloane, supra note 41, at 131-2.
954
Newcombe, supra note 50, at 25.
955 See ibid., 26.
956 See Beveridge, supra note 10, at 5-6.
957 See Dolzer, supra note 60, at 80; and Fortier and Drymer, supra note 8, at 308 & note 66 at 320.
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intention of the host-state that adopted the challenged measure. It lies in the degree of
interference required to effectively and permanently deprive the foreign investor of
his property.958 The problem of the degree has received different answers, depending
on the forum in which they were given. The European Court of Human Rights
considers the extinction of the rights of the owner as the chief criterion at the moment
of determining whether a deprivation has occurred.959 The Iran-US CT required a
non-ephemeral and unreasonable interference of the state in the rights of the alien.960
Some authors have seen a more flexible position in the judgments of the Iran-US CT
than in those of the European Court.961 Both standards, nonetheless, involve at least a
substantial and permanent interference; the same threshold usually required by ad
hoc, ICSID and NAFTA arbitral panels in their awards.962
Related with the problem of degree is that of partial expropriations.963
Measures that affect an investment by merely reducing its value or profitability are
normally not considered expropriatory in case-law and doctrine. At first sight, this
approach would rule-out the possibility of partial takings. International judicial
decisions, nevertheless, are divided on the issue.964 Kriebaum rightly argues that an
answer to this question depends on the notion of substantial deprivation, which she
describes in these words:
What it obviously does not mean is a total taking that leaves the investor without any
residual rights. In a wider sense, almost all cases of indirect expropriation are only
partial. Typically, there is no transfer of title and the physical property is not taken
but the investor is deprived of the substance of the investment. The decisive point for
an expropriation is the destruction of the capability to make use of the investment in
958
See Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8, at 825.
959 See Chapter 3 supra.
960
See Chapter 4 supra.
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Madalena, supra note 62, at 78; and Gutbrod and Hindelang, supra note 51, at 64-5.
962 See Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 723.
See, also, Chapters 5 and 6 supra.
963 See Herz, supra note 1, at 251.
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Kriebaum, supra note 661, at 69, & 73-82.
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an economic sense. The investor need not be deprived of its physical property, but it
has to be deprived of the economic benefit of its investment.965
The author concludes that a partial expropriation should be accepted if three
requirements are fulfilled. First, the overall investment project must be able to be
separated into a number of discrete rights. Second, the host-state must have deprived
the foreign investor of a right which is covered by one of the items in the definition of
investment in the applicable treaty. And third, this right must be capable of economic
exploitation independently of the remainder of the investment.966
7.2. Other compensable measures
Whether the taking is total or partial, the host-state's obligation to pay an
amount of money to a foreign investor may be based either on the law of
expropriation or on the law of state responsibility. The former is known in doctrine as
compensation; the latter as damages. In practice, both the requirement of a lawful
taking and the obligation derived from an internationally wrongful act are normally
referred to as compensation.967 Marboe argues that a lawful taking would require a
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, while an unlawful taking would require
full compensation.968 International case-law generally does not differentiate between
the two types of expropriation at the moment of awarding an amount to the foreign
investor on this basis. They will require the payment of compensation in conformity
to the fair market value, i.e. the Hull formula, whether the expropriation was lawful or
965 Kriebaum, supra note 35,at 71.
See, also, Fortier and Drymer, supra note 8, at 308.
966 See Kriebaum, supra note 35, at 83.
967
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See Chapter 1 supra.
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unlawful.969 But there is more to compensation than takings in international
investment law. The expropriation clause is not the only treaty protection that will
engage the international responsibility of the host-state if breached. Others include
national and MFN treatment, the obligation of full protection and security, and non¬
discrimination. And, most notably, FET.
The earliest FET clause is found in the 1948 Havana Charter.970 Article 11 (2)
of this treaty provided that the ITO would be able to recommend and promote
bilateral or multilateral agreements designed "to assure just and equitable treatment"
for foreign investments. That same year, the Ninth International Conference of
American States adopted the Economic Agreement of Bogota. Its Article 22 provided
for equitable treatment, but the treaty never entered into force.971 In the period that
followed the failure of the Havana Charter and the Economic Agreement of Bogota,
the US dropped the term "just" from its FCNs, referring instead to equitable or FET
in many of its treaties.972 The same standard appeared in the provisions of several
other instruments too, like Article I of the 1959 Abs/Shawcross Draft; Article 1 (a) of
the 1967 OECD Draft Convention; Paragraph 48 of the UN Draft Code of Conduct on
TNCs; the guideline III (2) of the 1992 World Bank Guidelines; Articles 3 (1) and 2
(c) of the 1994 Colonia and Buenos Aires Investment Protocols of Mercosur,
respectively; and Article 1.1 of the Draft MAI. Today, FET is included in Article 12
969 See ibid., 731 & 755-8.
970
C Schreuer, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice', (2005) 6/111 JWIThSl, at 357.
971 Available in Spanish at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/a-43.html> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
See C Yannaca-Small, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law', in
OECD, Working Papers on International Investment (2004), Nr. 3, at 4.
See, also, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-43.html> (last visited 31 March, 2008); and
UNCTAD supra note 19, at 211.
972 S Vasciannie, 'The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and
Practice', (1999) 70 BYIL 99, at 109-11; UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 211; and Yannaca-Small, supra
note 971, at 4.
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(d) of the 1985 MIGA Convention; Article IV (2) of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement;
Article 1105 (1) of the 1992 NAFTA; and Article 10 (1) of the 1994 ECT. It is also a
common feature of BITs and FTAs, concluded and in force worldwide.
7.2.1. Fair and equitable treatment
The wording of the FET clause varies slightly from one treaty to another.
Early BITs generally did not refer to FET.973 In the 1960s, German and Swiss BITs
included it in relation to the rules on the transfer of payments. FET started to appear
in the following years of that decade as a general standard of treatment.974 Currently,
the vast majority of these treaties include FET as one of its investment protections.975
An example of a typical FET clause, which resembles that of the Economic
Agreement of Bogota, is Article 3 (1) of the 1992 Argentina-Netherlands BIT:
Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to investments of
investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal thereof by those investors.976
The FET in Article 1105 (1) of NAFTA is quite similar to the one included in
most BITs. Under the heading of "minimum standard of treatment", this provision
states that "[ejach Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security".
973
UNCTAD, supra note 19, at 212 & 217.
974
R Dolzer, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties', (2005) 39 1L 87,
note 12 at 89.
975 Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 58.
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<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_argentina.pdf> (last visited 31
March, 2008).
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According to Dolzer, the purpose of FET is to fill those gaps that might be left
by the other provisions of a treaty. FET would then be an independent standard of
treatment referring to different types of governmental measures that deter foreign
investment, which more specific standards are not suitable to address. As a
consequence, FET will complement the investment protection offered by other
clauses of the treaty. It will not replace them. In this sense, the FET clause would
constitute a conventional application of the principle of equity praeter legem in
international law.977 Like the takings provision, the FET clause establishes an
absolute or non-contingent standard of treatment.978 It provides a fixed reference
point for the alien and the authorities of the country were the investment was made.
This means that the FET provision may be violated even if the foreign investor
receives the same treatment as investors of the host-state or of other states.
Some BITs combine FET with the national and MFN treatments, i.e. with
relative or contingent standards which depend upon those granted to other entities.979
Other BITs combine the FET standard with full protection and security.980 As with
FET, it is difficult to give a precise meaning to full protection and security. In
contrast with most investment protections, which impose restrictions on host-state
activity, full protection and security seeks to impose certain positive duties on it. This
977
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standard originated in FCNs and has been held to involve an obligation of due
diligence, requiring the governmental authorities to exercise reasonable care to
protect foreign investments.981 Full protection and security is an absolute or non-
contingent standard, and has been considered an obligation de moyens, thus not
establishing a strict liability standard for the host-state. The alien would have to prove
in court that the injury claimed is attributable to a lack of reasonable care in the
conduct of the host-state, but without having to establish bad faith.982 This distinction
is important, for if full protection and security were to be considered an obligation de
resultat, the failure to comply with a specific result by the host-state would make it
liable for damages, unless the governmental authorities could prove that this
circumstance was attributable to a cause not imputable to them, i.e. a cas fortuit, fault
of the claimant, or fault of a third party.983 While this standard has normally been
applied in situations of physical protection of real and tangible property, the scope
ascribed to FET by international tribunals has been broader.9 4
It has been sometimes questioned whether FET actually contains two standards
-namely "fair" and "equitable", both with different meanings. No evidence of state
practice supports this distinction, and the general assumption is that FET is a single,
unified standard.985 International arbitral tribunals called upon to settle cases
involving the FET standard have proved unwilling to give a specific definition of it.
Instead, they have decided on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the plain-
981 See Dolzer and Stevens, supra note 16, at 60-1;
N Blackaby and L Paraded, 'Investment Treaty Arbitration', in J Tackaberry and A Marriott (eds.),
Bernstein's Handbook of Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice (2003), Vol. I, at 723; and
Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 584.
982 See Blackaby and Paraded, supra note 981, at 723, and Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 584.
983 See K Zweigert and H Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law (1998), 501-2.
984
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meaning approach; whether the treatment provided by a particular host-state to a
particular investor was both fair and equitable.986 The Oxford English Dictionary
defines fair as according to rule. This is: equitable, impartial, just.987 In the same
dictionary, equitable is related to acts characterized by fairness. This is: reasonable,
just acts. Fair and equitable would, therefore, appear to be synonyms, and closely
connected to the idea of justice. Nonetheless, the concept of fairness derives from the
requirement of due process in US constitutional law, and it is not equated with justice
there. In the US, fair refers to the procedure, while justice refers to the outcome of the
trial.988
The lack of a notion of fairness in some languages has obscured the already
hazy meaning of the FET standard in international law. The following example
illustrates this situation. The French version of certain BITs refer to un traitement
juste et equitable, while the Spanish version mentions un tratamiento justo y
equitativo,989 These phrases have been normally translated as FET990. Nevertheless,
as Fletcher and Sheppard explain, Romance languages do not distinguish between
"fairness" and "justice". The authors highlight the problems derived from this fact,
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with the difficulties in translating Rawl's expression "justice as fairness".991 In French
or Spanish it would stand as "justice as justice", and the meaning of this concept -i.e.
that the principles of justice should be grounded in fair procedures of negotiations-
would be lost.992 Fletcher and Sheppard argue that:
The particular attachment of Anglo-American legal culture to the concept of
'fairness' derives from the emphasis in the common law on procedural regularity as a
value in itself, a value worth respecting apart from justice in the individual case. Our
notions of fairness and fair play draw heavily on analogies from competitive sports
and games, which pervade idiomatic English. Fair procedures are those in which both
sides have an equal chance of winning. The playing field is level. Neither side hides
the ball. No one draws from the bottom of the deck. Regardless of the sport or game,
no one seeks an 'unfair' advantage -by 'hitting below the belt', 'stacking the deck',
993
or 'loading the dice'.
This sports analogy can also be used in international law. FET would refer then
to nothing less, and nothing more, than procedural propriety in the treatment given by
the host-state to the foreign investor. Under the FET clause, the governmental
authorities have an obligation de moyens, not an obligation de resultat"4 In other
words, it is not the justice of the governmental treatment that would be guaranteed by
FET, but its fairness. Though the distinction between these two concepts was made in
the context of due process as a constitutional requirement in the US, it should be
employed to interpret the undefined meaning of FET in investment treaties. After all,
it was this country that introduced the term as it is currently found in treaty-law.
991
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7.2.2. . Elements ofprocedural propriety
Arbitral panels rarely find expropriations these days. They turn instead to
FET, when available under the applicable treaty.995 No international case-law on FET
existed before the year 2000. Since then, several judicial decisions have referred to
this standard. The open-ended wording of these clauses has allowed international
tribunals to identify different elements which form the obligation of procedural
propriety. Their breach by the host-state, either individually or combined, will amount
to a violation of the FET clause.996 Among the elements distinguished is due process,
a basic requirement of the rule of law. Its violation constitutes the international
wrongful act of denial of justice.997 MTD, Saluka and Compafila de Aguas del
Aconquija refer to this duty, which may be breached by the judiciary, as well as by
the executive.998 S.D. Myers, Loewen, and Thunderbird also mention it, in the context
of NAFTA.999 The importance of due process as an element of FET has been
recognised in the latest version of the US BIT. It expressly declares that FET
"includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative
995
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See, in general, Yannaca-Small, supra note 971, at 25-40; Schreuer, supra note 970, at 373-85; and S
Schill, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of
Law', (2006) 6 International Law and Justice Working Papers 1, at 11-23.
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998
See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, 1CS1D case No.
ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May, 2004, para. 109, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MTD-
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adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in
the principal legal systems of the world".1000 This declaration has been also
incorporated in FTAs recently concluded by the US.1001
The obligation of due process is closely connected to the concept of
arbitrariness, as defined in the ELSI case, which ultimately followed the Neer claim:
i.e. an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety.1002 Many
cases refer to arbitrariness in relation to the FET clause. For instance, Genin,
TECMED, Eureko, Saluka, and PSEGum, all BIT arbitrations. Some NAFTA
tribunals, like those in S.D. Myers, Mondev, Loewen, Waste Management, and
Thunderbird, have approached FET from this perspective too.1004 Due process is also
related with the obligation of non-discrimination. BIT-based cases that refer to this
element include Lauder, CMS, Eureko, and Saluka.]005 Among NAFTA arbitrations,
Waste Management and Loewen mention it as well.1006 The obligation of due
diligence is another vital part of the FET standard. Also called obligation of vigilance,
Art. 5 (2) of the 2004 Uruguay-US BIT, cited at note 51, supra.
1001
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it has been mentioned as a part of FET in some cases that have interlocked it with the
standard of full protection and security.1007
The focus on the FET debate has recently shifted to the respect for legitimate
expectations. Several cases based on BITs mention this obligation: TECMED,
Occidental, Eureko, PSEG, Siemens, and Enron.1008 Saluka even referred to it as the
dominant element in FET.1009 A number ofNAFTA disputes also mention the respect
for legitimate expectations: Metalclad, ADF, Waste Management, GAMI, and
Thunderbird.WU) The specific treatment expected by the foreign investor must be
based on the host-state's legal framework, or on an undertaking made explicitly or
implicitly by it.10" The obligation to respect legitimate expectations generally adopts
the form of a duty of consistent conduct by the authorities of the country in which the
investment was made.1012 In practice, problems do not so much arise from changes in
host-state legislation, but from inconsistent positions taken by organs of the
1007
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executive. For instance, the reversal of assurances by the host-state which led to
legitimate expectations will violate the principle of FET. In any case, this is not an
absolute obligation: it does not amount to a requirement for the host-state to freeze its
legal system for the investor's benefit. A reasonable evolution of the former's law is
part of what the investor must legitimately expect.1013 What FET requires is a stable
and predictable legal and business framework for the foreign investor.1014
The obligation of transparency is related with the respect for legitimate
expectations. It means that domestic authorities must make clear what they want from
the investor, and cannot hide behind their own ambiguity or contradiction.1015
Maffezini, TECMED, MTD, Saluka, PSEG, and Siemens mention this element.1016
Metalclad, refers to it in the context of NAFTA.1017 Another element recognised in
the FET standard is the obligation of good faith. This is a general principle of law that
requires parties to a transaction to deal honestly and fairly with each other.1018
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TECMED, Saluka, PSEG. and Siemens refer to it1019; as well as S.D. Myers, and
Waste Management.1020
In all, FET is an abstract legal term whose content is normally determined by
international law in its application to the facts presented by the parties to an
investment dispute.1021 The nature of FET is broad. Compliance with this clause can
also depend, for example, on the breach or the lack of breach of a domestic provision,
as Noble Ventures recognise, along with GAMI.]022 Arbitral practice shows that this
standard can be violated even if no mala fides is involved.1023
7.3. The international minimum standard
One of the most debated issues regarding FET has been that of its relation with
the customary standard of minimum treatment. According to Mann, Dolzer, Stevens,
Vasciannie, and Schreuer, it must be presumed that if the parties to a treaty wanted to
1019 See Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. case, supra note 707, para. 153; Saluka
Investments BV case, supra note 729, para. 303; PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretim ve
Ticarel Limited $irketi case, supra note 1003, para. 223; and Siemens A.G. case, supra note 741, para.
308.
1020 S.D. Myers, Inc. case, supra note 870, para. 134; and Waste Management, Inc. case, supra note 45,
para. 138.
1021
Dolzer, supra note 974, at 88.
See, also, Muchlinski, supra note 748, at 625.
1022 See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, 1CSID case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October, 2005, para.
178, available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008); and
GAMI Investments, Inc. case, supra note 878, para. 91.
See, also, Schill, supra note 996, at 13-5.
An exception to this trend can be found in ADF, where the tribunal considered that "something more
than simple illegality or lack of authority under the domestic law of a State is necessary to render an
act or measure inconsistent with the customary international requirements of Article 1105(1)".
ADF Group Inc. case, supra note 1010, para. 190.
See Dolzer, supra note 974, at 88; and Yannaca-Small, supra note 971, at 35.
1023
Schreuer, supra note 970, at 384.
See, e.g., Occidental Exploration and Production Co. (OEPC) case, supra note 721, para. 185; CMS
Gas Transmission Company case, supra note 722, para. 280; Siemens A.G. case, supra note 741, para.
299; Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. case, supra note 1008, para. 263; and Compahia de
Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. (Vivendi II) case, supra note 744, para. 7.4.12.
See, also, Mondev International Ltd. case, supra note 1004, para. 116; and Loewen Group, Inc. and
Raymond L. Loewen case, supra note 999, para. 132.
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refer to customary international law, they would have referred to it as such, rather
than using a different expression.1024 Dolzer rightly points out that it is doubtful that
the international minimum standard, first described in the Neer case in relation to the
physical security of an alien before 1945, should govern the contemporary regime of
international investment law.1025 In the absence of a clear indication to the contrary -
Schreuer adds-, the FET standard contained in BITs should be considered an
autonomous concept, whose meaning will ultimately depend on the specific wording
of the clause establishing it.1026 International case-law tends to support this doctrinal
approach. Tribunals have not restricted the application of the FET clause to the lack
of due diligence, wilful neglect, clear unreasonableness, or bad faith, already covered
by the customary standard.1027
The most intensive discussion on the relationship between the two standards has
taken place in the context of Art. 1105 (1) of NAFTA.1028 Early arbitral decisions,
notably S.D. Myers and Pope & Talbot, did not regard the FET standard in this
provision as restricted to customary international law.1029 The tribunal's reasoning on
the issue was detailed in Pope & Talbot, and one of the arguments given was
particularly persuasive. Namely, that:
the contrary view [...] would provide to NAFTA investors a more limited right to
object to laws, regulation and administration than accorded to host country investors
and investments as well as to those from countries that have concluded BITs with a
NAFTA party. This state of affairs would surely run afoul of Articles 1002 and 1003,
1024
Schreuer, supra note 970, at 360.
1025 See Dolzer, supra note 974, at 93.
1026
Schreuer, supra note 970, at 364.
1027
Blackaby and Paradell, supra note 981, at 722.
See, also, Redfern and Hunter, supra note 62, at 583-4.
1028 See Schreuer, supra note 970, at 362-4.
1029 See S.D. Myers, Inc. case, supra note 870, para. 264; and Pope and Talbot. Inc. v. The Government
of Canada, NAFTA, UNC1TRAL arbitration, Award, 10 April, 2001, paras. 110-8, available at
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Award_Merits2001_04_10_Pope_001.pdf> (last visited 31 March,
2008).
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which give every NAFTA investor and investment the right to national and most
favoured nation treatment1030
The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC), a body composed of
representatives of the three parties to this treaty with the power to adopt binding
statements on it, issued a Note of Interpretation in 2001 on the question. In it, the
FTC declared that Art. 1105 (1) "prescribes the customary international law [...]
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum [...] to be afforded to investments of
investors of another Party".1031 The Note of Interpretation further stated that FET
does "not require treatment in addition or beyond that which is required by the
customary international [...] minimum standard". Subsequent decisions of NAFTA
tribunals have accepted the FTC interpretation without resistance.1032
7.3.1. Developments in treaty-law
The FTC's interpretation embodied the concern of NAFTA members on the
expansion of the traditional minimum standard recognised in international law.
Recent US FTAs and BITs, as well as latest BIT models of Canada and Mexico,
expressly follow this approach.1033 NAFTA awards, issued after this interpretation,
lf)3°
Pope & Talbot Inc. case, supra note 1029, para. 117.
1031 Available at <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-
diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=en> (last visited 31 March, 2008).
1032 Schreuer, supra note 970, at 363.
See, e.g., Mondev International Ltd. case, supra note 1004, paras. 111-3 & 118-25; United Parcel of
America Inc. (UPS) v Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 21 November, 2002, para. 97,
available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/UPS-Jurisdiction.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008);
ADF Group Inc. case, supra note 1010, paras. 176-9 & 186; Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L.
Loewen case, supra note 999, paras. 125-6 & 128; and International Thunderbird Gaming
Corporation, supra note 999, paras. 192-3.
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See, e.g., Art. 15.5 para. 2 of the 2003 Singapore-US FTA, cited at note 854, supra; Art. 5 para. 2
of the 2004 Uruguay-US BIT, cited at note 51, supra; and Art. 10.5 para. 2 of the 2006 Oman-US
FTA, cited at note 856, supra.
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have struggled to comply with the views of the FTC, while acknowledging at the
same time the dynamic nature of the international standard. The tribunal in Mondev,
for instance, refused to accept that the meaning of Article 1105 was limited to the
Neer claim's formula.1034 In its wording:
Neer and like arbitral awards were decided in the 1920s, when the status of the
individual in international law, and the international protection of foreign
investments, were far less developed than they have since come to be. In particular,
both the substantive and procedural rights of the individual in international law have
undergone considerable development. In the light of these developments it is
unconvincing to confine the meaning of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full
protection and security' of foreign investments to what those terms - had they been
current at the time - might have meant in the 1920s when applied to the physical
security of an alien. To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate
with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign
investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.1035
According to this panel, the customary standard of minimum treatment has been
modified by state practice:
Investment treaties run between North and South, and East and West, and between
States in these spheres inter se. On a remarkably widespread basis, States have
repeatedly obliged themselves to accord foreign investment [a FET, and full
protection and security]. In the Tribunal's view, such a body of concordant practice
will necessarily have influenced the content of rules governing the treatment of
foreign investment in current international law. It would be surprising if this practice
and the vast number of provisions it reflects were to be interpreted as meaning no
more than the Neer Tribunal (in a very different context) meant in 1927 [sic].1036
The evolutionary potential of Article 1105 was recognised again in ADF, where
the panel profusely quoted Mondev on the issue.1037 A year later, Waste Management
See, also, Art. 5 para. 2 of the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT, cited at note 1, supra; and International Institute
for Sustainable Development, Investment Treaty News, 16 May, 2006, available at:
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mayl6_2006.pdf> (last visited 31 March, 2008); referring to the
2006 Mexico-UK BIT.
1034 Mondev International Ltd. case, supra note 1004, para. 114.
1035 Ibid., para. 115.
1036
Ibid., para. 117.
See, also, ibid., paras. 119 & 123.
1037 See ADF Group Inc. case, supra note 1010, paras. 179, 180 & 183-4.
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summarised both Mondev and ADF.]03H Thunderbird conformed to these decisions,
but in its own terms.1039
In general, BIT arbitrations have not followed the FTC's interpretation.1040 As
Schreuer explains, tribunals outside the NAFTA context have construed the relevant
provisions in BITs on the basis of their respective wording.1041 Notwithstanding the
legal gymnastics to which NAFTA awards have undergone to integrate a customary-
bound notion of FET and a modern interpretation of Article 1105, the solution given
by the FTC should not be applied beyond the scope of this treaty. FET is a
conventional standard: one that incorporates the minimum standard developed in
customary international law, and complements it. At present, the minimum treatment
guaranteed in BITs and EIAs comprise not only FET, but also the protection against
expropriation, as well as the principles of national and MFN treatment, full protection
and security, and non-discrimination. This protective framework was designed by the
US and Western European countries. Most countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe,
Latin American, and Oceania adhere to it today. Foreign investors and their counsel
are well aware of these treaty-protections, and they are not shy at the moment of
referring to them when lodging a claim under a BIT or a EIA. The following
observation of the arbitral panel in PSEG illustrates a common situation these days:
l0:'8 Waste Management, Inc. case, supra note 45, paras. 91-3.
See, also, GAMI Investments, Inc. case, supra note 878, para. 95.
1039 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation, supra note 999, para. 194.
1040
See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. case, supra note 998, paras. 110-2; CMS Gas
Transmission Company case, supra note 722, paras. 282-4; Occidental Exploration and Production
Co. (OEPC) case, supra note 721, para. 192; Saluka Investments BV case, supra note 729, paras. 294-
5; Siemens A.G. case, supra note 741, paras. 291-9; and Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P.
case, supra note 1008, paras. 256-8.
Compahla de Aguas del Aconquija did endorse the evolutionary principle of the minimum standard of
treatment, as expressed in Mondev and ADF.
Compahla de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. (Vivendi II), supra note 744, note
325 at para. 7.4.7.
1041
Schreuer, supra note 970, at 364.
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As it is by now customary in investment arbitration, the aggrieved party invokes the
breach of every BIT clause dealing with the standards of the investor's protection,
while the Respondent vehemently denies any breach.1042
From these protections, that against takings is one of the two most relied-upon
by claimants in investor-to-state disputes. The other is FET.1043
In the case-law of the Iran-US CT, every time the judges wanted to award
compensation for measures that did not amount to a taking, the tribunal applied the
concept of other measures affecting property rights. FET has sometimes been seen as
an equivalent notion.1044 In several arbitrations where no expropriation was found, the
tribunal concluded that the FET clause was breached. These cases include Maffezini,
MTD, Occidental, Saluka, PSEG, and Enronl045, among BIT arbitrations; S.D. Myers,
and Pope & Talbot, among NAFTA disputes.1046 At first sight, it would appear that
an interference that amounts to a substantive deprivation of the alien's property will
constitute an indirect taking, while a lesser interference will amount to a breach of the
FET clause. However, an indirect expropriation can overlap with an unfair and
inequitable treatment. In a number of arbitrations where a taking was found, the
tribunal concluded that the FET clause was also breached by the host-state. CME,
Middle East Cement, TECMED, ADC and Siemens are examples of such a
1042 PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited §irketi case, supra note
1003, para. 220.
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Dolzer, supra note 974, at 87.
See, also, Schreuer, supra note 970, at 357; and M Kantor, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: Echoes of
FDR's Court-Packing Plan in the International Law Approach Towards Regulatory Expropriation',
(2006) 5 LPICT 23\, at 238.
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See, e.g., Heiskanen (2007), supra note 60, at 218-9.
1045 See Emilio Agustin Maffezini case, supra note 599; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A.
case, supra note 998; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. (OEPC) case, supra note 721;
Saluka Investments BV case, supra note 729; PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretim ve
Ticaret Limited $irketi case, supra note 1003; and Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. case,
supra note 1008.
1046 See S.D. Myers, Inc. case, supra note 870; and Pope and Talbot. Inc. case, supra note 1029.
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situation1047. Metalclad too.1048 These cases show that FET and the protection against
indirect expropriation are related but distinct standards. They do share some of their
constitutive elements. Nevertheless, their legal nature is different. While the FET
clause establishes an obligation de moyens, the protection against expropriation
combines the latter with an obligation de resultat -the payment of compensation.
One of these shared elements is due process. It is a requirement of a lawful
expropriation, and a constituent part of the notion of FET. Another of these elements
is the respect for prior commitments and the legitimate expectations of the foreign
investor. This obligation is not only a part of procedural propriety, but also of the
concept of indirect takings, as traditionally understood in international law. Far from
being opposed to the sole-effect rule, the respect for legitimate expectations
complements such an approach. The threshold question is answered by the
application of the substantive-deprivation test. Other elements might help in the
determination of the expropriatory nature of the respective measure. The frustration
of the foreign investor's reliance on representations or undertakings, made explicitly
or implicitly by the host-state, is another.1049 These commitments can have a legal
nature, either national or international, or a non-legal nature.1050 Representations and
undertakings can be found in a treaty, a law, a license or a permit, or even in an
investment brochure.1051 To be legitimate, the expectation must be reasonable.
Expecting the host-state not to subject its legal system to any alterations with regards
1047 See CME Czech Republic B. V. case, supra note 681; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling
Co. case, supra note 685; Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. case, supra note 707; ADC
Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited case, supra note 739; and Siemens A.G.
case, supra note 741.
1048
See Metalclad Corporation case, supra note 867.
1049 See Paulsson and Douglas, supra note 8, at 158; and Kunoy, supra note 51, at 478-82.
1050 See Waelde and Kolo, supra note 8, at 843-5; Kunoy, supra note 51, at 482; and Newcombe, supra
note 50, at 45.
1051
Madalena, supra note 62, at 77; and Gutbrod and Hindelang, supra note 51, note 33 at 65-6.
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to the foreign investors, for instance, would not be reasonable.1052 Fortier and Drymer
point out that the allowed level of interference with the foreign investor's legitimate
expectations is a matter of degree. Furthermore, it is largely a question of consistency
and, ultimately, fairness in the behaviour of the host-state towards the alien.1053 It is
not strange, then, that this concept reappears as one of the elements of the FET
standard. Hence, as a separate cause of action for claiming damages.
7.3.2. The protection offoreign investors
Dolzer asks the supporters of the sole-effect doctrine to explain why the
treatment of aliens in international law should require a higher standard of protection
than that established by the major domestic legal orders.1054 The relevance of this
question is not limited to the problem of indirect expropriation, for in its answer lies
the raison d'etre of international investment law as a whole. Sornarajah contends that
the dominance of this regime, originally designed by the US to protect its investors
abroad, can only be explained in terms of power, and not in terms of logic or
reasoning:
The positivist notions of sovereignty which were the dominant notion in public
international law during this period should have supported the claims of the Latin
American states for the regime they argued [was] more consistent with state
sovereignty than the intrusive regime which the [US government] argued for on the
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Sornarajah is right on the role played by power in the establishment of the
international minimum standard. His assessment of sovereignty and the protection of
aliens, however, is wrong. Independence and sovereignty are synonyms in
international law.1056 As a sovereign, the state is not subject within its territory to the
jurisdiction of any state other than itself, or bound by any law other than its own and
international law.1057 Sornarajah forgets this last part of the concept of independence,
i.e. that the sovereign state can choose to bind itself to international law, whether
customary or conventional, thus limiting its own sovereignty. The consent of the state
to a customary norm may be express or implied. It requires state practice and opinion
juris -or, in the words of Article 38 (1) (b) of the ICJ's Statute: a general practice
accepted as law. The consent of the state may even be presumed in case of
acquiescence; that is to say, the silence or passivity of the state towards the conduct of
other states that would otherwise deserve a protest. The consent in treaties will
generally be explicit.1058 Once given, the state will have to keep its agreement under
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. This principle that does not only apply to
treaties, but to any instrument concluded by the state in any form.1059 But there is
more to sovereignty and the protection of aliens. It can be fairly claimed that the
international minimum standard is the forerunner of the international system of
human rights that governs the treatment of nationals and foreigners alike. Currently,
an international minimum standard is enshrined in BITs and EIAs, as well as in the
1056
Malanczuk, supra note 72, at 17-8.
On the relation between territorial sovereignty and international law, see Dunn, supra note 1, at 171-2.
1057 See H Steinberger, 'Sovereignty', in R Berhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV, at 511-2.
1058 In relation to treaties establishing rights for third states, Art. 36 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides that the consent of the third state is presumed "so long as the contrary is
not indicated" and "unless the treaty otherwise provides".
Available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/l_1_1969.pdf> (last
visited 31 March, 2008).
In force since 1980.
1059
See, in general, Lachs, supra note 1046.
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UN Covenants, the European Convention, the American Convention, and the African
Charter on human rights.1060 Arguing that the norms on the treatment of aliens go
against the state's sovereignty is equivalent to arguing that the norms on human rights
go against it.
Sornarajah has dubbed the international law on foreign investment as a law of
greed.1061 His answer to Dolzer's question can only be formulated in negative terms:
there is no reason why a foreigner investor who voluntarily assumes a risk by
entering a host state should be insulated from the risks inherent in the host state and
should not bear the costs of his own adventure.1062
He is wrong again. There are several reasons for protecting aliens. Relying on
the law of the host-state alone has never been an attractive option for foreign
investors. Salacuse points out some of the risks to which an alien is subject abroad. It
is not only that domestic law can be easily changed after the investment has been
made by the host-state, or that the government officials of the latter -responsible for
applying this law- may act impartially towards him. It is also that, in the past, host-
states have treated foreign investors in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner in the
past, imposing onerous conditions on the operation of foreign investment.1063
The US-Mexican General Claims Commission had already observed in the 1926
Hopkins case that:
The citizens of a nation may enjoy many rights which are withheld from aliens, and,
conversely, under international law aliens may enjoy rights and remedies which the
nation does not accord to its own citizens.1064
1060 See Paulsson, supra note 82, at 35.
1061 A Newcombe, 'Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law', (2007) 3/VIII JWIT357, at
359.
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Sornarajah, supra note 68, at 55.
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Salacuse, supra note 634, at 659.
See, also, Been and Beauvais, supra note 583, at 107 & 118; and Newcombe, supra note 50, at 46-7.
1064
George W. Hopkins (US v. Mexico), US-Mexican General Claims Commission, Opinion and
decision, 31 March, 1926, (1926) 21 AJIL 160, para. 16.
This case was quoted in S.D. Myers, Inc. case, supra note 870, para. 260.
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Dunn developed this idea two years later:
From a practical point of view, the foreigner, although he may be accorded full civil
rights on the same basis as citizens, is often at a disadvantage in any dispute which he
may have with the agents of the state of his sojourn merely by reason of the fact that
he is a foreigner. Furthermore, being deprived of political rights outside of his own
country, he is not at liberty to participate in the determination of the social and
economic order and has not the political means for the protection of his interests that
are at the disposal of the citizen. Perhaps for these reasons as much as any other, it
has been found necessary, in a world of diverse cultures and heterogeneous peoples,
of strong governments and weak governments, of orderly countries and disorderly
countries, to work out a common code of treatment of aliens in order that there might
be some basis of security and predictability upon which to build the present complex
structure of international intercourse.
This common code of treatment is technically called the 'minimum standard of
• .. ,1065
justice
Aliens constitute a minority that requires special protection. Ignatieff illustrates
this fact by reference to the problem of balancing liberty and security in the fight
against of terrorism. He says:
Democratic citizens do not actually have to balance their [sic] liberty against their
security, but their security against the liberty of others, usually non-citizens.
Decisions to abridge civil liberties for non-nationals have aroused little public
resistance since September 11, while measures aimed at citizens, like national
identity cards or more intrusive security screenings at airports, have been stymied.1066
Ignatieff concludes that "[o]bserving international law is the best way to correct
the partiality that states feel towards their own citizens and mitigate the
discrimination that it meets out towards non-citizens".1067 The same conclusion is
applicable regarding the balance of interests between the community and the
individual involved in the problem of indirect expropriation. In the James case, the
European Court of Human Rights recognised aliens as a minority that should receive
special protection.1068 So did the arbitral panel in TECMED.]069 The special
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Dunn, supra note 1, at 174.
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1067 Ibid.
1068 James and others case, supra note 295, para. 63.
See, also, Lithgow and others case, supra note 304, paras. 111-9.
1069 Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. case, supra note 707, para. 122.
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protection expected by foreign investors comprises the payment of compensation in
case of a taking, and of damages in case of any breach of the applicable investment
treaty. It also includes the possibility to settle any investment dispute before an
international tribunal. On this respect, Paulsson remarks:
The great difficulty is to understand that international adjudication is not foreign [sic]
adjudication. The citizens of a given country have no stake in foreign justice; they did
not create it, and whatever they may think of its qualities in the abstract it has no
legitimate basis on which to judge them (unless they venture abroad). Therefore, as
long as international justice is thought of as foreign justice, it will be resisted. The
key is the perception of inclusiveness; when 'we' are part of the processes of
international law, consulted in its formation and benefiting from its protections and
remedies, it becomes 'our' law too.1070
The protection of aliens is, nonetheless, not unlimited. It does not cover them
from any risk faced while investing abroad. Ordinary commercial risks are
excluded.1071 The tribunal in Maffezini, for example, emphasized that BITs are not
insurance policies against bad business judgments.1072 This approach goes back to
Oscar Chinn, and can also be found in the case-law of the Iran-US CT.1073
7.4. Conclusion
Judges and arbitrators have generally followed a sole-effect rule on the
problem of indirect takings. Its counterpart, the police powers solution, has been a
mere exception to an established trend in international case-law. NAFTA arbitrations
have prompted a change in this state of affairs. The protections designed to promote
1070
Paulsson, supra note 82 at 27.
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See, e.g., Kunoy, supra note 51, at 477-8; Gutbrod and Hindelang, supra note 51, at 63; or Kunoy,
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10 2 Emilio Agustin Maffezini case, supra note 599, para. 64.
See, also, Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. case, supra note 685, para. 153.
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See, also, Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International,
Inc.case, supra note 426, at 149.
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the investment of nationals of developed states in developing countries are now being
used to challenge the regulatory measures adopted by any governmental authority,
whether of a developing or of a developed state. Against this background, the US has
decided to substitute its long-standing advocacy of the international minimum
standard for that of the national treatment it so strongly opposed in the past.
Abandoning the international standard means abandoning the sole-effect rule, and the
best way to achieve this is by transforming treaty-law, as a guideline for decision¬
makers in order to, ultimately, transform customary international law. Canada and
other Western European countries are starting to see the convenience of the US
approach.
While the police-powers rule derives from the US regulatory takings doctrine,
the sole-effect variant is strongly grounded in international law. It is true: African,
Asian, and Latin American countries did come to accept the sole-effect approach
because they had no other choice. This rule was part of the international minimum
standard required by capital-importing states as a condition to invest the funds or
materials developing states need to build or rebuild their economies. And it is also
true that the sole-effect approach may not be completely consistent in international
case-law, not even within the reasoning of a particular tribunal in a specific award.
But it is a position that has provided a useful guidance to foreign investors and host-
states, as well as to judges and arbitrators. Furthermore, it is a solution that finds
support in the traditional concepts of sovereignty and lawful expropriation, and
ultimaltely in the minimum standard of treatment in which international investment
law is based.
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The challenge to the regulatory powers of the host-state is, nevertheless, not
restricted to the question of indirect expropriation. In the exercise of its authority, a
government may breach different provisions of a BIT or an EIA. These are designed
to reflect the various aspects of the international minimum standard protected by
treaty-law. The violation of any investment protection by the host-state will trigger its
international responsibility. Against the uncertainty provoked by the current sole-
effect/police-powers debate, claimants in investment disputes have opted to allege the
breach of the FET clause in virtually every proceeding brought before an arbitral
panel established under a BIT or an EIA. The undefined concepts of indirect takings
and FET have led to some confusion on the relation between the two clauses. The
answer to the threshold question in each case lies on two independent but





The protection of property is currently part of not one, but two areas of
international law. Both human rights and investment treaties provide for a minimum
standard of treatment. There are, nonetheless, some differences which go beyond the
fact that under international human rights law the minimum standard is applicable to
aliens and nationals of the host-state alike. The most developed human rights case-
law on the subject comes from Europe. It has neither adopted the sole-effect nor the
police-powers rules as a solution to the threshold question. The reason for this
approach lies in a distinction which is not available under BITs and EIAs. Controls
on the use of property and lesser interferences give the decision-maker in Europe the
option of achieving a similar result to that aimed at by supporters of the police-
powers doctrine -i.e. no compensation for justified measures. The fair balance test on
which this conclusion must be based is, however, significantly more complete than
the purpose test applied to the police-powers rule. In case of deprivation, the affected
individual or legal entity does have a right to be compensated under European human
rights law. Nevertheless, the host-state is not constrained by a Hull formula
applicable to all events. It is, furthermore, given a wide margin of appreciation
regarding compensation for nationalisations. No need for a police-powers solution
here, either.
Investment-dispute panels only exceptionally refer to international human
rights law. The treaty protections over which they have jurisdiction are closer to that
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of the Iran-US CT, so arbitrators in these controversies tend to follow and develop its
case-law on the protection of property. The Iran-US CT considered compensation for
expropriation as part of the minimum standard of treatment. It answered the
threshold question on a case-by-case basis, applying a sole-effect rule. An
interference amounted to an expropriation when it was non-ephemeral and
unreasonable, irreversibly depriving the owner of the effective use and control of his
property. The Iran-US CT distinguished lawful from unlawful takings concerning
restitution, but not with regards to the applicable standard of compensation. In its
decisions, any expropriation required the payment of a full compensation. This
standard was not extended to other measures affecting property rights. The tribunal
relied on the concept of lesser interferences, as developed in European human rights
law, to construe this phrase of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Such an
interpretation offered the Iran-US CT an alternative to the sole-effect rule and the full
compensation standard in those cases were an interference not amounting to an
indirect taking was found. Claimants affected by these measures were awarded
partial compensations.
BITs and EIAs expressly recognise today the host-state's right to expropriate
foreign property. Nonetheless, it is a right that must be exercised in conformity with
certain requirements. One of these conditions is the adoption of the respective
measure for a public purpose; another is the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation. As in the case-law of the European Commission and Court
of Human Rights, and the Iran-US CT, national authorities are now granted a wide
margin of appreciation in relation to the public purpose involved in the adoption of
the expropriatory measure. And like the Iran-US CT, arbitrations instituted under
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investment codes, investment agreements, and BITs have followed a sole-effect
approach, as a general rule. They normally apply the standard of substantial and
permanent deprivation, derived from actions or omissions. This means, the
destruction of the ability of the foreign investor to use, enjoy and dispose his
property.
NAFTA arbitrations originally adopted the sole-effect rule too. But when
expropriation claims started being lodged against the US and other developed states,
the international minimum standard strongly advocated by these countries became
more than suspicious: it became undesirable. The Trade Promotion Act of the US
was enacted in 2002, shortly after the award in Metalclad was issued. This statute
openly declared that one of the main negotiating objectives of the US is to ensure a
national treatment standard for anyone investing within its borders. For that purpose,
the guidelines domestically developed by US courts were included in its treaties. The
police-powers rule had not been adopted in a judicial decision since Sea-Land, the
Iran-US CT case of 1984. It was applied again in 2005 and 2006, by Methanex and
Saluka, respectively. The same year of the latter, Canada concluded a BIT which
closely resembles the terms of US treaties. Before these international agreements,
only the Harvard Draft, the OECD Draft Convention and the Third Restatement had
timidly incorporated a police-powers solution to the question of intent. In other
words, no treaty had done so.
Although the police-powers rule is still exceptional in investment treaty
arbitrations, even in those instituted under NAFTA, its eventual application has
driven claimants to other compensable measures included in BITs and EIAs. Among
these, foreign investors have mostly resorted to FET, a clause which complements
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the protection against expropriation. This absolute standard forms part of the
minimum treatment guaranteed in investment treaties since the 1960s. As with
indirect takings, the definition of FET does not answer the threshold question. The
distinction between non-compensable regulatory measures and breaches to this
clause, entitling the foreign investor to damages, can only be found on a case-by-case
basis. International arbitral panels have identified certain elements which should
guide the decision-maker's assessment. These elements include due process; non¬
discrimination; due diligence; the respect for legitimate expectations; transparency;
and good faith. The overarching obligation comprising them all is the duty of
procedural propriety in the treatment of the alien. This is an obligation de moyens,
rather than an obligation the resultat, for it is not the justice of this treatment that will
be guaranteed by FET, but its fairness.
Unlike other measures affecting property rights under the Claims Settlement
Declaration of the Iran-US CT, FET is a precise treaty standard which cannot be
equated to any interference short of taking. Procedural propriety is also relevant with
regards to the law of expropriation. Restricted in this case to the obligations of due
process and the respect for legitimate expectations, the concept of fairness must aid
the decision-maker at the moment of establishing whether a taking was lawful and
whether an indirect expropriation had occurred, respectively. Besides this
circumscribed obligation de moyens of procedural propriety, the protection against
expropriation also imposes on the host-state an obligation the resultat. And the main
guideline to its compliance is still the substantial deprivation of the alien, i.e., the
effect of the measure in his property.
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Even though the threshold question of indirect expropriation involves important
economical, political and social aspects, it is primarily a legal issue. This problem
cannot be reduced to a policy-oriented choice between favouring the foreign investor
or the host-state. Being a problem of law, the analysis of indirect takings must start
from this standpoint. The power of national authorities to adopt sovereign measures
should be appraised against the international minimum standard to which states have
consented to in an express or implied form. This standard of treatment, first
described in the Neer case, has certainly evolved since the 1920s. Treaties have
codified and progressively developed the customary protection of foreigners, an
essential part of which is the international law of expropriation. Its norms recognise
the right of the host-state to take foreign investments, a right which must be
exercised in conformity with four requirements. Public purpose is one of them. It is
meant to avoid openly abusive measures, adopted for purely private reasons. The
payment of compensation in Hull's terms, to the affected individual or legal entity, is
another one. The sole-effect rule guarantees that this compensation is paid every time
a foreigner is substantially deprived of his investment. These norms on the protection
of aliens provide legal certainty to foreign investors, as well as host-states. In them,
police-powers is an exception, not the rule.
It took several decades to achieve an agreement in the international society
regarding the protection of aliens. This consensus can be found in the network of
BITs and EIAs in force. The question is for how long. The absolute minimum
standard of treatment, on which it is based, was initially advocated by the US with
the support of Western-European states. Their multiple interventions in Latin
America led to the Calvo doctrine, which proposed a relative standard of national
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treatment for all investors in the host-state, whether alien or not. The long-standing
conflict that ensued is far from settled. The minimum standard continues to be
threatened by its counterpart, the national treatment. This time, mostly advocated not
by Latin American or African or Asian states, but by the US and Western European
countries. Ironically, the national agendas currently pursued by developed states are
not different from those pursued by developing countries some years ago. New BITs
and EIAs have included a police-powers rule aimed at transforming the international
standard of treatment into a national one. This policy not only threatens the
international law of expropriation. Other compensable measures under BITs and
EIAs might be assessed against this background in the future. And then, the




1. Aldrich, G, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal (1996).
2. Allen, T, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005).
3. Avanessian, A, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in Action (1993).
4. Beveridge, F, The Treatment and Taxation ofForeign Investment under
International Law (2000).
5. Birnie, P, and Boyle, A, International Law & the Environment (2002).
6. Bishop, R, Crawford, J, and Reisman, M, Foreign Investment Disputes.
Cases, Materials and Commentary (2005).
7. Brower, C, and Brueschke, J, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
(1998).
8. Boyle, A, and Chinkin, C, The Making ofInternational Law (2006).
9. Brownlie, I, Principles ofPublic International Lcrw (2003).
10. Calvo, C, Le Droit International Theorique et Pratique (1896).
11. Carreau, D, and Juillard, P, Droit International Economique (2003).
12. Cassese, A, International Law (2005).
13. Cassese, A, International Law in a Divided World (1994).
14. Clayton, R, and Tomlinson, H, The Law ofHuman Rights (2000).
15.Comeaux, P, and Kinsella, N, Protecting Foreign Direct Investment
under International Law. Legal Aspects ofPolitical Risk (1996).
256
16. Crawford, J, The International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2005).
17. Davidson, S, The Inter-American Human Rights System (1997).
18. Dolzer, R, and Stevens, M, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995).
19. Dugard, J, International Law. A South African Perspective (2000).
20. Fletcher, G, and Sheppard, S, American Law in a Global Context. The
Basics (2005).
21. Harris, D, O'Boyle, M, and Warbrick, C, Law of the European
Convention on Human Rights (1995).
22. Higgins, R, Problems & Process. International Law and How We Use
It (1994).
23. Ignatieff, M, The Lesser Evil. Political Ethics in an Age of Terror
(2005).
24. Jennings, R and Watts, A, Oppenheim 's International Law (1996).
25. Lowenfeld, A, International Economic Law (2003).
26. Malanczuk, P, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law
(1997).
27. Matsushita, M, Schoenbaum, T, and Mavroidis, P, The World Trade
Organization. Law, Practice, and Policy (2004).
28. Merrills, J, and Robertson, A, Human Rights in Europe. A Study of the
European Convention on Human Rights (2001).
29. Mouri, A, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the
Work ofthe Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (1994).
257
30. Mowbray, M, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on
Human Rights (2007).
31. Muchlinski, P, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (1995).
32. Ovey, C, and White, R, Jacobs and White, The European Convention
on Human Rights (2006).
33. Ridruejo, P, Curso de Derecho Internacional y Organizaciones
Internacionales (2000).
34. Paulsson, J, Denial ofJustice in International Lcrw (2005).
35. Quataert, D, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (2006).
36. Rawls, J, A Theory ofJustice (2005).
37. Redfern, A, and Hunter, M, Law and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration (2004).
38. Robertson, A, and Merrills, J, Human Rights in the World (1996).
39. Sands, P, Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking of
Global Rules (2005).
40. Seidl-Hohenveldern, I, International Economic Law (1992).
41. Schrijver, N, Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Balancing Rights
and Duties (1997).
42. Shea, D, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and
International Law and Diplomacy (1955).
43. Shihata, I, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank
Guidelines (1993).
44. Sornarajah, M, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2004).
45. Trayner, J, Latin Maxims and Phrases (1986).
258
46. Van Dijk, P, and Van Hoof, G, Theory and Practice of the European
Convention on Human Rights (1998).
47. White, G, Nationalisation ofForeign Property (1961).
48. Zweigert, K, and Kotz, H, Introduction to Comparative Law (1998).
Articles
1. Akpan, G, 'The Investment Provisions of the United States-Singapore
Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA. Old Wine in a New Skin or
Something Else?', (2005) 6/VIJWIT 873.
2. Aldrich, G, 'What Constitutes a Compensable Taking: The Decisions
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal', (1994) 88 AJIL 585.
3. AlQurashi, Z, 'Indirect Expropriation in the Field of Petroleum', (2004)
5/VI JWIT 897.
4. Anderson, D, 'Compensation for Interference with Property', (1999)
4/VI Eur. HRLR 543.
5. Appleton, B, 'Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective',
(2003)11 NYUEU 35.
6. Been, V, and Beauvais, J, 'The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA's
Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest for an International
"Regulatory Takings" Doctrine', (2003) 78 NYULR 30.
7. Bernardini, P, 'Investment Protection under Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Investment Contracts', (2001) 2/II JWIT235.
259
8. Bowett, D, 'State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments
on Compensation for Termination or Breach', (1988) 59 BYIL 49.
9. Brower, C, 'Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and
Compensation: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal', (1987) 21 1L 639.
10. Brunetti, M, 'Indirect Expropriation in International Law', (2003) 5/III
FORUM 150.
11. Brunetti, M, 'The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter
11, and the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation', (2001) 2 Chic. JIL 203.
12. Christie, G, 'What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International
Law?', (1962) BYIL 307.
13. Chinkin, C, 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law', (1989) 38/IV ICLQ 850.
14. Commission, J, 'Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration. A Citation
Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence', (2007) 24/11JIA 129.
15. Dalrymple, C, 'Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause',
(1996) 29 Corn. IU 161.
16. Dolzer, R, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in
Investment Treaties', (2005) 39 IL 87.
17. Dolzer, R, 'Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?', (2003) 11
NYUELJ 64.
18. Dolzer, R, 'Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property', (1986) 1/1 ICSID
Rev. 41.
260
19. Dolzer, R, 'New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien
Property', (1981) 75/111 AJIL 553.
20. Dolzer, R, and Bloch, F, 'Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual
Realignments?', (2003) 5/III FORUM 155.
21. Dunn, F, 'International Law and Private Property Rights', (1928) 28
Colum. LR 166.
22. Elkins, Z, Guzman, A, and Simmons, B, 'Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000', (2008) 1 UILR
265.
23. Escobar, A, 'Introductory Note on Bilateral Investment Treaties
Recently Concluded by Latin American States', (1996) 11/1ICSID Rev.
86.
24. Fortier, Y, and Drymer, S, 'Indirect Expropriation in the Law of
International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor',
(2004) 19/11 ICSID Rev. 293.
25. Francioni, F, 'Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property:
The Borderline between Law and Equity', (1975) 24/11 ICLQ 255.
26. Garcia-Mora, M, 'The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions
and International Law', (1950) 33/IV MLR 205.
27. Geiger, R, 'Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons
from the Multilateral Agreement on Investment', (2003) 11 NYU ELJ
94.
28. Gibson, C, and Drahozal, C, 'Iran-United States Tribunal Precedent in
Investor-State Arbitration', (2006) 23/VIJIA 521.
261
29. Graham, E, 'Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment, and the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Issues Raised by
Nongovernmental Organizations', (1998) 31 Corn. ILJ 599.
30. Graham, F, 'The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual
Renunciation of Diplomatic Protection', (1970) 6 Tex. ILF 289.
31.Gutbrod, M, and Hindelang, S, 'Externalization of Effective Legal
Protection against Indirect Expropriation. Can the Legal Order of
Developing Countries Live up to the Standards Required by
International Investment Agreements? A Disenchanting Comparative
Analysis', (2006) 7/1 JWIT 59.
32. Guzman, A, 'Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties', (1998) 38 Virg. JIL 639.
33. Heiskanen, V, 'The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation',
(2003) 5/III FORUM 176.
34. Heiskanen, H, 'The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation in Light of the
Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal', (2007) 8/II JWIT
215.
35. Herz, J, 'Expropriation of Foreign Property', (1941) 35 AJIL 243.
36. Higgins, R, 'The Taking of Property by the State: Recent
Developments in International Law', (1982) 176/III RdC 259.
37. Hillgenberg, H, 'A Fresh Look at Soft Law', (1999) 10/111 EJIL 499.
262
38. Hindelang, S, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy
Investment Climate - The Question of Whether BITs Influence
Customary International Law Revisited', (2004) 5/V JWIT 769.
39. Juillard, P, 'MAI : A European View', (1998) 31 Corn. 1LJ All.
40. Kantor, M, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment: Echoes of FDR's Court-
Packing Plan in the International Law Approach Towards Regulatory
Expropriation', (2006) 5 LP1CT231.
41. Kishaiyian, B, 'The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formulation of Customary International Law', (1994) 14 NWJILB 327.
42. Klabbers, J, 'The Redundancy of Soft Law', (1996) 65 Nor. JIL 167.
43. Kriebaum, U, 'Partial Expropriation', (2007) 8/1 JWIT69.
44. Kriebaum, U, 'Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the
Investor and the State', (2007) 8/V JWIT1M.
45. Kunoy, B, 'Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID
Transnational Arbitration', (2005) 6/III JWIT467.
46. Kunoy, B, 'The Notion of Time in ICSID's Case Law on Indirect
Expropriation', (2006) JIA 337.
47. Loppacher, L, and Kerr, K, 'Investment Rules. The U.S. Agenda in
Bilateral Trade Agreements', (2006) 7/1 JWIT39.
48. Lowenfeld, A, 'Investment Agreements and International Law', (2003)
42 Colum. JTN 123.
49. Madalena, I, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Protection of the
Environment: the Border between National Environmental Regulation
and Expropriation', (2003) 12/111 Eur. ELR 70.
263
50. Maniruzzaman, A, 'Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle
of Non-Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An
Overview', (1998) 8 .JTLP 57.
51. Mann, F, 'British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments', (1981) BYIL 241.
52. Mann, F, 'Outlines of a History of Expropriation', (1959) 75 LQR 188.
53.1 Marboe, 'Compensation and Damages in International Law. The
Limits of the 'Fair Market Value", (2006) 7/V JWIT 723.
54. Metzger, S, 'Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of Private
Foreign Investment', (1960) 9 JPL 133.
55. Mountfield, H, 'Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of
the European Court of Human Rights', (2003) 11 NYU ELJ 136.
56. Muchlinski, P, 'The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Where Now?', (2000) 34 IL 1033.
57. Neumayer, E, and Spess, L, 'Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?', (2005) LSE
Research Online.
58. Newcombe, A, 'The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in
International Law', (2005) 20/1ICSID Rev. 1.
59. Newcombe, A, 'Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law',
(2007) 3/VIII JWIT 357.
60. Norton, P, 'A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation', (1991) 85 AJIL
474.
264
61. Orrego Vicuna, F, 'Carlos Calvo, Honorary NAFTA Citizen', (2002)
11 NYUELJ 19.
62. Orrego Vicuna, F, 'Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expectations:
Balancing the Rights of the State and the Individual under International
Law in a Global Society', (2003) 5/III FORUM 188.
63. Parra, A, 'Principles Governing Foreign Investment, as Reflected in
National Investment Codes', (1992) 7/IIICSID Rev. 428.
64. Paulsson, J, 'Arbitration Without Privity", (1995) 10/11 ICSID Rev.
232.
65. Pellonpaa, M, and Fitzmaurice, M, 'Taking of Property in the Practice
of the Iran - United States Claims Tribunal', (1988) 19 Neth. YIL 53.
66. Picciotto, S, 'Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The
Antinomies of the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment', (1998)
19 UPenn. JIEL 731.
67. Reisman, M, and Sloane, R, 'Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation
in the BIT Generation', (2003) 74 BYIL 115.
68. Root, E, 'The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad', (1910)
4 AJIL 517.
69. Ruiz Fabri, H, 'The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human
Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for "Regulatory
Expropriations" of the Property of Foreign Investors', (2003) 11 NYU
ELJ 148.
70. Sacerdoti, G, 'Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on
Investment Protection', (1997) 269 RdC 251.
265
71. Sacerdoti, G, 'The Admission and Treatment of Foreign Investment
under Recent Bilateral and Regional Treaties', (2000) 1/1 JWIT 105.
72. Salacuse, J, 'BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries',
(1990) 24/111 IL 655.
73. Salacuse, J, and Sullivan, N, 'Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain', (2005) 46/1
Harv. ILI 67.
74. Sampliner, G, 'Arbitration of Expropriation Cases under U.S.
Investment Treaties - A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn't
Bark?', (2003) 18/1ICSID Rev. 1.
75. Schill, S, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as
an Embodiment of the Rule of Law', (2006) 6 1LJWP 1.
76. Schreuer, C, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice', (2005)
6/III JWIT 357.
77. Schwarzenberger, G, 'The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on
Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary', (1960) 9 JPL 147.
78. Sedigh, H, 'What Level of Host State Interference Amounts to a Taking
under Contemporary International Law', (2001) 2/II JWIT 631.
79. Shenkman, E, 'Could Principles of Fifth Amendment Takings
Jurisprudence be Helpful in Analyzing Regulatory Expropriation
Claims under International Law?', (2003) 11 NYUELJ 174.
80. Sohn, L, and Baxter, R, 'Responsibility of States for Injuries to the
Economic Interests of Aliens', (1961) 55 AJIL 545.
266
81. Sornarajah, M, 'Power and Justice in International Law', (1997) 1
SJICL 28.
82. Stumberg, R, 'Sovereignty by Subtraction: The Multilateral Agreement
on Investment', (1998) 31 Corn. 7L/491.
83. Tobin, J, and Rose-Ackerman, S, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral
Investment Treaties', (2004) 293 Yale LERP.
84. Tobin, J, and Rose-Ackerman, S, 'When BITs have some bite', (2006)
Yale LSDWP.
85. Tschofen, F, 'Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign
Investment', (1992) 7/IIICSID Rev. 384.
86. Vallianatos, M, 'De-Fanging the MAI', (1998) 31 Corn. ILJ713.
87. Vandevelde, K, 'The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the
United States', (1988) 21 Corn. ILJ201.
88. Vandevelde, K, 'U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: the Second Wave',
(1993) 14 Mich. JIL 621.
89. Vasciannie, S, 'The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment Law and Practice', (1999) 70 BYIL 99.
90. von Mehren, R, and Kourides, P, 'International Arbitration Between
States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases',
(1981) 75 AJIL 476.
91.Waelde, T, 'Energy Charter Treaty-based Investment Arbitration.
Controversial Issues', (2004) 5/IIIJWIT313.
267
92. Waelde, T, and Kolo, A, 'Environmental Regulation, Investment
Protection and 'Regulatory Taking' in International Law', (2001) 50/IV
ICLQ 811.
93. P Weil, 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?', (1983)
77 AJIL 413.
94. Weiner, A, 'Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of
"Legitimate" Regulatory Purposes', (2003) 5/III FORUM 166.
95. Wetsberg, J, 'Applicable Law, Expropriatory Takings and
Compensations in Cases of Expropriation: ICSID and Iran - United
States Claims Tribunal Case Law Compared', (1993) 8/1 ICSID Rev. 1.
96. Westberg, J, 'Compensation in Cases of Expropriation and
Nationalization: Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal',
(1990) 5/11 ICSID Rev. 256.
97. Weston, B, "Constructive Takings' under International Law: A Modest
Foray into the Problem of'Creeping Expropriation", (1975) 16/1 Virg.
JIL 103.
Contributions to compilations & edited volumes
1. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third. The Foreign
Relations Law ofthe United States (1987).
2. Benedek, W, 'Drago-Porter Convention (1907)', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.),
EPIL (1992), Vol. I.
268
3. Blackaby, N, and Paradell, L, 'Investment Treaty Arbitration', in
Tackaberry, J, and Marriott, A, (eds.), Bernstein's Handbook of
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Practice (2003), Vol. I.
4. Blumemwitz, D, 'Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation',
in Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV.
5. Boyle, A, 'Soft Law in International Law-Making', in M Evans (ed.),
International Law (2006).
6. Brower, B, 'Natural Resources, Sovereignty over', in Bernhardt, R,
(ed.), EPIL (1997), Vol. III.
7. Buxbaum, R, and Riesenfeld, S, 'Investment Codes', in Bernhardt, R,
(ed.), EPIL (1995), Vol. II.
8. Chinkin, C, 'Normative Development in the International Legal
System', in Sheldon, D, (ed.), Commitment and Compliance. The Role
ofNon-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2003).
9. Condorelli, L, 'Premier Protocole Additionel. Article 1', in L Pettiti, E
Decaux and P Imbert (eds.), La Convention Europeenne des Droits de
1'Homme (1999).
10. D'Amato, A, 'Good Faith', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (1995), Vol. II.
11. Davidson, S, 'The Civil and Political Rights Protected in the Inter-
American Human Rights System', in Harris, D, and Livingstone, S,
(eds.), The Inter-American System ofHuman Rights (1998).
12. Dinstein, Y, 'Deprivation of Property of Foreigners under International
Law', in Ando, N, et al (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda
(2002).
269
13. Dolzer, R, 'Expropriation and Nationalization', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.),
EPIL{\995), Vol. II.
14. Dolzer, R, 'Requisitions', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV.
15. Dolzer, R, 'Sequestration', in R Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol. IV.
16. Evans, M, (ed.), International Law (2004).
17. Evans, M, and Murray, R, (eds.), The African Charter on Human
Rights and Peoples': the System in Practice, 1986-2000 (2002).
18. Garcia-Amador, F, 'Calvo Doctrine, Calvo Clause', in Bernhardt, R,
(ed.), EPIL (1992), Vol. I.
19. Garner, B, (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (1999).
20. Gretton, G, The Protection of Property Rights', in A Boyle et al (eds.),
Human Rights and Scots Law (2002).
21.Hartwig, M, 'Colonies and Colonial Regime', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.),
EPIL(1992), Vol. I.
22. Heyns, C, 'Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter', in Evans,
M, and Murray, R, (eds.), The African Charter on Human Rights and
Peoples': the System in Practice, 1986-2000 (2002).
23. Houde, M-F, and Yannaca-Small, C, 'Relationships between
International Investment Agreements', in OECD, Working Papers on
International Investment (2004), Nr. 1.
24. Jaenicke, G, 'Havana Charter', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL (1995),
Vol. II.
25. M Janis, 'Equity in International Law', in Bernhardt, R, (ed), EPIL
(1995), Vol.2.
270
26. Lachs, M, 'Pacta Sunt Servanda', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL (1997),
Vol. III.
27. Lillich, R, 'Lump Sum Agreements', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL
(1997), Vol. III.
28. Paulsson, J, and Douglas, Z, 'Indirect Expropriation in Investment
Treaty Arbitrations', in Horn, N, (ed), Arbitrating Foreign Investment
Disputes. Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004).
29. Petersmann, E, 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States', in
Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL (1992), Vol. I.
30. Riesenfeld, S, 'Foreign Investments', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL
(1995), Vol. II.
31. Riesenfeld, S, and Caron, D, 'United States-Iran Agreement of January
19, 1981 (Hostages and Financial Agreements)', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.),
EPIL (2000), Vol. IV.
32. Rubins, R, 'The Notion of 'Investment' in International Investment
Arbitration', in Horn, N, (ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment
Disputes. Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004).
33. Schreuer, C, 'The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other
Investment Protection Treaties', in C Ribeiro (ed.), Investment
Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty (2006).
34. Seidl-Hohenveldern, I, 'Aliens, Property', in Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL
(1992), Vol. I.
35. Silagi, M, 'Preferential Claims against Venezuela Arbitration', in
Bernhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL (1997), Vol. III.
271
36. Steinberger, H, 'Sovereignty', in Berhardt, R, (ed.), EPIL (2000), Vol.
IV.
37. Tomuschat, C, 'New International Economic Order', in Bernhardt, R,
(ed.),£/VL(1997), Vol. III.
38. UNCTAD, Developments in International Investment Agreements in
2005 (2006).
39. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (2004),
Vol. I.
40. UNCTAD, Investment Provisions in Economic Integration Agreements
(2006).
41. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(2005).
42. UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment
Agreements (2005).
43. UNCTAD, The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(2006).
44. Vagts, D, 'Minimum Standard', in R Berhardt (ed.), EPIL (1997), Vol.
III.
45. Waelde, T, 'Requiem for New International Economic Order', in
Hafner, G, et al (eds.), Liber Amicorum I. Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998).
46. Wallace, D, 'Case Study under NAFTA: Lessons for the Wise?', in N
Horn (ed), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes. Procedural and
Substantive Legal Aspects (2004).
272
47. Yannaca-Small, C, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment Law', in OECD, Working Papers on
International Investment (2004), Nr. 3.
48. Yannaca-Small, C, "Indirect Expropriation' and the 'Right to
Regulate' in International Investment Law', in OECD, Working Papers
on International Investment (2004), Nr. 4.
273
